


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REVELATION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING: A COMPARATIVE  
STUDY OF GABRIEL MORAN AND CARL ROGERS

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Thesis presented to the Department of  
Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts,  
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fulfillment of the requirements for  
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## CURRICULUM STUDIORUM

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## INTRODUCTION

"Human self-understanding," according to E. Schillebeeckx, "is the intrinsic condition for the possibility of revelation."<sup>1</sup> Such a statement marks a change from the position held by those theologians who in their efforts to guarantee the gratuity of the divine gift from the inroads of the errors that began with laicism of the sixteenth century and continued up to the modernist immanentism of the twentieth century, stress the total Otherness of God. The propositional notion of revelation predominant during many years is, however, beginning to give way under the impact of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. In the document on Divine Revelation and the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,<sup>2</sup> a broader notion of revelation is present which takes into account the historical nature of revelation and man's secular condition.

The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between revelation and man's self-understanding. This is done by comparing the theology of revelation in the

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1 E. Schillebeeckx, "Faith Functioning in Human Self-Understanding," in T. Patrick Burke (ed.), The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1966, p. 42.

2 All quotations are taken from The Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Walter M. Abbot, S.J., and trans. ed. Msgr. J. Gallager, New York, 1966.

writings of Gabriel Moran and the psychological view of man in the thought of Carl Rogers. By comparing a contemporary revelational concept of man with a contemporary psychological notion of man an attempt is made to show that the changing view of revelation reflects man's changing self-understanding. Of deeper concern in this consideration is the hostility often manifested between theology and psychology.

The seeming dichotomy between theology and psychology and ultimately between religion and science indicates a notion of God's revelation which embodies a system of thought extrinsic to man and irreconcilable with man's modern experience of reality. Certain writings of theologians and, in particular, the official apologetics of the nineteenth century, while wrestling with the issues raised by rationalism and fideism, give the impression that God is a divine being facing man from beyond history and divine revelation is the communication of truths to men caught in their own limited knowledge. Faith, in this context, is the acceptance of a revealed message, independently of its meaning for man and its effect on human life. When revelation is conceived in this extrinsicist manner there is no need on the part of the Church to dialogue with the world. Pope Pius IX in the *Syllabus of Errors*<sup>3</sup> in 1864 condemns among other modern

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<sup>3</sup> "Syllabus of Errors," in Dogmatic Canons and Decrees, New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1912, p. 187-209.

abominations that the Roman Pontiff can, and ought to reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization.

Scientists, on the other hand, who conceive themselves to be intelligent and critical people, find it impossible to be believing Christians. Freud<sup>4</sup> looks forward to the future when mature man can do without the consolation of the religious illusion in order to endure the troubles of life. Marx<sup>5</sup> calls religion the opium of the people because it turns men's minds away from this world to promises of future happiness. Carl Rogers,<sup>6</sup> in describing his reasons for leaving his ministerial studies at Union Theological Seminary, says he cannot work in a field where he is required to believe in some specified religious doctrine. To have to profess belief in a set of revealed doctrines in order to remain in his profession seems to him to be a denial of his freedom and his humanity.

Today there is a tendency among Catholic theologians to break away from an extrinsic notion of revelation added

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<sup>4</sup> Sigmund Freud, Future of an Illusion, tr. W.D. Robson-Scott, New York, Doubleday, 1964, p. 81-82.

<sup>5</sup> Karl Marx, "Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1864," in Howard Selsam and Harry Martel (eds.), A Reader in Marxist Philosophy, Selected Writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, New York, Modern Library, 1963, p. 227.

<sup>6</sup> Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961, p. 8.



to human life from outside and a movement towards a dynamic notion of revelation that takes place in human life and creates history. The writings of Gabriel Moran are seen as part of this development. His writings, therefore, are studied as part of a reversal, which begins with Newman and Blondel, and proceeds on through Karl Rahner and the North American writers, Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum. Such a trend, beginning with Newman, is variously described along its route as personal-historical, transcendental-metaphysical and pragmatic-evolutionary, or as a shift from a cyclic model of revelation to a process model.

But a parallel development, from a static to a process model, is also visible in the psychological images of man. The writings of Carl Rogers are seen as representative of this shift. His notion of man is therefore studied as part of a development which begins with Freud, Jung, Adler, and proceeds through Allport, Goldstein and Rollo May to Carl Rogers. This development can also be seen as a shift away from a cyclic model of man to a process model. In tracing this movement, however, as well as the movement evident in the conceptions of revelation, no attempt is made to offer a critical analysis of the various works mentioned, but simply, by highlighting the dynamic elements in the different theories, to present a picture which indicates the direction being taken.

By taking the writings of Gabriel Moran and Carl Rogers as representative of a shift which has occurred in each field, and by comparing them, it should be possible to point to a relationship between revelation and self-understanding. If the theology of revelation reflects man's self-understanding not only extrinsically but intrinsically, in a way that safeguards both the gratuity of grace and the autonomy of man, then it can be further concluded that growth in self-understanding is revelation and vice versa. Such a finding should have repercussions on catechetical and pastoral ministry and on the development of dogma. It should also throw some light on "the unsettled account of the modernistic and anti-modernistic tumult [which] still lies open in front of us."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Schillebeeckx, op. cit., p. 41.

## CHAPTER I

### GABRIEL MORAN: THEOLOGY AND THE DYNAMIC NOTION OF REVELATION

#### 1. Historical Survey.

All notions of revelation can be broadly divided into two main streams of thought, the static and dynamic, or in philosophical terms, the Appollonian and Dionysian. These terms, used by Sam Keen,<sup>1</sup> and borrowed from Nietzsche,<sup>2</sup> refer to two approaches,<sup>3</sup> the metaphysical and the phenomenological, where knowledge of reality in the metaphysical approach takes place according to the subject-object model, and where knowledge of reality in the phenomenological approach has its starting point in man in his total pre-reflective, existing being-in-and-for the world.

Sam Keen believes that when these two approaches are used in the interpretation of God and man two different understandings develop. In the Appollonian stream God is understood as a transcendent being, separate and apart from his

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1 S. Keen, "Manifesto for a Dionysian Theology," Cross Currents, Vol. 19, 1968-69, p. 37-54.

2 F.W. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Hellenism and Pessimism, tr. W.A. Haussmann, Edinburgh, T.N. Foulis, 1910. See, in particular, p. 21-28.

3 These two approaches are similar in meaning to the Lockean and Leibnitzian concepts used by Allport to contrast the two different psychological approaches. See below, p. 114-115.

creation. In a special time and place he revealed to man truths to be believed, rites to be performed and laws to be obeyed. To ensure the preservation of this revelation which is contained in Scripture and Tradition, a Church was founded whose main task is to preserve and hand on the divinely revealed truths. When man accepts these truths, obeys these laws and performs these rites, he attains salvation.

In contrast is the Dionysian stream wherein the boundaries separating God and man are broken. God is not a transcendent God isolated in eternity nor an object to be known solely by a past revelation. The incarnation did not happen only once but happens again and again in the process of becoming. Revelation is not limited to any special realm of the sacred nor to any special time. All of reality is sacramental. God is perceived as source of life and power, inviting man toward wholeness in every moment of experience. Man becomes authentic by continuing openness to the power of being which is in all beings. He is more a process than a substance. Like fire and water his life is one of constant flux and movement.

The Apollonian stream can be seen as representing the cleavage that took place in the seventeenth century between the natural reality of human thought and life and the sphere of grace, revelation and faith, where the latter

are set aside as "supernatural" reality beside the natural reality.<sup>4</sup> The Dionysian stream, on the other hand, with its understanding of God, no longer apart from the world but with and for man, can be seen as representing a solution to the cleavage.

When the cleavage took place that separated the natural world from the supernatural world, two reactions developed, one a feeling that the supernatural world is inessential to man, and the other reaction, an effort to bridge the gulf between nature and grace through the use of reason. Through the latter reaction and on a purely rational basis, proofs are presented of the possibility and the fact of Christian revelation. In this type of systematic apologetics revelation is no longer understood as an immediate communication from God to man but is viewed in a static and objective way, as a commodity already received.

The Catholic theology of faith becomes so infected with rationalism that many begin to regard this kind of apologetics as the real basis of faith. This approach

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<sup>4</sup> See: Bernard Lonergan, "Theology in its New Context," in L.K. Shook (ed.), Renewal of Religious Thought, Vol. 1, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1968, p. 34. "Then (1680) it was that Herbert Butterfield placed the origins of modern science, then that Paul Hazard placed the beginning of the enlightenment, then that Yves Congar placed the beginning of dogmatic theology. When modern science began, when the Enlightenment began, then theologians began to reassure one another about their certainties."

becomes so familiar that it is considered the traditional mode of approach. It pervades the First Vatican Council particularly with regard to its promulgations concerning both faith and infallibility. On the one side, the task of the Church is conceived as protecting and preserving the deposit of faith, and on the other side, the believer must believe all that is "contained in the written word of God or in tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching."<sup>5</sup>

After the First Vatican Council more and more theologians stress the formal side of faith and the objective side of revelation. Not until the middle of the nineteenth century does there emerge a strong reaction to this too static notion of revelation, and in its place, there develops a search for a more dynamic conception.

The development of this trend is traced in the following pages. The shift from the static Appollonian conception of the fact of revelation to the more dynamic Dionysian understanding of the nature of revelation is seen for the purposes of this essay as originating with the writings of John Henry Newman and culminating in the writings of Gabriel Moran. Since an understanding of the nature of revelation is

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<sup>5</sup> Trans. are from John Clarkson *et al.*, The Church Teaches, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1955, p. 30.

fundamentally the task of grasping more deeply the relation between nature and the supernatural, the theme pursued in the first part of the chapter is that of the relationship of nature and grace. In the course of the long history of Christianity this problem is phrased in various ways: the problems of the relation between faith and reason, God and man, and sacred and secular, are but a few. Although the emphasis varies, the problem is basically the same. In the first part of this chapter, this theme is discussed under the following headings: John Henry Newman and Development; Maurice Blondel and the Apologetics of Immanence; Karl Rahner and Theological Anthropology; and the North American Writers. The second part of the chapter deals with the notion of revelation in the writings of Gabriel Moran who attempts to clarify the natural-supernatural conflict by treating revelation as an interpersonal communion between God and man as man moves forward according to the rhythm inherent in human life.

#### A. John Henry Newman and Development

The singular characteristic of the works of John Henry Newman is his endless battle against the spirit of Liberalism.<sup>6</sup> Newman describes Liberalism as a "false

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<sup>6</sup> J. Gervais, "L'apologetique de Newman," Revue de l'University d'Ottawa, Vol. 14, 1944, p. 436. "Rationalisme en un autre terme, que Newman combattrait tout particulièrement

liberty of thought" which makes the mistake "of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it," and of claiming to prove on intrinsic grounds, "the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word."<sup>7</sup>

Among the eighteen tenets of Liberalism that Newman condemns are the following:

No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so [...] No one can believe what he does not understand [...] No theological doctrine is anything more than an opinion which happens to be held by bodies of men [...] It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not brought home to him by actual proof [...] It is immoral in a man to believe more than he can spontaneously receive as being congenial to his moral and mental nature [...] No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the way of scientific conclusions [...] There is a right of Private Judgment: that is, there is no existing authority on earth competent to interfere with the liberty of individuals in reasoning and judging for themselves about the bible and its contents, as they severally please.<sup>8</sup>

Newman's condemnation of these propositions raises the problem of the relation between faith and reason, which

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sous la forme du libéralisme religieux. Lui-même jugeant sa carrière en rétrospective y voyait le combat de sa vie, ainsi qu'il s'exprimait dans son discours d'acceptation du chapeau cardinalice."

<sup>7</sup> J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua: Being a History of His Religious Opinions. London, Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1879, p. 288. Hereafter referred to as Apologia.

<sup>8</sup> Apologia, p. 290-291.



is basically the problem of the relation of nature and grace. If faith and reason are opposed, then it follows that nature and grace are opposed. Newman believes they are not. His thoughts on this subject pervade his writings. Closely related to this topic is his notion of the development of doctrine. For this reason, these two topics are considered in what follows. The discussion limits itself mainly to the Fifteen Sermons,<sup>9</sup> the Grammar of Assent,<sup>10</sup> and the Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.<sup>11</sup> The Grammar and Sermons represent the exposition of Newman's theory on the relationship of faith and reason, and the Essay on Development, the definitive expression of his theory on the development of doctrine.

Basic to Newman's discussion of the relationship of faith and reason is his distinction between implicit and explicit reasoning.<sup>12</sup> Implicit reasoning is reasoning that is natural, spontaneous, non-technical, unreflective and unconscious. Explicit reasoning, on the other hand, is a

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9 J. Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1901, c1843, p. 202. Hereafter referred to as Sermons.

10 -----, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1947, c1870, p. 387. Hereafter referred to as Grammar.

11 -----, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, New York, Image Books, 1960, c1878, p. 434. Hereafter referred to as Essay.

12 Sermons, xi, 1.

type of reasoning that is logical, technical and reflective. While implicit reasoning is personal and rooted in unconscious experience, explicit reasoning is impersonal and technical. Although the operations of implicit and explicit reasoning are different, yet they are related. Explicit reasoning is the logical interpretation of the spontaneous experience of implicit reasoning.

Of the two types of reasoning, implicit reasoning is considered more noble and more comprehensive since it involves the whole person, and leads to genuine convictions. Although explicit reasoning is not the most important aspect of man's reasoning powers, yet it is of great service to thought because it demonstrates the logical coherence, pattern and order present in spontaneous experience. It is of further service because it makes possible the exchange of ideas which are so necessary in enriching, correcting and criticizing the ideas of others.

With these distinctions in mind, Newman makes the following statements: "Instead of there being really any such united process of reasoning first, and then believing, the act of faith is sole and elementary, and complete in itself, and depends on no process of mind previous to it." <sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Sermons, xi, 1.

"Faith is the reasoning of a religious mind."<sup>14</sup> It is "an act of reason."<sup>15</sup>

What Newman means in these and other statements is that although faith does not depend on a process of explicit reasoning yet it is always a type of implicit reasoning, and because it is a type of implicit reasoning, it is natural for man to believe. Man accepts many things through the process of implicit reasoning of which he is not aware nor able to demonstrate. He is not able to give adequate reasons for example, why he belongs to one political party rather than to another; why he likes certain types of literature and music and not others, or why he holds certain opinions.<sup>16</sup> The reasons for holding these views and opinions are not less strong because man is not able to justify himself or prove that he is correct. Likewise with faith. There is nothing which Scripture says about faith, however startling it may be at first sight, which is inconsistent with the state in which man finds himself by nature with reference to the acquisition of knowledge generally--a state in which man must assume something to prove anything, and can gain nothing without a venture.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Sermons, xi, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Sermons, xi, 3.

<sup>16</sup> Sermons, xi, 13.

<sup>17</sup> Sermons, xi, 22.

This is not meant in any way to downgrade man's ability to reason explicitly. Although faith can exist in its absence, yet it is necessary for a conscious understanding of faith. To say that implicit reasoning is all that is essential to faith is "to discard the science of theology from the service of religion."<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, to maintain that explicit reasoning is alone essential to faith is "to maintain that every child, every peasant must be a theologian."<sup>19</sup> Examples of faith in each of these states, when attended by a conscious exercise of reason, and when not is found in Scripture.<sup>20</sup> In proportion as the mind reflects upon itself, it is able "to give an account"<sup>21</sup> of what it believes and hopes, as far as it does not thus reflect, it is not able.<sup>22</sup> Such knowledge cannot be wrong, yet cannot be necessary, as long as reflection is at once a natural faculty of our souls, yet not an initial faculty.<sup>23</sup>

The meaning of the relationship of faith to reason can be further enlightened by a study of Newman's notion of assent. If Christians do not base their assurance of faith

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18 Sermons, xiii, 4.

19 Sermons, xiii, 4.

20 Sermons, xiii, 4.

21 Sermons, xiii, 4.

22 Sermons, xiii, 4.

23 Sermons, xiii, 4.

on a well-reasoned body of logical propositions, how can the assent of faith be a rational and therefore a reasonable act? Newman discusses this problem in the Grammar of Assent.

In the opening chapter of this book, Newman describes three natural ways of entertaining propositions, namely doubt, inference and assent.<sup>24</sup> Doubt is interrogative in form and asks a question; inference is conclusionary in form and conditional since it rests on premises; and assent is assertive in form and unconditional since it implies the absence of conditional premises. Newman is mainly concerned with the problem of assent.

Assent may be either notional or real. Notional propositions are composed of common nouns and expressed in abstract terms, while real propositions employ singular, concrete, individual terms. The distinction is best expressed in Newman's own terms:

Now there are propositions, in which one or both of the terms are common nouns, as standing for what is abstract, general, and non-existing, such as "Man is an animal, some men are learned [...]" These I shall call notional propositions, and the apprehension with which we infer or assent to them, notional. And there are other propositions, which are composed of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand for things external to us, unit and individual, as "Philip was the founder of Alexander," "the earth goes round the sun," and these I shall call real propositions, and their apprehension real.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Grammar, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Grammar, p. 29.

The apprehension of all propositions falls into one of these two fundamental categories.<sup>26</sup> While real apprehensions are deep but narrow, notional apprehensions are broad and shallow. Real apprehensions are more vivid, more forceful but not more valid. They are more vivid and forceful because the experience of concrete facts excites and stimulates the affections and passions in a way that an intellectual idea cannot. Notional apprehensions follow naturally from the dynamic nature of man's intellect which continually impels him to pass from the particular to the general, from the concrete to the abstract, and from images to notions. From notional apprehensions follow such rational classifications as categorization and the framing of hypotheses.

Assent given to real apprehensions is real and to notional apprehensions is notional. When assent is given to Christian dogma it is either real or notional depending on the way dogma is apprehended. When the assent given to dogma is real it results in an act of religion, and when it is notional it results in a theological act.

Religion has to do with the real and the real is particular; theology has to do with the notional and the notional is the general and systematic. Hence dogma has to do with the dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it, and lives and thrives in the composition of them. In them it finds the

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<sup>26</sup> Grammar, p. 16-28.

motives for devotions and faithful obedience, while theology on the other hand forms and protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one by one, but as a system of truth.<sup>27</sup>

Two other distinctions in assent besides real and notional must be noted. When assent given is exercised unconsciously, it is simply assent, and when it is arrived at deliberately, it is complex. In complex assent efforts are made to prove what is already believed to be true so that the new assent differs from the old insofar as it is now explicit and deliberate and is an "assent to an assent, or what is commonly called a conviction."<sup>28</sup> Such a conviction Newman calls a certitude and the proposition or truth a certainty.<sup>29</sup>

The certainty is never attained through logical inference but through probability:

It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstance of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible.<sup>30</sup>

Drawing conclusions from such probabilities and giving assent to the pervading conclusions contained within

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<sup>27</sup> Grammar, p. 106.

<sup>28</sup> Grammar, p. 147.

<sup>29</sup> Grammar, p. 148.

<sup>30</sup> Grammar, p. 219.

them, but never consciously formulated, requires the operation of a special sense that Newman calls the "illative sense."<sup>31</sup>

The range of the illative sense is vast; it has its function "in the beginning, middle, and end of all verbal discussion and inquiry, and in every step of the process."<sup>32</sup> It determines what science cannot determine, "the limit of converging probabilities and the reasons sufficient for a proof."<sup>33</sup>

It is the ratiocinative mind itself, a rule to itself, and it appeals to no judgment beyond its own, and attends upon the whole course of thought from antecedents to consequents, with a minute diligence and unwearied presence, which is impossible to a cumbrous apparatus of verbal reasoning.<sup>34</sup>

The illative sense is used by both the educated and uneducated believer. Through the use of the illative sense, the illiterate man attains a real certitude of the fundamental truths of the faith. By means of the illative sense, the literate man not only arrives at certitude but is able to demonstrate his certitude.

With these distinctions, then, that of implicit and explicit reasoning, of real and notional assent and the

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<sup>31</sup> Grammar, p. 262.

<sup>32</sup> Grammar, p. 274.

<sup>33</sup> Grammar, p. 273.

<sup>34</sup> Grammar, p. 274-275.



operation of the illative sense, Newman is able to counter the spirit of Liberalism. Faith is an act of religion which is at the same time both deeply intellectual and profoundly religious and supernatural. It is an act of the whole knowing person in which man grasps much more in an experiential unreflective way than he can ever put into words. Dogmas, the expressions of faith, to which man gives real assent are but the explicit formulations of man's implicit belief. Man may not be able to give adequate reasons for holding certain dogmas but his reasons for holding these dogmas are not less strong because he is not able to justify himself or prove that he is correct.

Implied in this understanding of the relation between faith and reason or the natural and the supernatural is Newman's understanding of revelation and dogmatic development. Revelation is not simply a number of truths which can be demonstrated through the process of logical reasoning but is one complex saving reality, of which the notional is merely one aspect. The apostles experience Christ in a total way, in which both implicit and explicit elements are present in their knowledge. Their implicit understanding of Christ comprises a comprehensive intuitive grasp, a type of experiential understanding of the essence of Christianity, which is handed down by and in the Church. This intuitive understanding is present in the Church as an idea or

impression which creates an atmosphere which is felt and experienced by new members. The idea or impression because it is a living idea "not only modifies, but is modified, or at least influenced, by the state of things in which it is carried out, and is dependent in various ways on the circumstances which surround it."<sup>35</sup> It is this idea or impression which is the link between unsystematized revelation and systematic theology with its definitions of dogma. Schillebeeckx summarizes Newman's idea by saying:

The whole of the development of dogma begins with a comprehensive intuition which is in many respects implicit and continues, through implicit and explicit thought, to the point where the dogma is explicitly formulated. The initial truths of faith that have not yet been consciously reflected on, are, according to the psychological and sociological laws of growth of the human mind, driven forward under the impulse of the Holy Spirit and, in the course of time, projected more and more sharply onto the ~~implicit~~<sup>ex</sup> consciousness of the Church.<sup>16</sup>

To determine whether the development of dogma is authentic or not, neither the illative sense, nor logical thought can be the ultimate criterion. There is need of an infallible guide, an external authority, in order to separate a true development from a false development which can arise from "the mass of mere speculation, extravagance,

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35 Sermons, xv, 13.

36 E. Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, Vol. 1, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1967, p. 61.

corruption, and error."<sup>37</sup> Such an infallible authority has "the power of deciding whether this, that, and a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true."<sup>38</sup>

Since Newman's approach to faith is not only dogmatic but historical, he looks at the Church's history to find out precisely what the gift of infallible teaching means. In the light of this history he discovers seven characteristics of authentic dogmatic development: preservation of type, continuity of principles, power of assimilation, logical sequence, anticipation of its final configuration, conservative action on its past, and lasting vigor.<sup>39</sup>

This is all too short a summary of the complex thinking of Newman but it is sufficient to point to the dynamic notion of revelation that Newman holds. It is clear that the 'idea' or 'impression' with which Newman is concerned is God's saving revelation, his self-disclosure in history. By stressing that this 'idea' or 'impression' is a living idea which modifies and is modified by time, Newman bridges the gulf created between the natural and the supernatural. Revelation is an historical reality which is experienced by man. Man's growing experience in faith, Newman calls

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37 Essay, p. 97.

38 Essay, p. 97.

39 Essay, pp. 173-417.

implicit reasoning. This type of reasoning, unconscious and unreflective, tends constantly towards conceptualization. The concepts are the expressions of man's growing awareness of God. Their real value is to be found in man's real assent, that is, in experiential knowledge, and not in the concepts on their own, divorced from human experience.

As the works of Blondel and Rahner are investigated in the following sections, the dynamic approach is further enlarged and specified.

#### B. Maurice Blondel and the Apologetics of Immanence

Upheaval and crises wrack the Church during the lifetime of Maurice Blondel. Pope Pius IX issues his Syllabus of Errors (1864) and the First Vatican Council convenes in 1870. Through the documents on faith and infallibility of the First Vatican Council, a sharp distinction is made between the two orders, natural and supernatural.<sup>40</sup> Against the idea that revelation is something progressively discovered by human reason, the Council stresses the "divine deposit delivered to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared."<sup>41</sup> Although the Council does

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Denzinger-Schonmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Freiburg im Br., 321963, n. 3004. Hereafter abbreviated DS.

<sup>41</sup> DS 3020.

not espouse a totally propositional view of revelation, the theology after Vatican I stresses this aspect of revelation. As a result, the Church becomes more and more estranged from the culture of its time. Blondel<sup>42</sup> writes:

For the first time since Christianity formed souls and societies, we find ourselves faced by a public and social apostasy which is no longer merely the schism of a nation or a king, nor the heresy of a doctor or a sect, nor a political and moral revolt, but which is a whole civilization cutting itself off completely from Christianity.<sup>43</sup>

Henry Bremond, a lifelong friend of Blondel, associates the origin of the separation of the Church from the lives of the people not with the Syllabus nor with Vatican I but with the condemnation of Quietism in 1699. The fear aroused by this condemnation leads to a divorce between reason and feeling and the failure of the imagination. The spiritual, mystical tradition becomes ever more and more extinct as a result and in its place arises a spirituality

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<sup>42</sup> The main works of Blondel which are used for this chapter are his essay of 1896, usually referred to in English as the Essay on Apologetics, and his article of 1904 called Histoire et dogme. These two works are translated and presented by A. Dru and I. Trethowan in Maurice Blondel: The Letter on Apologetics, and History and Dogma, London, Harvill Press, 1964. Hereafter referred to as Letter on Apologetics or History and Dogma.

<sup>43</sup> Maurice Blondel, La semaine de Bordeaux et le Monophorism, Paris, Bloud, 1910, p. 25, quoted in Letter on Apologetics, p. 21.

externalized in devotions and outward expressions of religion.<sup>44</sup>

By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, two currents of thought are at work attempting to analyze the relationship between the natural and the supernatural. These two streams of thought Blondel calls "extrinsicism" and "historicism."<sup>45</sup>

Extrinsicism refers to an approach to theology which conceives of God as a divine being facing man from beyond history and divine revelation as a totality of doctrine given once and for all at a given point in history to a Church divinely established as the sole guardian and teacher of this revelation. When revelation is conceived in this manner there is no relationship between revelation and man other than that which is extrinsic.

[...] the relation of the sign to the thing signified is extrinsic, the relation of the facts to the theology superimposed upon them is extrinsic, and extrinsic too is the link between our thought and

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<sup>44</sup> See, Introduction to The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma, p. 24, where Dru and Trethowan say: "The quietist controversy in the course of which Bossuet wrote that he had 'God, the King and Madame de Maintenon on his side,' marks the great caesura and is at the origin of the divorce between Catholicism and living thought, genuine art and honest scholarship which Blondel and his generation (who rediscovered the spiritual tradition) were the first to recognize, understand and reverse."

<sup>45</sup> History and Dogma, p. 221-236.

our life and the truth proposed to us from outside. such, in its naked poverty, is extrinsicism--it lacks the strength to make life circulate between faith and dogma or between dogma and faith, and allows them turn by turn to fall tyrannically one upon the other.<sup>46</sup>

Extrinsicism also denies any relationship between Christian revelation and the different periods of history, other than a point of time at which revelation is given and a period of time to establish an infallible Church. The revelation which the Church has, possessing as it does an ageless factor uninfluenced by local color, allows of no rule of interpretation other than an outside control.<sup>47</sup> Any development that occurs is limited solely to a development in explicitation and systematization of the original deposit.

Blondel has hard words for theologians who belong to this trend. The impression they give is

[...]one of uninterrupted defeat, [...] of mystical ideologists claiming to impose their systems upon the concrete truth of history, and of men who end by taking refuge in an ostrich-like policy, shutting their eyes and not even allowing themselves to face too plainly the embarrassing literalness which they continue to teach the simple.<sup>48</sup>

The opposite extreme of extrinsicism is "historicism."<sup>49</sup> Historicism sees a relationship between Christian revelation

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 228.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 230.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 231.

and faith but it is a relationship which is one of dependence of revelation on the investigations of historical science. If the truth that Christianity claims to contain cannot be proven in the real order of history it is to be rejected. As Loisy puts it:

If the history of religion is not established by means of historical research, if the biblical tradition, both Jewish and Christian, has not consistency of itself (i.e., as it appears in the light of historical research), then it is not necessary to count on the magisterium of the Church to give this to it.<sup>50</sup>

Blondel rejects historicism as an evil equally as dangerous as extrinsicism. On the one hand, historicism attempts to make a purely objective study of the recorded facts of history. This is impossible because the historian, whether he is aware of it or not, approaches his study with certain assumptions which influence the selection he makes of material, the aspects he focuses upon and the portrait he paints. And on the other hand, history can never be solely descriptive; it is always interpretative. The interpretation the historian gives to history is always made in the light of the assumptions he holds and the degree of understanding he has of the people's involvement in life. The Christian historian, for example, interprets Biblical

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<sup>50</sup> Yves M.J. Congar, La tradition et les traditions, Paris, 1960, p. 265, quoted by William Scott, s.j., "The Notion of Tradition in Maurice Blondel," Theological Studies, Vol. 27, 1966, p. 385.



history in the light of his faith, while the historian, lacking this faith interprets the same history from a different stance. Although what they say on the descriptive level may be similar, the interpretation given by each is different. Hence, historicism must be rejected as an answer.

If the answer to the relationship between the natural and the supernatural is not to be found either in extrinsicism or in historicism, where is it to be found? Blondel says: in Tradition.

Tradition, for Blondel, "can never be reduced to fighting the alterations and the forgetfulness that time brings."<sup>51</sup> It is not "a transmission, principally oral, of historical facts, of truths received, of teachings communicated, of consecrated practices and of ancient customs."<sup>52</sup> Neither is it "a separate element which can be reduced entirely to its intellectual justifications."<sup>53</sup> It is rather, "the living synthesis of all the speculative and ascetic, historical and theological forces"<sup>54</sup> and it embraces "the data of history, the efforts of reason and the

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51 Ibid., p. 386.

52 Ibid.

53 Au Coeur de la crise Modernist. Le Dossier inédit d'une controverse: Lettres de Maurice Blondel et autres. présentées par René Marlé (ed.), Paris, Aubier, 1960, quoted by Dru and Trethowan, p. 215.

54 Ibid.

experience of faithful action."<sup>55</sup> Tradition is not only faithful to the past but it illuminates the future. "As paradoxical as such an affirmation may seem, one can maintain that tradition anticipates the future and disposes herself to illumine it by the same effort that she makes to live faithful to the past."<sup>56</sup>

Blondel's theory of tradition corresponds to his dynamic notion of revelation, which is revealed in his apologetics of immanence and in his basic philosophy of life.

Blondel in his two essays Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma seeks a via media between extrinsicism and historicism.

In the Letter on Apologetics, Blondel describes his "method of immanence."<sup>57</sup> He first says what the method is not. It is not a system whereby man "can find, of himself and in himself, all the truths necessary for his life,"<sup>58</sup> so that his whole salvation comes from himself alone. Neither is it a method which excludes any transcendent reality and makes human subjectivism into an absolute.<sup>59</sup>

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55 Ibid.

56 Maurice Blondel, Les premier écrits, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950, p. 205, quoted by Scott, op. cit., p. 387.

57 Letter on Apologetics, p. 156ff.

58 Ibid., p. 156.

59 Ibid.

Blondel writes:

In order to avoid the narrow doctrine which sees in the supernatural only a servile heteronomy and which imposes God's gift after the fashion of a yoke--as though it were a matter of painfully grafting onto our body a new eye or a third arm-- it is not necessary to fall into the contrary error, and to seek, in the name of a "principle of immanence" to reduce the supernatural to the role of a supreme expansion of our being--as though the apparent heteronomy ought to be resolved by a total human autonomy. [...] The role of the method of immanence is precisely to guard us against both extremes: it is to place us face to face with ourselves and with God; it is to make us measure the infinite disproportion between our nature and our destiny; it is to manifest, in its full rigor, the necessary and salutary heteronomy [...]<sup>60</sup>

The method of immanence claims that any truth that exists for man is to be found in his experience of reality. Awareness of the transcendent is part of man's experience since any ideas he has of transcendent truths or beings, whether real or imaginary, are always immanent insofar as they are man's own. If there is a transcendent in the finite, then it is through man's experience of reality and his reflection upon it that he becomes aware of it.

Thus the immanent affirmation of the transcendent, even of the supernatural, does not prejudge in any way the transcendent reality of the immanent affirmations --a radical distinction [...] which is capable of securing the mutual independence of the two orders and it is, moreover, in conformity with the very letter

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<sup>60</sup> B. de Saily, "La Notion et le role du miracle," Annales de philosophie chrétienne, July 1907, quoted by Avery Dulles, Revelation Theology: A History, New York, Herder and Herder, 1969, p. 88.

of the dogma which maintains the pure liberality of the author of grace together with the obligation laid upon us men.<sup>61</sup>

That the method of immanence not be abused, Blondel insists that it not go beyond itself. It can never reach the supernatural nor deny its truth. All it can do is demonstrate that the supernatural is indispensable and at the same time inaccessible for man.<sup>62</sup> Blondel writes:

In determining the genesis of the idea of revelation, or in showing the necessity of dogmas or of revealed precepts, we never do anything more than indicate blank spaces which cannot be filled in or established in their reality by any resource of ours.<sup>63</sup>

By applying the method of immanence, Blondel in his basic philosophical treatise, L'Action,<sup>64</sup> demonstrates the need for the transcendent, through what he calls the inner law or logic of action.

Gregory Baum summarizes what Blondel means by the logic of action:

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61 Letter on Apologetics, p. 157-158.

62 Ibid., p. 161.

63 Ibid., p. 160.

64 Maurice Blondel, L'Action. Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique, Paris, Alcan, 1893. Three versions appeared: the thesis, xxv-433 p.; the printed version, xxv-495 p. put on sale without the permission of Blondel, and this gave him the opportunity of recalling it and of re-casting the last section, beginning at p. 401, and of adding forty-two pages. This last version has been republished as the first volume of Premier écrits by the Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.), 1950.

There is in man a spring of action, an unending concern or an inexhaustible willing (la volonté voulante) which gives rise to an unending chain of concrete choices, of freely chosen acts (les volontés voulues), by which he tries to realize himself more fully. By an unshakable determinism of action, man is forever making free, individual choices (volontés voulues) for the sake of fulfilling the necessary will or thrust at the core of his being (volonté voulante) to become more truly himself.<sup>65</sup>

Every man by the logic of action, which causes him to move ever forward in the options he chooses, comes one day to the point where he is summoned to the inevitable option, either to choose or to refuse the supernatural. If man should refuse to open up to the supernatural, he chooses to be less than human. But, if on the other hand, he chooses the supernatural, he does so in one of two ways, either he opens himself up to God as he is revealed, or if he has not heard of God, he refuses to invest with divine qualities anything that is finite.

To be faced with this option, and all men are, at one time or another in their lives, is to define man as ordered to the supernatural. Man has need of the supernatural in a way that does not compromise the gratuitous character of the gift.

The supernatural is not reduced to a part of nature nor does it make the supernatural extrinsic and alien

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<sup>65</sup> G. Baum, Man Becoming: God in Secular Experience, New York, Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 16-17.

to man. What it does mean is that God's prevenient grace is present to all of mankind. Blondel writes:

So without there being any 'real' continuity between the sphere of reason and that of faith, without in any way bringing within the determinism of human action the order of supernature, which is always beyond the capacity, the merits and the demands of our nature [...] it is legitimate to show that the development of the will constrains us to the avowal of our insufficiency, leads us to recognize the need of a further gift, gives us the aptitude not to produce or to define but to recognize and to receive it, offers us, in a word, by a sort of prevenient grace, that baptism of desire which, presupposing God's secret touch, is always accessible and necessary apart from any explicit revelation, and which, even when revelation is known, is, as it were the human sacrament immanent in the divine operation.<sup>66</sup>

In conclusion, neither extrinsicism nor historicism can link the two orders, the natural and the supernatural. Only necessity can. The supernatural is always pure gift and never arises from man's nature. But because man has need of the supernatural to attain fulfillment, the supernatural is never an alien element in man's life. Before the act of faith, God's secret summons does not leave man's reason and will in a state of legitimate indifference or innocent and definitive neutrality.<sup>67</sup> And after the act of faith, "human co-operation remains co-extensive with the primary and gratuitous activity of God; thus there is still

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<sup>66</sup> Letter on Apologetics, p. 162-163.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 141.

a natural life to be found even in the supernatural life."<sup>68</sup>  
 The supernatural always remains a gift from God. Man's natural desire for God always remains a natural desire, a point of entry for the supernatural, yet essentially different from it.

### C. Karl Rahner and Theological Anthropology

Karl Rahner's theological anthropology is evident in his discussion on the relationship of nature and grace. Just as grace cannot be understood in isolation from man so neither can man be understood in the absence of grace.

As Blondel does before him, Rahner recognizes two polar theological positions on the relationship of nature and grace, that of extrinsicism and intrinsicism. In both his essays on nature and grace,<sup>69</sup> he presents first these two extreme positions and having done this, he presents the fruits of his own theological reflections. By treating the problem in this fashion, Rahner's procedure articulates the

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68 Ibid.

69 Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace," Theological Investigations, Vol. I, Baltimore, Helicon Press, 1961, p. 297-317; and "Nature and Grace," Theological Investigations, Vol. IV, Baltimore, Helicon Press, 1966, p. 165-188. Hereafter referred to as TI, I and TI, IV, respectively.

problem's full complexity and depth, and makes his own synthesis clearer by contrast. This method is pursued in the following pages.

Rahner, in his treatment of the relationship of grace and nature keeps the two opposed theoretical positions in mind, that of extrinsicism, "the average textbook conception,"<sup>70</sup> and that of intrinsicism. Extrinsicism has a two-story idea of the relation of nature and grace where each element is seen as a self-sufficient entity. It views grace as "a mere superstructure, very fine in itself certainly, which is imposed upon nature by God's decree, and in such a way that the relationship between the two is no more intense than that of a freedom from contradiction."<sup>71</sup> Intrinsicism, on the other hand, goes to the opposite extreme. Its proponents urge that if God calls man to a beatific vision, his call must find some response in man even before he receives his first salutary grace. They therefore equate man's supernatural orientation with the natural dynamism inherent in man's nature in such a way that the gratuity of God's grace is lost sight of.<sup>72</sup>

By examining Rahner's criticism of both views, an understanding of his own view can be attained, particularly

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70 Cf. TI, I, 298.

71 Cf. TI, I, 298.

72 Cf. TI, I, 303.



since his own positive statements arise out of his discussion of opposing theories.

Rahner's difficulty with intrinsicism is twofold: whether grace can be gratuitous, because God seems to owe fulfillment to the creature which was created desiring it, and whether the notion of nature is left with any meaning. Some notion of pure nature must be necessary, Rahner says, in order to provide "the necessary background against which one recognizes that the beatific vision is a gratuitous grace, not merely not due to man as a sinner, but not due to man even as a creature."<sup>73</sup>

Rahner's criticism of the extrinsic view is more detailed. It is also more severe since he considers it more dangerous and more standard among theologians. His first criticism is against the concept of grace as something of which man is unaware, because it is beyond consciousness. Such a concept is particularly inadequate from a religious point of view. If man in his experience of himself experiences himself only as 'pure nature,' he is in danger of behaving accordingly. When God's call does come to him, it is not surprising to find him treating this call as a mere 'disturbance,' which forces something upon him for which he is not made.<sup>74</sup>

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73 Cf. TI, IV, 185.

74 Cf. TI, I, 300.

The second difficulty Rahner experiences with extrinsicism comes from the tacit presuppositions and ontological conceptions it holds.<sup>75</sup> How can man really know what is pure nature and what is not? Is there not a difference between experiencing grace and experiencing grace as grace? Rahner replies that those who define pure nature presuppose that all that man experiences belongs to nature, his aspirations, his longings, and his feelings of guilt. But the history of nature and the history of grace are so closely intermingled, that it is almost impossible to differentiate that activity which rises strictly from pure nature and that which does not. How can one know, for example, whether the resurrection of the body is an indication of man's natural destiny or not?<sup>76</sup> Or, how can one tell whether Christ's walking on water is an expression of his perfected human nature or of his elevated human nature? The only way man can know is with the help of revelation "which tells us what in us is grace and so provides us with the means of abstracting this grace from the body of our existential experience of man and thus of acquiring pure nature (in its totality) as a remainder."<sup>77</sup>

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75 Cf. TI, I, 300.

76 Cf. TI, IV, 183ff.

77 Cf. TI, I, 303.

The difficulty with the ontological conceptions of extrinsicism is the difficulty of accepting a supernatural end for which man has no created ontological counterpart within himself. To emphasize, as do the extrinsicists, the potentia obedientialis as the absence of contradiction between nature and grace, does not lessen the problem. But to equate the ordination of man to God with the natural dynamism of man towards grace, as do the intrinsicists, does not protect the gratuity of God's grace, either.

For these reasons, Rahner finds it necessary to reopen discussion on the relation of nature and grace. Inspiration to aid in these discussions comes from many sources. One is philosophical. Philosophy recognizes in man a real longing for absolute being, a longing which "is present in every spiritual act as its raison d'etre"<sup>78</sup> and the a priori condition of "all knowledge where a finite object is grasped."<sup>79</sup> This orientation towards God is not merely something added unto man's nature but is man's orientation to God "even though an implicit and a priori transcendental, makes him what he experiences himself to be, something that he can deny and repress only at the cost of sin, because even then it is affirmed in every act of

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78 Cf. TI, IV, 169.

79 Cf. TI, IV, 169.

his spiritual existence, though only as an implicitly transcendental a priori ."<sup>80</sup>

A second source is the history of theology. A study of history reveals that certain valuable insights can be lost in the course of time in the effort to stress other important elements of doctrine. An example of such an insight is St. Thomas' desiderium naturale in visionem beatificam and his understanding of the compenetration of sacrament and personal act.<sup>81</sup>

A third impulse comes from dialogue with reformed theology.<sup>82</sup> The questions the Reformers ask themselves are the questions Catholic theologians must ask. The question of what man is, whether he is a sinner, and how far does he remain a sinner when he is justified, is the same as asking how Christocentric is the whole actual world and order of salvation.<sup>83</sup> It is the question of the supernatural character of grace. Is man, in fact, a closed, self-contained and finished system, in which he can work out his "natural existence, while grace is a sort of pure superstructure imposed on him, but leaving the lower element in him unaltered?"<sup>84</sup>

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80 Cf. TI, IV, 170.

81 Cf. TI, IV, 172.

82 Cf. TI, IV, 173.

83 Cf. TI, IV, 173.

84 Cf. TI, IV, 173.

The fourth stimulus comes from the mentality of the present day. Thought today is considered existential. "One strives to 'experience' the reality of grace precisely there where one lives one's own existence; and so one tries to see supernatural--and not just medicinal--grace as the activation and the force of concrete existence."<sup>85</sup>

Taking these developments into consideration, Rahner develops his own answers to the relationship of grace and nature. Basic to his discussion are the principles of his theological anthropology which he elaborates and explains in his two books, Spirit in the World,<sup>86</sup> and Hearers of the Word.<sup>87</sup> Rahner describes man, in Spirit in the World, as that essence of absolute transcendence towards God insofar as man in his understanding and interpretation of the world respectfully pre-apprehends towards God. In 1966, in a lecture given in Chicago, he says:

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85 Cf. TI, IV, 173.

86 Karl Rahner published Geist in Welt in Innsbruck, in 1939. In 1957, Johann Baptist Metz, acting for Rahner, brought out a second, slightly altered edition. In 1963, the Spanish translation appeared, and in 1968, the French and English appeared: Karl Rahner, S.J., Spirit in the World, London/New York, Sheed and Ward/Herder and Herder, 1968, trans. by William Dych, S.J. All three translations have been of the second edition.

87 Karl Rahner published Hörer des Wortes in Munich, in 1941. In 1963, Johann Baptist Metz brought out a second edition in which he made several changes. In 1969, the English translation appeared: Karl Rahner, S.J., Hearers of the Word, London/New York, Sheed and Ward/Herder and Herder, 1969; trans. by M. Richards.

As soon as man is understood as that being which has absolute transcendence toward God (and it is surely obvious that he is such) then anthropocentricity and theocentricity in theology are not contradictions but strictly one and the same thing seen from two different aspects, and each aspect is unintelligible without the other. That theology should be anthropocentric does not contradict its being most rigorously theocentric: It is, however, opposed to the view that man is merely one particular topic in theology among others, for example, the angels or the material world. It is contrary to the view that it is possible to speak theologically about God without at the same time saying something about man, and vice versa. Speech about God and speech about man are connected, not only from the point of view of content, but from the point of view of knowledge itself.<sup>88</sup>

Some understanding of Rahner's transcendental notion of man can be gleaned by considering his concepts of vorgriff, the supernatural existential, and potentia obedientialis. The reasons for reflecting on these terms and not on others is the close relationship they have to the solutions Rahner offers to his objections against scholasticism. Vorgriff is of particular relevance to Rahner's objection against the neo-scholastic concept of grace as something of which man is unaware, because beyond consciousness, and the supernatural existential and potentia obedientialis reflect his answer to those who define man as a pure nature possessing a kind of natural integrity which demands nothing beyond itself.

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<sup>88</sup> Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology," in T. Patrick Burke (ed.), The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1966, p. 1-2.

The word vorgriff is basic to Rahner's transcendental anthropology. God is present to man as horizon and is apprehended by man in an unthematic, non-objective, global way. Rahner describes this apprehension as a vorgriff, which is translated into English as meaning "preapprehension," "transcendental anticipation," "anticipating grasp" of being.<sup>89</sup>

Rahner's transcendental understanding of God differs from traditional scholastic and philosophical positions which hold that man is capable of a metaphysics of transcendence because of a special innate idea or because of a specific and immediate intuition of a metaphysical object.<sup>90</sup>

Rahner explains his position by beginning with the questioning of man. Since the human intellect cannot inquire about that which is absolutely unknown and completely unknowable, any question that man asks presupposes a knowledge of being. Rahner says:

Being is questionability. Now one cannot ask about being in its totality without affirming the fundamental knowability, in fact a certain 'a priori' knowness of being as such. What is absolutely unknown cannot be asked about.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Andrew Tallon, "Spirit, Matter, Becoming: Karl Rahner's 'Spirit in the World' (Geist in Welt)," The Modern Schoolman, January 1971, p. 155.

<sup>90</sup> Francis Fiorenza, Introduction to Rahner's Spirit in the World, p. xliii.

<sup>91</sup> Rahner, Spirit in the World, p. 68.

This implicit non-objective awareness of being is the basis of all of man's questioning. Because man's presence to being is not a presence that is absolute but finite, man must continue to ask questions. Rahner explains it this way:

This questionability is such that it remains questionable, that is, it is a questionability that is not always and totally eliminated when it receives an answer. This questionability shows that being is being-present-to-self and that being always remains questionable. Why must being be asked about if being is already and always being-present-to-self? The one who must ask is being because in asking about being he is already with being, and yet he is not it because he is not yet with being in its totality in such a way that this being-with-being is a questionless possession of being in its totality. Thus the being that must ask is non-being, is deficient in its innermost ground of being.<sup>92</sup>

The very inquiry after being indicates not only man's presence in being but also the finitude of his presence. His presence in being, his non-objective awareness of God as an a priori condition of human knowing and willing, makes direct objective knowledge of God in categorical judgments impossible. Man can only make judgments because God appears to him non-objectively as the Absolute Mystery. Any objective discourse about God, therefore, must always be indirect, analogous and inadequate.

Avery Dulles seems to summarize this meaning of vorgriff when he writes:

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92 Ibid., p. 71-72.



In every act of knowledge [...] man is obscurely in contact with God as the inexhaustive plenitude lying beyond all possible objects. But God appears more as a question than an answer. In the absence of revelation, man could not know whether he will ultimately show himself as a just and merciless judge or as a loving Saviour. <sup>93</sup>

And Louis Roberts explains:

Whatever is known intellectually contains data coming from within and data coming from without, that is, includes both 'a priori' and 'a posteriori' elements. The 'a posteriori' elements are that which we know reflexively, the 'a priori' elements are that by means of which we know whatever we know, the unthematic given. <sup>94</sup>

The supernatural existential refers to the supernatural orientation of man to God. Prior to man's justification by sanctifying grace whether this is conferred sacramentally or outside the sacraments, man is already redeemed and obliged to tend to his supernatural end. <sup>95</sup> This situation in which man finds himself is not merely external to man nor is it a divine help which is given now and then to man during his life but it is "an objective, ontological modification of man, added indeed to his nature by God's grace and therefore supernatural, but in fact never lacking in the real order." <sup>96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Dulles, op. cit., p. 159.

<sup>94</sup> Louis Roberts, The Achievement of Karl Rahner, New York, Herder and Herder, 1967, p. 26-27.

<sup>95</sup> Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Theological Dictionary, edited by Cornelius Ernst, O.P.; translated by Richard Strachan, Montreal, Palm Publishers, 1965, p. 161.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

Because of this supernatural orientation man can never be 'defined' or 'delimited' in the same way that sub-human entities can.<sup>97</sup> He is always more than 'pure' nature. His whole experience of life is indelibly affected by this elevation. It is felt in the

[...] experience of infinite longings, of radical optimism, of unquenchable discontent, of the torment of the insufficiency of everything attainable, of the radical protest against death, the experience of being confronted with an absolute love precisely where it is lethally incomprehensible and seems to be silent and aloof, the experience of a radical guilt and of a still abiding hope, and so forth.<sup>98</sup>

The supernatural existential is therefore a kind of first revelation, what Rahner calls "transcendental revelation."<sup>99</sup> It is not revelation in the sense that it gives any conceptual knowledge of God, but in that the God of eternal life is the true horizon of man's activity and the absolute towards which man constantly reaches. It is the most fundamental revelation since it forms the "basis of all the articles of faith and is the condition of their very possibility, alone making them really the words of God."<sup>100</sup>

Potentia obedientialis refers to man's capacity for the supernatural. Man's nature by virtue of its

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97 Cf. TI, IV, 183.

98 Cf. TI, IV, 183-184.

99 Karl Rahner et al., (eds.), Sacramentum Mundi, An Encyclopedia of Theology, Vol. 5, 1970, p. 350. Hereafter referred to as SM.

100 Cf. SM, V, 350.

transcendence, exists as openness to the totality of being, and hence, for the self-communication of God. Rahner describes this potency as follows:

The intrinsic being of man is called an 'obediential potency' for supernatural grace, insofar as, in virtue of his spiritual transcendence to all being, man is open to God's self-communication, which can only be imparted to a creature whose nature does not confine it to a particular sphere of existence. This potency (receptivity) is called 'obediential' because what it really is would still be meaningful if God did not communicate himself; so that this communication remains free notwithstanding the potency--that is, remains grace. The potency has no claims to advance before God but remains obedient to his good pleasure.<sup>101</sup>

The potentia obedientialis must not be understood as a potentia obedientialis for supernatural grace as the ontological elevation of man (supernatural existential) to share in the life of God but as giving man the possibility to hear the Word of God. While potentia obedientialis prepares man for the gospel in such a way that he is standing ready to receive revelation should it occur in time and space, the supernatural existential enables man to receive revelation. This is to say, the obediential potency gives man the ability to hear and receive, and the supernatural existential, the capacity to receive.

The problem Rahner is trying to solve here is expressed in his own words:

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<sup>101</sup> Rahner and Vorgrimler, op. cit., p. 367.

Whether and in what sense man is able to discover within himself some kind of 'ear' for revelation which might possibly proceed from God, before he has in fact heard something and come to know thereby that he can hear; and how this capacity to hear within his constitution has to be interpreted, in terms of the revelation granted.<sup>102</sup>

Rahner's answer to this problem (that is, his obediencial potency as an openness for the Word of God, and his supernatural existential as giving man the capacity to receive the Word) is found to be unsatisfactory to some theologians. Johannes Metz attempts to explain the evident ambiguity present in Rahner's treatment of the problem by saying:

In light of factual revelation, the concrete ability to hear the divine word of revelation is constituted by two moments: by the spiritual transcendence of man (his 'subjectivity') and by its 'elevation' through grace, or its 'illumination'.<sup>103</sup>

A few pages later, he adds:

The distinction made between the 'potentia obediencialis' for word-revelation and that for grace does not imply, of course, that these two messages of God and thus these two 'potencies' related thereto, are adequately distinguishable in the last analysis. A hearing of the word of God as 'divine' word [...] is possible only if the power of comprehension 'a priori' needed for the genuinely human consummation of this hearing has itself been enlightened 'divinely,' by what we call 'grace.'<sup>104</sup>

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102 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, p. 9-10.

103 Ibid., p. 10, n. 10.

104 Ibid., p. 22.

Similarly, Schillebeeckx criticizes Rahner for shifting the problem of the relationship between nature and grace to the relationship between nature and the supernatural existential. He writes:

Un tel médium ou "réalité de liaison" est inutile et en soi dénué de sens, car par cette solution on ne fait que déplacer le problème: du rapport entre la nature et la surnature, on passe à la question du rapport entre la nature et ce 'médium,' lequel n'est pas naturel et n'est cependant pas non plus la grace sanctifiante.<sup>105</sup>

In spite of the reservations entertained regarding Rahner's supernatural existential, it is recognized that Rahner has, through his theological anthropology contributed much to a new understanding of man. When these three terms, vorgriff, supernatural existential, and potentia obedientialis are taken together, man's nature can be conceived of in a twofold manner. First, man is to be considered "a spirit standing essentially before the unknown God, before the absolute God whose 'meaning' cannot be defined in terms of this world or of man."<sup>106</sup> Any positive relationship that occurs between God and man must originate with God. Man himself must always reckon "with the possibility of a revelation from this God, indeed such revelation presents man to

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<sup>105</sup> E. Schillebeeckx, "L'instinct de la foi selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Vol. 48, 1964, p. 396. See also, Roger Lapointe, "L'ontologie de Karl Rahner," Dialogue, Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol. 8, 1970, p. 610.

<sup>106</sup> Rahner, Hearers of the Word, p. 15.

himself for the first time. The transcendental relationship which he derives alone and uniquely from God's absolute good-pleasure is what constitutes his concrete nature."<sup>107</sup>

Second, man is an historical being precisely as spirit, so that "he is obliged to depend upon his history not only by virtue of his biological existence, but also as the foundation of his spiritual existence."<sup>108</sup> Rahner explains:

It follows from this that man, by reason of his original nature, is from the very start already directed towards the historical contingency of a revelation, should it occur. Should God, of his free choice, wish not to reveal himself but to remain silent, man would attain the ultimate and highest self-perfection of his spiritual and religious existence by listening to the silence of God.<sup>109</sup>

This understanding of man enables Rahner to counter the objection he raises against the extrinsicists and the intrinsicists and to offer his own description of the relation of nature and grace.

Against the neo-scholastic concept of grace as something of which man is unaware, because it is beyond consciousness, Rahner says, "This grace (grace is not just pardon for the sinner but participation in the divine nature) affects our conscious life, not just our being but our existence."<sup>110</sup>

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107 Ibid., p. 15-16.

108 Ibid., p. 16.

109 Ibid.

110 Cf. TI, IV, 178.

Rahner admits that this grace is not known as one object among others; it is "neither a datum of knowledge nor an abstract and merely consequent summing up of what is known," but is "the 'a priori' horizon given in consciousness"<sup>111</sup> which gives the context for all knowing. Man's spiritual life is thus lived out in the realm of the salvific will of God, of his prevenient grace, of his call as it becomes efficacious: all of which is an element within the region of our consciousness, though one which remains anonymous as long as it is not interpreted from without by the message of faith.<sup>112</sup>

To encounter the word that founds and enlightens existence, it is necessary to listen in on history. The ability to listen in on history depends on man's ability to experience the world, particularly the world of men. Rahner writes, "What mediates the experience of God is primarily man's relationship to the world of men (mitwelt), to the environment of persons, to a human thou."<sup>113</sup>

And this human thou is not just any object in man's experience, but is radically constitutive for his self-understanding as subject and for his relationship to the world. Certain experiences only become possible through the encounter with this

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111 Cf. TI, IV, 178.

112 Cf. TI, IV, 180.

113 Karl Rahner, "The Mission of the Church and Humanizing the World," Doctrine and Life, Vol. 21, 1971, p. 232

personal human world, in which a person is revealed to himself for the first time. Such things, for example, as the transcendental experience of freedom, of responsibility, of absolute truth, of love and personal trust--all these are mediated by this interpersonal world and it is these experiences which make possible any experience of God at all and any understanding of what is meant by (the word) of God.<sup>114</sup>

As man is able to listen in on history, he can know grace intimately, since it is not so much beyond, as that which forms, consciousness.

Against the extrinsic concept of pure nature and the intrinsic concept which identifies man's orientation to God with the natural dynamism of man's organism, Rahner posits the potentia obedientialis and the supernatural existential.

Against the extrinsicists, he writes:

If God gives creation and man above all a supernatural end and this end is first 'in intentio,' then man (and the world) is by that very fact always and everywhere inwardly other in structure than he would be if he did not have this end, and hence other as well before he has reached this end partially (the grace which justifies) or wholly (the beatific vision).<sup>115</sup>

Against the intrinsicists he writes:

But it only follows from this that if God wills a supernatural and unexacted end and if he wills this (or must will it) in such a way that the created quiddity has for it a disposition of a positive and unconditional kind, then God must simultaneously give

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. TI, I, 302-303.



to this created thing the disposition to this end. But it does not follow that the disposition must itself belong to the nature of this thing.<sup>116</sup>

Rahner thus safeguards the gratuity of the supernatural while at the same time demonstrating the dynamic relationship between nature and grace. By asserting that the positive, unconditional orientation of man to God is not natural but supernatural, Rahner, together with the extrinsicists, defends the special gratuity of the supernatural. Secondly, Rahner admits the full force of the arguments against extrinsicism, for he upholds the theory that man's nature is ontologically modified by grace, but he differs from radical intrinsicism which identifies the positive, unconditional orientation to vision with a natural desire. This desire is supernatural, insists Rahner. Even before man receives his first gift of internal grace, the supernatural is already intrinsic to him, but it is intrinsic to him not in the order of pure nature but in the order of the supernatural.

Keeping in mind Rahner's objections to extrinsicism and intrinsicism and his own positive statements, it is now possible to understand something of the depth of meaning he gives to the following short description of the relation of nature and grace:

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116 Cf. TI, I, 308.

God wishes to communicate himself, to pour forth the love which he himself is. That is the first and the last of his real plans and hence of his real world too. Everything else exists so that this one thing might be: the eternal miracle of infinite love. And so God makes a creature whom he can love: he creates man. He creates him in such a way that he can receive this Love which is God himself, and that he can and must at the same time accept it for what it is: the ever astounding wonder, the unexpected, unexacted gift. And let us not forget here that ultimately we only know what 'unexacted' means when we know what personal love is, not vice versa: we don't understand what love is by knowing the meaning of 'unexacted.' Thus in this second respect God must so create man that love does not only pour forth free and unexacted, but also so that man as real partner, as one who can accept or reject it, can experience and accept it as the unexacted event and wonder not owed to him, the real man. As unexacted, not only because he does not deserve it as sinner, but further because he can also embrace it as unexacted when, already blessed in this love, he is allowed to forget that he was a sinner once.<sup>117</sup>

Man who is to receive this love which is God himself must, therefore, first have a congeniality for it, a real potency for it, the potentia obedientialis. Secondly, real man should be able to receive this Love as what it is, a free gift. But this means that the supernatural existential, consisting in man's orientation to God, is itself to be considered as unexacted and supernatural. Thirdly, the man who receives this Love, in the Holy Spirit and by way of the Gospel, is able to distinguish and delimit what he always is (his concrete, indissoluble quiddity) from what this unexacted real receptivity is, the supernatural

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117 Cf. TI, I, 310-311.

existential, and what is left over as remainder when this inmost centre is subtracted from the substance of his concrete quiddity, his 'nature.' Nature in this sense is a remainder concept, a possible abstraction whose exact content, however, cannot be experienced, nor described, in a pure state.<sup>118</sup>

In summary, Rahner's understanding of the relationship between nature and grace is the foundation of his theological anthropology. It permeates his description on the relation of the order of creation and the order of grace where the incarnation is viewed as "the ontological unambiguous goal of the movement of creation as a whole, in relation to which everything prior is merely a preparation of the scene."<sup>119</sup> It explains Rahner's stress on man's experience as the locus of God's revelation. The presence of God and man to each other is so intermingled that in "one way or the other both remain indestructible and interdependent [...] [although] the very obscurity of the presence of each in the other means that they can appear to be separated."<sup>120</sup> The mystery of this relationship creates the Christian understanding of man where the bond linking man to God and that

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118 Cf. TI, I, 311-315.

119 Cf. TI, I, 165.

120 Rahner, "The Mission of the Church and Humanizing the World," p. 234.

linking him to his neighbor are radically and indissolubly present each within the other.<sup>121</sup> And finally, it is basic to his notion of revelation where God is seen not as one particular object alongside others but as present to man as ground and horizon and final end of his own personal orientation towards the various dimensions of his intersubjective world.<sup>122</sup> No longer can God's revelation be understood as the communication of a definite number of truths to which additions may conceivably be made at will nor can it be seen as an infringement on man's world of an alien power. Revelation is, instead,

[...] an historical dialogue between God and man in which something happens, and in which the communication is related to the continuous "happening" and enterprise of God. This dialogue moves to a quite definite term, in which first the "happening" and consequently the communication comes to its never-to-be-surpassed climax and so to its conclusion. Revelation is a saving happening, and only then and in relation to this a communication of "truths." This continuous happening of saving history has now reached its never to be surpassed climax in Jesus Christ: God himself has definitely given himself to the world [...] Now there is nothing more to come: no new age, no other aion, no fresh plan of salvation, but only the unveiling of what is already "here" as God's presence at the end of a human time stretched out to breaking point: the last and eternally the latest, newest day. It is because the definitive Reality which resolves history proper is already here that Revelation is "closed." Closed, because open to the concealed presence of divine plenitude in Christ.<sup>123</sup>

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121 Ibid., p. 235.

122 Ibid., p. 232.

123 Karl Rahner, The Christian Commitment, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1963, p. 48-49.

In conclusion, Rahner's great contribution to the theology of revelation is an emphasis on the Good News of the Gospel that God is redemptively present to man, not only in his most fundamental option but in all the aspects of man's growth. The preaching of the Gospel is not a message added to man's life from without, but rather, since God, as man's horizon, is co-known in a nonthematic way in man's consciousness of himself, makes explicit as thematized knowledge the divine self-communication that is gratuitously offered to all men.

That God is redemptively present to man is a theme that is taken up by many other writers. Of particular note on the North American continent are Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum. They differ from Rahner's transcendental metaphysics in that they use an approach that is influenced by North American pragmatism.

D. North American Theologians: Eugene Fontinell;  
Leslie Dewart; Gregory Baum

On the North American continent, especially in the writings of Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum, the relation between grace and nature is not so much defined metaphysically as it is described phenomenologically.

(a) Eugene Fontinell.- The problem of the relation of nature and the supernatural is for Eugene Fontinell, chairman of the philosophy department of Queen's College, New

York, a problem of truth. A split between the supernatural and the natural, he believes, is inevitable when truth is seen as the correspondence of the mind with an outside reality. Fontinell, therefore, sets out to re-construct the nature of truth. He begins by describing his world view, which he bases on the philosophy of William James and John Dewey.

Some of the phrases he uses to describe this world are: open and unfinished, a challenge rather than a completion, fields and relations rather than substances or other metaphysical forms.<sup>124</sup> He writes:

We inhabit a world both precarious and stable --a world in which uncertainty, unpredictability and uncontrollability are as real as constancy and regularity. These features do not exist in some form of metaphysical juxtaposition or dualism. Nature is a flow within which we differentiate some features which are more enduring than others, but this gives us no right to separate those features from the ongoing relational process in which they are encountered.<sup>125</sup>

Fontinell next considers the meaning and role of experience. He uses the word experience in the same sense that Dewey does, as the interaction between the organism and the environment, an interaction that can be described as transaction or, better still, as contextual.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Eugene Fontinell, "Religious Truth in a Relational and Processive World," Cross Currents, Vol. 17, 1967, p. 287-291.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., p. 291.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 293.

To refer to experience as contextual is to see the subject-object distinction not as two different kinds of reality but as a distinction occurring within experience which in its primordial concreteness is neither subjective nor objective.<sup>127</sup> To refer to experience as contextual is also to refer to experience as future-oriented. Since experience is always relative to a context which is not enclosed or shut off, experience can be seen as open to the future, characterized by projection and by a reaching forward into the unknown.<sup>128</sup> And finally, referring to experience as contextual, enables Fontinell to distinguish between knowledge and experience. Knowledge is a particular mode of experience, a distinctive kind of transaction.<sup>129</sup> It does not encompass the world as a whole. To assert that knowledge alone gives access to reality is, Fontinell feels, to be guilty of vicious intellectualism. Knowing arises "out of a problematic situation and is a direct and controlled effort to render the situation more satisfactory."<sup>130</sup>

In terms of experience, Fontinell describes his notion of religious truth. Truth in its primary sense refers

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127 Ibid., p. 295.

128 Ibid., p. 296.

129 Eugene Fontinell, Toward a Reconstruction of Religion: A Philosophical Probe, New York, Doubleday, 1970, p. 66-67.

130 Ibid., p. 66.

to personal experience "insofar as the relations constituting this experience are satisfactory,"<sup>131</sup> that is, conducive to the developing life of the person. So it is with religious truth. It can also be judged pragmatically. It is true if it enables one to participate more fully in the ongoing processive reality with which man is continuous. Thus religious truth differs from other truth only in its comprehensiveness and not because it pertains to a different kind of reality.<sup>132</sup> It is existential and participational rather than abstract and representative.<sup>133</sup>

Religious truth is characterized by faith and faith is an integrating experience which serves to order, direct, illuminate and render meaningful human life.<sup>134</sup> Its role is to hold together the diverse aspects or modes of human life or experience. Through faith all kinds of experience such as knowing-experience, affective-experience, and esthetic-experience, are brought together into a relatively cohesive whole which is expressed in the life of the person.<sup>135</sup>

Faith is not knowledge, whether about God or man or the world.<sup>136</sup> Faith and knowledge are functionally different

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131 Ibid., p. 93.

132 Ibid., p. 104.

133 Ibid., p. 93.

134 Ibid., p. 86.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid., p. 83.



modes of experience both indispensable and while not reducible one to the other are intimately and dynamically related. On the one side, faith serves knowledge by "expanding man's vision beyond his knowledge and constantly energizing him and spurring him on to greater realization."<sup>137</sup> On the other side, knowledge serves faith positively by continually supplying it with new and more adequate concepts and symbols by which it can deepen and develop. Negatively, knowledge serves faith by criticizing the expressions of faith, thereby continually obliging the believer to be wary of his symbols and to avoid transforming them into idols.<sup>138</sup>

The expressions Fontinell is referring to include creeds, dogmas and scripture. Creeds, dogmas and scripture represent attempts on the part of the community "to articulate its continuing encounter with the nameless one."<sup>139</sup> They do not give any knowledge or information about God. Their role is to help deepen and develop the life of faith. "They serve as religious energizers insofar as they intensify and expand the life of the person and the community."<sup>140</sup> They do this "by continually enlarging man's vision, by

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137 Ibid., p. 90.

138 Ibid., p. 91-92.

139 Ibid., p. 105.

140 Ibid.

stimulating him to better modes of action [...] and by adding to human life a quality and dimension which can be achieved in no other way."<sup>141</sup> Fontinell admits that this

[...] does not rule out the possibility that some of these articulations have a unique and indispensable role in the continuing life of the community. In the case of Christianity, this would most assuredly hold for Sacred Scripture. Even here, however, I would insist that the Bible is the work of the human community though I believe that it proceeds from a community experience with that Other who is not reducible to the human community.<sup>142</sup>

(b) Leslie Dewart.- Leslie Dewart of St. Michael's College, Toronto, speaks in somewhat the same terms as Fontinell. While Fontinell attributes the cause of the split between nature and the supernatural to the classical notion of truth, Dewart conceptualizes the problem as the hellenization of doctrine. When the Church speaks about the divine mystery in terms taken from a past cultural experience, the believer is unable to integrate his contemporary experience with his religious experience. The solution to the problem, Dewart believes, is de-hellenization of doctrine.

In his effort at de-hellenization, Dewart insists that the classical theory of knowledge and consequently of truth and reality must be built on a new basis more in line with contemporary experience, which is non-Thomistic, and non-hellenic. To continue to use an outdated philosophy is

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

to increase the disparity between Christian belief and contemporary experience. To decrease the disparity, therefore, it is necessary to rebuild on contemporary experience. This whole process Dewart calls dehellenization.

Dewart begins his book, The Future of Belief,<sup>143</sup> with outlining the problem and stating his purpose. The problem as he sees it is the split between the sphere of religion and that of man's contemporary experience. It is not merely one aspect of the sphere of religion that is opposed to man's experience, it is "contemporary experience 'as a whole' that is incongruous with Christian belief 'as a whole'."<sup>144</sup> When such a cleavage exists, the sphere of religion appears as an artificial world superimposed against man's experience of the world and, hence, irrelevant. The Church herself is to blame for this split. By choosing to speak about the divine mystery in terms taken from a past cultural experience, she is responsible for the lack of integration between faith and the life of her people. The solution, therefore, must consist in the de-hellenization of doctrine in such a way that Christian theistic belief can be integrated with the everyday experience of man.

By contemporary experience Dewart means the "mode of consciousness which mankind, if not as a whole at least

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<sup>143</sup> Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief: Theism in a World Come of Age, New York, Herder and Herder, 1966, 223 p.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

in respect to our own civilization constituting man's cultural vanguard, has reached as a result of its historical and evolutionary development."<sup>144a</sup> By integration he means the question of a "true, organic process of coordination, interrelation and unification."<sup>145</sup>

This integration must begin at the heart of the Church itself for it is here that the disparity between Christian belief and this contemporary experience can be observed immediately.<sup>146</sup> And integration must begin with the integration of the concept of God with contemporary experience.<sup>147</sup> But before there can be an adequate concept of God there must be an adequate theory of dogmatic development. And before there can be an adequate theory of dogmatic development there must be an adequate theory of truth.

Dewart dismisses what he calls the classical notion of truth which he sees as essentially the conformity of the knowing subject with the object known.<sup>148</sup> Such a theory supposes, he believes, that man can "conceive and understand knowledge from the outside, as if [man] could witness from a third, 'higher' viewpoint, the union of two lower things, object and subject."<sup>149</sup> In its stead, Dewart proposes an

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<sup>144a</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

alternate view. He begins from the assumption that what characterizes the distinctively human form of knowledge is self-consciousness. In knowing anything in the external world man discovers that he is aware of his own presence to himself, not as another object, not as an addition, but as an intensification of his presence to himself.<sup>150</sup> His knowledge grows as the mind self-differentiates "its-self out of reality from which it was originally continuous and united in undifferentiation."<sup>151</sup> Through the constant process of self-differentiation man is able to know non-self as distinct from himself and through this process become present to himself.<sup>152</sup>

On the basis of this mechanism of knowledge, Dewart describes his notion of truth. Truth is the result of the mind coming-into-being through the self-differentiation of that-which-is-into self and world.<sup>153</sup> Truth pertains to the quality of man's intellectual life and can only be maintained through the heightening of consciousness.<sup>154</sup> More precisely, it is the deepening and intensifying fidelity of man to the reality which envelops him.

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150 Ibid., p. 83.

151 Ibid., p. 190-191.

152 Ibid., p. 105.

153 Ibid., p. 93.

154 Ibid.

This is not to deny the need for conceptualization. Dewart points out that man's grasp of truth can become conscious only through conceptualization.<sup>155</sup> Without concepts man would not be able to think. The concepts themselves are not the truth; they are simply the cultural form of human experience. They are not imposed upon a pre-existing human experience but constitute experience itself. Dewart sums this up when he writes:

Psychic life reaches the level of specifically human experience only as it receives (in conceptualization) A CULTURAL FORM. Thus, no given cultural form (or conceptualization) is specifically required by human experience. And yet, every human experience requires, in order to exist, some concrete cultural conceptual form or other.<sup>156</sup>

With this understanding of the notion of truth and the role of concepts, Dewart is able to formulate his notion of revelation and doctrinal development. Revelation must no longer be considered as the communication of a doctrine or a message nor as a record of a revelation that happened once but happens no longer. Revelation is an event that happens today through God's present self-communication. In one sense it can be said that revelation closed with the death of the last apostle, but in another sense, it continues. It closed in the sense that the fullness of God's revelation was given in Jesus but it endures in that the

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155 Ibid., p. 105.

156 Ibid., p. 106.

original self-revelation remains and is continuously offered to man throughout history. The Church's acknowledgment of this continued revelation in faith is what Dewart calls her experience. This experience as well as all of man's other experiences need to be conceptualized in order to be conscious and real. Dogmas are the Church's efforts to conceptualize and formulate her faith experience. Since God continues to reveal himself so must the Church continue to formulate dogmas. These formulations, in order to be integrated with man's contemporary experience, must not be tied to the past. To tie God's revelation to the past is to present God to man in terms incomprehensible to him. An example of this would be to talk of God in scholastic terms as a supernatural being above and beyond man. What is essential is that man should experience God as an expansive force impelling him to grow beyond himself.

This understanding of revelation is made clearer in the light of Dewart's discussion of the relation of nature and grace. He disagrees with the scholastic notion that grace is an order of reality 'above' the natural order, as he disagrees with those who reduce the order of grace to that of nature.<sup>157</sup>

The whole distinction between the natural and the supernatural order is, he feels, nothing but a mere play on

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157 Ibid., p. 208.

words. It is better to do away with the notion of the supernatural altogether.

Since nature is essentially contingent, deriving its intelligibility from its factuality and historicity, nature is historically, not metaphysically, related to grace. Grace is thus understood as a historical fact, God's presence to man, which existentially qualifies the historical intelligibility of nature in a definitive way.<sup>158</sup>

(c) Gregory Baum.- Gregory Baum of St. Michael's College, Toronto, in his latest book<sup>159</sup> is concerned primarily with the doctrine of God, but in the treatment of this doctrine he treats of matters which have to do with the relation of nature and grace. His basic theme is that "God is present to man in the action that constitutes his history, and creates an experience that is, properly speaking, supernatural."<sup>160</sup> He develops this theme by using a methodology which he describes as the "application of a psychologically oriented phenomenology."<sup>161</sup>

In his opening chapter Baum situates his book in the stream of thought which he sees as having originated with Blondel, the French philosopher who insisted "that creative thinking, even in the Christian Church, must take place in

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 210.

<sup>159</sup> Gregory Baum, Man Becoming: God in Secular Experience, New York, Herder and Herder, 1970, 285 p.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p. xiii.



dialogue with the thought that preoccupies man in the present."<sup>162</sup> Describing in some detail Blondel's rejection of extrinsicism and historicism, Baum sees in Blondel's method of immanentism<sup>163</sup> the seed of a new trend in theology ranging all the way from Joseph Maréchal, Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, to the composition of the conciliar documents of Vatican II and outwards to the whole Church. Baum, however, distinguishes his own position from Blondel's by stating that:

[...] the contemporary theologian will ask the question whether a careful description of human life might not reveal that man is open to the supernatural not only in the ultimate option described by Blondel, but in many other options that constitute the turning points in a man's life.<sup>164</sup>

In his chapter on "redemptive immanence,"<sup>165</sup> Baum describes his position. God is present to man not only in his fundamental option by which man transcends the finite but in the many necessary and painful choices by which man perseveres toward growth and reconciliation. To be more precise, "God is what happens to man on the way to becoming human."<sup>166</sup>

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162 Ibid., p. 2.

163 See above, p. 24-26.

164 Baum, op. cit., p. 39.

165 Ibid., p. 37-60.

166 Ibid., p. 40.

The occasions in which God "happens" to man in his secular life can be summed up as "dialogue" and "community."<sup>167</sup> Man comes to be through dialogue. The constitutive role of dialogue is evident in the possession of language and the emergence of consciousness. Again and again through dialogue man hears a special word which evokes a response that transforms his life. This word coming to man through conversation with others and resounding in his conscience addresses man with a force that reveals who he is. It judges him; it summons him to grow; it demands a reply. It leaves him with two choices, either to close himself off or to open himself to the truth and lay hold of reality in a new way. When it is accepted, it is experienced not only as transcendent but as gratuitous. It is recognized by the Christian acquainted with scripture as God's word present in history. "Believing that God's word is present in human history, the Christian discerns this word as the special summons available in the human dialogue by which men come to be."<sup>168</sup>

Man also comes to be through community. Baum writes:

In general, it is the love and care offered to us by others that creates in us the strength to enter into the dialogue of life. Only as we are loved and recognized do we gain the self-confidence necessary to listen and reply. [...] Love in other words, finds freedom [...] This strength comes from a

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167 Ibid., p. 41-60.

168 Ibid., p. 47.

certain self-possession to which men have access only if they have shared life or enjoyed communion with others [...] Only as they are loved by others, only as we share in community, do we come to accept ourselves. We discover our worth as persons through the love of others and our share in the life of the community. The acceptance and care given to us by others produce the freedom in us to face the challenges of life and become more truly ourselves.<sup>169</sup>

As the Christian recognizes God's word present in human dialogue, so too, he recognizes God's redemptive presence in the gifts given him in community. "As Word and as Spirit, God is present in man's making of man. God is present in the dialogue and the communion by which men enter into their humanity."<sup>170</sup> God's presence to man is not confined to the ultimate religious moments when man must choose between the finite and the infinite. His presence "is discernible in the ordinary situation of human life in the dialogue that constitutes man's history and in the gifts that reconcile him with himself and with others."<sup>171</sup>

Human life is not only open at the top, [...] where man may opt for the infinite; it is open to the transcendent mystery in the entire process of man's humanization. The locus of the divine is the interpersonal. God is present in that area of human life where man [...] invests most of his intellectual and emotional energies, namely his ordinary, secular existence.<sup>172</sup>

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169 Ibid., p. 49-50.

170 Ibid., p. 57.

171 Ibid., p. 58.

172 Ibid.

That God is redemptively present to human life is Baum's first principle for the development of doctrine. It is also his answer to the problem of the relation of nature and grace. Through a process conception of man, Baum feels he can steer clear of both extrinsicism and pantheism. A process conception of man in which man is seen as coming to be through dialogue and sharing indicates the need of a gift dimension in man's life, which is not opposed to man but enables him to grow beyond that which he is able to do in terms of his own powers and resources. God is such a gift dimension in man's life. Through man's dialogue and communion with others, God is present summoning and freeing him to grow in such a way that God "enters into the very constitution of who man is and will be."<sup>173</sup> But when man is conceived in terms of a closed substance then God must be seen as extrinsic to man, or the substance of man himself as divine. Baum denies both. Man remains truly man and God remains truly God not as a being apart from man and superior to him but constitutive of his very being.<sup>174</sup>

Baum's second principle for the development of doctrine is that "every sentence about God can be translated into a declaration about human life."<sup>175</sup> This is not to be

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173 Ibid., p. 172.

174 Ibid., p. 171-172.

175 Ibid., p. 181. See Rahner's theological anthropology above.

interpreted as reducing the divine to the human:

Since God is present in human life not through a message sent across a distance nor by gifts offered from afar but by his own Word and his own Spirit, his presence to human life is he as he is in himself. The Word of God to man is God himself. This is the Good News proclaimed by Jesus Christ. For this reason we may not suppose that behind God's presence in history there is a God existing in himself. From this it follows that as we speak about human life in all its dimensions, we are in fact also speaking about God.<sup>176</sup>

God is present to man not simply through some effects in history (created grace) but as he is in himself (uncreated grace), that is, "God has entered the definition of man."<sup>177</sup> To say that God has entered the definition of man is another way of saying, Baum declares, that history is supernatural.<sup>178</sup> "God's gratuitous self-communication is co-constitutive of human history, and since man is who he has come to be and who he will be, God-as-he-is-in-himself enters the historical definition of man."<sup>179</sup>

Baum applies these two principles of interpretation to the statement that God exists. According to the first principle of interpretation the statement that there is a God "does not deal with a being having a supposed existence

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176 Ibid., p. 181-182.

177 Ibid., p. 184.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.

independently of man."<sup>180</sup> Because God is redemptively present to man in such a way that he constitutes man's very being, man can have no spectator knowledge of God. The mystery that God exists includes man. According to the second principle, the statement that God exists means that man is always more than man. It is a declaration about human life. "It means that man is alive by a principle that transcends him, over which he has not power, which summons him to surpass himself and frees him to be creative."<sup>181</sup>

The doctrine of God is not a description of a supreme being called God. Man can have no observer knowledge of God. The doctrine of God is Good News. It illuminates the human situation. It declares unto man the meaning and destiny of his life.<sup>182</sup>

These two principles, Baum believes, should form the basis of all doctrinal development in the Church. The Church as she formulates her doctrine should first know the question of human existence.<sup>183</sup> When she is aware of the question that threatens human existence, she must then listen to God's word to find the answer. She listens as she re-reads the scriptures and the ecclesiastical tradition of the past. At the same time, she listens to the word of God speaking in

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180 Ibid., p. 185.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid., p. 186.

183 Gregory Baum, Faith and Doctrine: A Contemporary View, New York, Newman Press, 1969, p. 103ff.

the contemporary experience of all men. She can discern what is the Word of God speaking in the world by its "harmony and coherence with the identical Word recorded in the scriptures and celebrated in the Church."<sup>184</sup> The answer the Church receives often involves a re-focusing of the whole Gospel. This is so because all the doctrines of the Church are related and give witness to a single reality, namely, The Word of God. When the meaning of one doctrine is shifted or re-focused, the entire doctrine of the Church must, therefore, be re-interpreted in the light of the new focus.<sup>185</sup>

When development takes place in this manner, it is not a development that could be called homogeneous which is the passage from what is implicit to an explicit formulation. This kind of development represents rather a

[...] certain doctrinal shift. As the Church enters a new culture the doctrinal development that takes place is an original, Spirit-created formulation--tested again and again by the apostolic witness--of the self-identical Gospel spoken by God in the Church.<sup>186</sup>

Implicit in Baum's treatment of the development of doctrine is a notion of revelation not given once and for all in the past but as the continued self-disclosure of God in the contemporary experience of all men:

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184 Ibid., p. 107.

185 Ibid., p. 110-111.

186 Ibid., p. 103.

Divine self-revelation is complete with Jesus Christ. In Christ, God has made himself known in the definitive and unconditional way. Nothing can be added. The apostolic witness to Christ needs no supplement. Christ is the Word of God. At the same time, divine revelation is a continuing reality in the Church in the sense that God continues to disclose himself to men as Father, Word and Spirit in the identical gift of himself. What God has said in Christ, he continues to say to the Church.<sup>187</sup>

What God says to the Church he says also to all men wherever they are, orientating them away from sin toward growth and reconciliation.<sup>188</sup> Because of the presence of this Word, human life is always and everywhere what could be called "supernatural."<sup>189</sup> "Human life is always the realization of a salvational dialogue with God."<sup>190</sup> In other words, "the self-communication of God, which has become concrete and visible in the man Jesus, to whom the Church gives witness by her faith, orientates the whole of human history toward growth and reconciliation."<sup>191</sup>

In summary, all three authors, Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum, like the other authors considered above, are concerned with the separation of the world of religion from man's secular experience. All seem to agree that the problem of the relation of grace and nature is due

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187 Ibid., p. 106.

188 Ibid., p. 106-107.

189 Ibid., p. 112.

190 Ibid.

191 Ibid., p. 113.



to an outmoded metaphysics. If the humanism and the spirituality of the Christian community is to be freed from the incubus of a philosophy which is preventing the access of the word of God to contemporary man, there is need of the guidance of contemporary philosophy. Fontinell, basing himself on the philosophy of James and Dewey, attempts to reconstruct the nature of truth. Intelligence is no longer the faculty through which man moves beyond the world to the divine realities which give it its sense but it is the faculty whose task is to project, criticize and constantly revise structures so that man can live a life more integrated, more coherent and more meaningful. In terms of his re-interpretation of the nature of truth, faith is not acceptance of divinely revealed truths but is instead an integrating experience which serves to order, direct, illuminate and render meaningful human life. Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum, basing themselves on a metaphysics of presence, are convinced that God should not be spoken of in terms of being. For Leslie Dewart, God is the transcendent presence who reveals himself to historical human consciousness. The task of the Church is to constantly revise her formulation of Christian faith to keep them in line with man's contemporary awareness of God. Baum describes God's presence to man by saying that God is what happens to man on the way to becoming human. He is present not only in special moments and places but in the many necessary and

painful choices by which man perseveres toward growth and reconciliation.

In conclusion, the main unifying theme among these writers is their focus on experience and their rejection of any metaphysics which places an eternal Absolute, fixed forms or natures above or beneath the process of experience. Through an approach that is experiential, evolutionary and pragmatic, they hope to show that God is present to man, and that this presence is manifested in and through the events of man's life in the world. Only such an understanding of God, they feel, is capable of bridging the growing chasm between Christian faith and contemporary culture. Henceforth, any separation between sacred and secular must be considered more rational than real. In the words of Gregory Baum, God is present as Word and Spirit in man's making of man.

#### E. Summary

The introduction to this chapter begins by saying that the notion of revelation can broadly be divided into two main streams of thought, the static and dynamic or the Appollonian and Dionysian. According to the stream described as Appollonian, revelation is seen as the communication of a message from a transcendent God separated and isolated from his creation. Implied in this notion is a dualistic notion of reality. On the one side is the world

of man's natural reality, and on the other side, superimposed above and beyond the sphere of man's natural activity, is the sphere of grace, revelation and faith. According to the stream described as Dionysian, the boundaries separating God and man are broken. Revelation is no longer conceived as a message coming to man from the outside but as the self-communication of God to man in all of man's secular temporal activity. The authors discussed in this chapter belong to this second stream. Since the first stream implies a split between the natural and the supernatural, and the second, a dissolving of the boundaries that separate these two, the theme around which the notion of revelation is examined is the problem of the relation of grace and nature.

Although Newman does not deal specifically with this problem, yet his writing on the relation of faith and reason and on doctrinal development does not permit the separation of grace and nature. According to his notion of doctrinal development, revelation is not simply a number of truths which can be demonstrated through the process of logical reasoning but is instead one complex saving reality, of which the intellectual is merely one aspect. Blondel, through his method of immanence, attempts to bridge the gap between nature and the supernatural by showing the inner affinity between the two: the openness of man's deepest will for supernatural grace which is given to man as summons and as grace to enter into the newness of life. In Rahner's

theological anthropology, the gap between nature and grace no longer exists. Every theological statement about God is at the same time a statement about man, and vice versa, every statement about man is a statement about God. God is the a priori condition of all human knowing and willing, and man is that being who has absolute transcendence towards God. So indelibly is man affected by God's grace that he can never be at rest except in interpersonal communion with God. While Rahner uses a transcendental methodology in his attempt to show the inner affinity between nature and grace, Fontinell and Dewart make use of a processive world view. According to this view the features of reality do not exist in some form of metaphysical juxtaposition or dualistic tension. In terms of this world view, Fontinell sets out to re-interpret the nature of truth. According to this interpretation, faith is not acceptance of divinely revealed truths but is an integrating experience which serves to order, direct and illuminate life. Dewart, on the other hand, asks for the de-hellenization of doctrine. Hellenization of doctrine, he feels, is the cause of the disparity between man's religious experience and his contemporary experience. To de-hellenize is, therefore, to demolish a two-storied view of the universe and to put an end to a notion of grace as an order above the natural order. Gregory Baum, on the whole, accepts the world view of Fontinell and Dewart.

Through the application of a psychologically oriented phenomenology, he insists that God is present to man in the action that constitutes man's history and creates an experience that is, properly speaking, supernatural.

From what has been said, it is obvious that natural versus supernatural is eliminated in the minds of the above authors. God is no longer to be conceived as a sublime complement which ultimately remains alien to man but is seen instead as the only concretely existing and authentic way of being human.

Another way of viewing the shift that has taken place in the notion of revelation is to look at the different stages of development. A first stage is evident in primitive religions where religion has a revelation consisting of rites, beliefs and codes bequeathed to men by the gods. Through an obedient acceptance of this revelation man is assured of everlasting salvation. A second stage can be seen as the stage in which religion has a revelation that is not opposed to reason. This stage is evident in the Church particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The great systems of Bossuet, Pascal and other seventeenth century thinkers present convincing proof of the possibility and the fact of Christian revelation.

Vatican I, in particular, through its promulgations concerning both faith and infallibility had the result of stressing this notion of revelation. While the task of the Church is

to preserve and protect the deposit confided to her keeping, the task of the believer is to obey and accept all that is contained in the deposit. A third stage could be described as the stage in which the Church no longer has a revelation but she is called to be a revelation. Like the Jews in the Old Testament who claimed to meet God in their historical experience so, too, the Church preaches the Good News that God is redemptively present among men.

The authors considered above pertain to this third stage. Every act of revelation is a revealing of the divine and human in indissoluble relationship. For Newman, the fullness of God's revelation in Christ is present to the Church in the manner of an 'idea' or 'impression' which creates an atmosphere which is felt and experienced by new members. Growth in the divine/human encounter takes place according to the psychological and sociological laws of growth of the human mind. Under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, this encounter is projected more and more sharply unto the Church's consciousness of herself so that she can constantly proclaim the good news of God's continued self-revelation. For Blondel, man's growth towards maturity is evidence of God's presence to man summoning him to move ever forward in the options he chooses to the inevitable option in which he must choose to open himself to the infinite or to enclose himself in the finite order and thus

violate the thrust of his own action. To choose the supernatural is to enter into a newness of life in which God's revealing presence is manifested in man's involvement in life and the quality and depth of his experience of reality. Rahner recognizes that through the Incarnation the whole of history is under the influence of grace. God's gift of himself is not to a chosen few but to the whole human race, to the believer and the unbeliever, to those who accept the Christian message and to those who do not. The divine message preached by the Church is not new knowledge added to human life from without; rather it makes explicit the divine self-communication gratuitously offered in human life. And lastly, Fontinell, Dewart and Baum see revelation manifested in man's making of man. God is revealed in the many necessary and painful choices by which man perseveres towards growth and reconciliation.

The notion of revelation presented in the writings of the above authors is reflected in the writings of Gabriel Moran. This soon becomes evident in Moran's notion of revelation as historical, as personal communion and as an interrelationship of God and the individual within a believing community. For the purposes of this essay, Moran's notion of revelation is studied by looking at his concept of man as an historical being marching forward with the community towards freedom.

## 2. Gabriel Moran and the Concept of Revelation.

Gabriel Moran conceives of man as a historical human being marching forward with the community towards freedom and liberty. Man is not born to live in slavery nor to be the slave of any system whether this system be political or religious or ideological. Man is the pinnacle and crown of creation:

The last glimmering hopes of man for sacred messages and divine institutions were extinguished with Christ. What had been implicit has now become an unavoidable fact, namely, that man is the high point of creation and that there are no messages or truths above him. If God is to be sought, it can only be in human life. God can be for man only as man takes up his own responsibility and frees himself from every form of slavery.<sup>192</sup>

The crucial difference between the historical man and the 'cyclical' man is that the latter, without hope in the future, escapes into an unreal world "where God's word is a formula, where God's law is a code, and where the worship of God consists in the protection of one's soul from meeting other people,"<sup>193</sup> while the former, as a part of the whole human family, moves toward a goal in time.

This section deals with Moran's understanding of the nature of revelation by considering his conception of man as

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<sup>192</sup> Gabriel Moran, "The God of Revelation," in Daniel Callahan (ed.), God, Jesus and Spirit, New York, Herder and Herder, 1969, p. 13-14.

<sup>193</sup> -----, Theology of Revelation, New York, Herder and Herder, 1966, p. 155.



historical under the headings: A. Way of Being; B. Way of Growing; and C. Way of Knowing.

#### A. Way of Being

Gabriel Moran conceives of man, not as "an atemporal, non-spatial, non-social"<sup>194</sup> being, but of man in "his entire temporal mode of existence"<sup>195</sup> which is historical. The

historicity of man's being is a key concept in the works of Gabriel Moran.<sup>196</sup> Without a thorough understanding of this concept all that Moran says concerning revelation is meaningless. This concept of historicity is discussed in the following pages by contrasting (i) the ahistorical, atemporal view of man<sup>197</sup> with (ii) the historical, temporal view. Such a sharp contrast should highlight the meaning of historicity as conveyed in Moran's writings.

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194 Gabriel Moran, Contemporary Theology of Revelation and Its Effects Upon the Catechetical Theory, doctoral dissertation presented to the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 39. Hereafter referred to as Doctoral Dissertation.

195 Ibid., p. 38.

196 Gabriel Moran, Theology of Revelation, Chapter II. In this chapter, Moran tries to establish a few principles concerning the relationship between history and revelation. Several times throughout his works he returns to this problem.

197 See Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History, New York, Harper Torchbook, 1959, and Alan Richardson, History, Sacred and Profane, London, SCM Press, 1964, for what follows.

(i) Archaic man<sup>198</sup> is afraid of time and history.

History for him is devoid of meaning for it lacks both purpose and destiny; history leads only to death because it means change and change leads to decay and annihilation. Neither the objects of the external world nor human acts have any autonomous value. History is not real.

The real world is extraterritorial. Here dwell the gods who are the prototypes that serve as models for all man's actions.<sup>199</sup> Human acts acquire meaning and become real only to the extent of their participation in this transcendent reality. The participation takes place by reproducing or imitating a primordial act posited in the beginning by one of the gods or some other non-human being. Man's reality consists then in ceasing to be himself and in repeating the gestures of another. 'Profane' time, as such, does not exist for man since every meaningful act participates in some way in the 'sacred.' As man initiates these gestures not only does he reproduce the original gesture but also the gesture coincides with the same primordial mythical moment. Any action man performs that is not in imitation of the gods is considered meaningless and has to

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198 This term was used by Eliade to mean premodern or traditional societies and included the ancient cultures of Asia, Europe and America.

199 Eliade, op. cit., p. 4.

be regenerated through annulment or abolition of concrete time.<sup>200</sup> This leaves man free from the burden of time and its irreversibility. "Everything begins over again at its commencement every instant. The past is but a prefiguration of the future. No event is irreversible and no transformation is final."<sup>201</sup> Man does not have to fear the unknown for nothing new ever happens in the universe that has not already been done at some primordial instant:

Everything is but the repetition of the same primordial archetype; this repetition, by actualizing the mythical moment when the archetypal gesture was revealed, constantly maintains the world in the same auroral instant of the beginning. Time but makes possible the appearance and existence of things. It has no final influence upon their existence, since it is itself constantly regenerated.<sup>202</sup>

History is but the cycle of endless repetitions, the cycles of which go on forever. History is an enslavement and a curse. Redemption resides in the Beyond, the Center of the cosmos, which is removed from space and time. The Road that leads to the Center is difficult and arduous; it is a "rite of the passage from the profane to the sacred, from the ephemeral and illusory to reality and eternity, from death to life, from man to eternity."<sup>203</sup> Here

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200 Ibid., p. 86.

201 Ibid., p. 89.

202 Ibid., p. 90.

203 Ibid., p. 18. The difficulty of this journey can be seen in the pilgrimages to sacred places, such as Mecca and Jerusalem.

profane space is transformed into sacred space and concrete time is transformed into mythical time.

This withdrawal from history and the denial of the temporal process continues to our day:

[...] so it is that, in political economy, we are witnessing the rehabilitation of the notions of cycle, fluctuation, periodic oscillation; that in philosophy the myth of eternal return is revived by Nietzsche; or that, in the philosophy of history, a Spengler or a Toynbee concern themselves with the problem of periodicity.<sup>204</sup>

A "nostalgia for the myth of eternal repetition and [...] for the abolition of time"<sup>205</sup> is also present in the literary works of two modern writers, T.S. Eliot and James Joyce, and in the superficial conceptions of Christianity where Christianity is reduced "to one of many religions in which the revealed truths are handed down at the beginning"<sup>206</sup> or where "Jesus of Nazareth is taken to be an oracle of divine truths."<sup>207</sup>

(ii) In contrast to the cyclic view, the Jews introduce a new concept of history into the world.<sup>208</sup> History

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<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p. 146.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>206</sup> Gabriel Moran, Vision and Tactics, New York, Herder and Herder, 1968, p. 48.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 40-41. Moran gives an answer to those who dismiss the Jewish contributions as insignificant.

for the Jews is not a "process of events or a collection of facts"<sup>209</sup> into which man is fitted, but history is what emerges from the dialogue of God and his people.<sup>210</sup>

The biblical writers are convinced that what is primary is not some pattern of impersonal events that communicates a message; what comes first is God and man's relation to God.<sup>211</sup>

The Bible is the record of man's encounter with God. This encounter takes place, not in some "transcendent instant in the beginning"<sup>212</sup> but in time. The God who addresses man addresses not "an atemporal, non-spatial, non-social part of man"<sup>213</sup> but man "constituted by spatio-temporal and social relations."<sup>214</sup> God meets the individual within Israel. He calls Abraham from the Land of Ur, he gives the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai and he leads the people of Israel from the land of slavery into the Promised Land.

These are concrete irreversible events in which God calls a people to be his possession. God does not speak once and simply leave a norm or laws for the people to

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209 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 35.

210 Ibid., p. 42.

211 Ibid., p. 36.

212 Ibid., p. 37.

213 Ibid., p. 39.

214 Ibid.

follow but he speaks again and again to his people and teaches them to see him at work in history. It is through a consciousness of this fact that the writer of Genesis can say that when God created the world, he saw that it was good.<sup>215</sup> No longer does life consist of finding ways to escape from the earth but rather the earth is the place where man and God became accustomed to one another.<sup>216</sup> This involves a process:

Because God is He who speaks and acts and man is the creature who hears and responds, there will be a process to their intercourse, a process in which God is becoming God-with-us and man is being summoned to a life of responsiveness.<sup>217</sup>

Because of man's finite and material structure, this process cannot help but be a slow, halting and somewhat painful one.<sup>218</sup> Every failure on the part of man is for God a "new starting point from which to move and a new route to follow in the dialogue with man."<sup>219</sup> God does not leave man alone but gently draws him forward "not simply by disregarding failure, but using failure to bring man to see what man is and what God is."<sup>220</sup>

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215 Genesis, 1:31.

216 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 49.

217 Ibid., p. 36.

218 Ibid., p. 49.

219 Ibid.

220 Ibid.

Implicit from the beginning of this personal dialogue is the "conception of a history which could only lead toward communion or away from it."<sup>221</sup> It led to deeper communion:

Whatever the ontological consequences that might be drawn from the biblical teaching, the scripture leaves little doubt that the whole of history moves toward its assumption in Christ. All of the words which God had spoken, beginning with the word of creation, are included in the Word who is personally God.<sup>222</sup>

History, the continuing developing dialogue between God and man, reaches its climax in Jesus Christ who is man receiving as well as God giving.<sup>223</sup>

Christ is man totally receiving. The whole flowing development of man's relationship to God, in "his levels of uniqueness and universality"<sup>224</sup> are recapitulated in Christ. In him is summed up all that is best in the religious life of mankind not only of Israel but of the whole human race.<sup>225</sup> In him, the end is reached<sup>226</sup> and from him the whole of history opens out into the future.<sup>227</sup>

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221 Ibid., p. 53.

222 Ibid., p. 65.

223 Ibid., p. 71.

224 Ibid., p. 72.

225 Ibid.

226 Moran, Vision and Tactics, p. 102.

227 -----, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 69.

Christ is also God totally revealing himself to man<sup>228</sup> in a personal human way. In the past, God had revealed himself to man through visions, ecstasies, dreams, events and persons but in Christ he fully reveals himself by incarnating himself in the flesh of human nature. The Christians of the New Testament declare that what their eyes had at last seen and their hands had handled is the embodiment of what God has been saying all along to Abraham, Moses and the Prophets:

With Jesus Christ, the irreducible, concrete, fleshly word was spoken which expressed all that God wished to say or could say to the world. 'The secret of God becomes the secret of man, because this man is God. The veil of the temple that kept the holy of holies hidden is rent. The light is given, the light is united to men, and this union is not a philosophical system or an inspired book, but is someone living, the man Jesus Christ.'<sup>228</sup> From that moment onward, the expression 'word of God' could have only one strict and proper meaning: the personal Word. Any other use of 'word of God' is valid insofar as it shares in or throws light upon the person of the Word.<sup>229</sup>

The claim of uniqueness could at first sight appear narrow and arrogant depending on the way uniqueness is viewed. There are two ways uniqueness might be interpreted, in an exclusive or an inclusive sense.<sup>230</sup> An exclusive sense means that Christ is exclusively the truth, that all

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<sup>228</sup> Emile Mersch, Theology of the Mystical Body, trans. by Cyril Vollert, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1951, p. 388.

<sup>229</sup> Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 63.

<sup>230</sup> C.F.D. Moule, "Is Christ Unique?" in Moule (ed.), Faith, Fact and Fantasy, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1964. p. 105.



other religions and systems are false and Christianity alone is true. If, on the other hand, uniqueness is inclusive, it means that wherever truth is found, whether in other religions, in the words of great religious leaders, or through the findings of natural science and secular systems, it is somehow included and transcended in Christ.

It is in this latter sense that Christ is understood: "[...] the uniqueness of Christ and the uniqueness that the Christian seeks is not the dominating power of exclusivity but the receptive center of inclusivity."<sup>231</sup> Such a statement somehow presupposes that "all men are already related to Christ."<sup>232</sup> All men who go to the Father go through Christ and all men who are enlightened are enlightened by the Light of the World.

To affirm that all men are united in a bond of relationship is to imply that there is one destiny for the human race, a destiny which is not opposed to what man himself wants. "The Christian believes that if he digs deep enough he will find an identity between what he wants to do and what God does."<sup>233</sup>

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231 Gabriel Moran, Experiences in Community, New York, Herder and Herder, 1969, p. 33.

232 Ibid., p. 34. "Karl Rahner has made famous the notion of anonymous or latent Christianity [...] if one wishes to maintain both belief in the uniqueness of Christ and the necessity of a completely ecumenical stance, then one needs a theological link. Ineluctably, one is led to the claim that all men are already related to Christ. The church, in such a theology, is the making visible what is present everywhere."

233 Ibid., p. 114.

What God wants for man is that he become human:

The prophets of Israel have never announced a God upon whom their hearers' striving for security reckoned. They have always aimed to shatter all security and to proclaim in the opened abyss of the final insecurity the unwished-for God who demands that his human creatures become real, become human, and confounds all who imagine that they can take refuge in the certainty that the temple of God is in their midst.<sup>234</sup>

The fullness of what it means to be human is revealed in Christ who is the "key to the personal, social, and historical character,"<sup>235</sup> of man's way of being.

He is the norm of our concrete history, both that of the individual and the race; he is the one 'finite-infinite,' the only 'concrete-universal.' The truth, law, the good are revealed as not external criteria, but a human person; this is the way in which Christ is the final standard of human entelechy.<sup>236</sup>

Faith in Christ provides "the inspiration for accepting human history and seeing a meaning in it."<sup>237</sup> When this meaning is removed and when history has no support from beyond itself there is the danger that technology may serve only to enslave and to frighten man forcing him to

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<sup>234</sup> Martin Buber, Eclipse of God, New York, Harper, 1957, p. 73, quoted by Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 28.

<sup>235</sup> Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 71.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., p. 86-87.

<sup>237</sup> Gabriel Moran, Catechesis of Revelation, New York, Herder and Herder, 1966, p. 53.

escape the terrors of history and live in a world of unchanging archetypes.<sup>238</sup>

#### B. Way of Growing

"Faith in a God of history is the affirmation of the world moving towards its own future."<sup>239</sup> Growth in such a world has two characteristics: (i) secularity and (ii) eschatology.

(i) Secularity.- To describe man's growth as secular<sup>240</sup> is to claim "that God is to be found in the real, that is, in the world of human experience."<sup>241</sup> Man cannot find God or grow as an historical being by trying to escape

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<sup>238</sup> See Eliade, Cosmos and History, p. 160-162. "Basically the horizon of archetypes and repetition cannot be transcended with impunity unless we accept a philosophy of freedom that does not exclude God. And indeed this proved to be true when the horizon of archetypes and repetition was transcended for the first time by Judaeo-Christianism, which introduced a new category into religious experience: the category of faith, [...] since the 'invention' of faith, in the Judaeo-Christian sense of the word (for God all is possible), the man who has left the horizon of archetypes and repetition can no longer defend himself against that terror except through the idea of God."

<sup>239</sup> Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 60.

<sup>240</sup> Moran uses the word "secular" in the double sense that the "world" is used in the gospel: "The world is the place of sin and the power that holds man back from God. The world is at the same time the creation of God and the field of reconciliation." Experiences in Community, p. 58.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid., p. 58-59.

time into some realm of unchanging archetypes. He must begin by accepting the world as it is.<sup>242</sup>

One of the first steps in accepting the world is to accept oneself. This, man cannot do unless others first accept him. As man grows in his relation to others and opens himself to deeper communion, he finds himself. By getting to know another, he gets to know himself. In addressing another, he discovers himself. As he discovers himself and others he realizes that "human reality, despite all its problems, is a positive force,"<sup>243</sup> "[...] an impulse of freedom from within."<sup>244</sup> Movement towards an inner freedom is concomitant with growth towards maturity. "Freedom is the goal and the task of man's life. Precisely because it is the goal of human life, freedom cannot be comprehended antecedently; it is understood only in the process whereby it is attained."<sup>245</sup> Its attainment can be a frightful and mysterious burden:

At the end of all freedom is a court sentence: that's why freedom is too heavy to bear [...] For anyone who is alone, without God and without a master, the weight of days is dreadful. Hence, one must choose a master, God being out of style.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid., p. 112.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 106-107.

<sup>246</sup> Albert Camus, The Fall, New York, Random House, 1956, p. 132, quoted by Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 108-109.

Because of the burden there is the temptation to escape from freedom by handing it over to someone else who will make the decisions. A power is needed that will enable man to accept his freedom and push forward; it is the power to "accept human life in the daring risk of faith."<sup>247</sup> Freedom is a gift to be received. To receive the gift, man must let go of the freedom he has and surrender himself.

Man has to open up to God and accept what may come from his hands. This standing open at the center ought to be considered the focus of all human activity. Every step toward truth and every act of love is a movement inward to or outward from the complete surrender to God.<sup>248</sup>

The freedom spoken of is not for the Christian only, but for all men.

Freedom is to work outward through all levels of human flesh even to the transformation of the universe. All creation is to have its share in the liberty which belongs to the children of God. Just as the flesh of Christ was transformed through painful endurance, so all flesh is brought to freedom in patient acceptance.<sup>249</sup>

Freedom cannot be had in isolation from others. As soon as it becomes an individual seeking it becomes a self-glorifying, self-seeking security. To be free means to be free to love other people:

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<sup>247</sup> Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 109.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid., p. 110.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p. 111.

To be free is to establish that kind of dependency on others which develops personality. When the individual begins to understand that his life is relational, he will see that the choice is not between God and himself nor himself and other men. He must affirm all of them together.<sup>250</sup>

The Church has a role to play in the growth of the world community towards freedom. Freedom is not one of the virtues of the Christian Church; it is the very meaning of her life.<sup>251</sup> The Church is the witness to the freedom of Christ not by being a society apart from the temporal society or by being an ark of salvation in the midst of a sinful world, but by being a light of revelation.

The Church is not one society running parallel to other groups, with each having a particular and exclusive end. The Church exists to support the human endeavor to be human and to remind men that there may be more to the human than what they can see.<sup>252</sup>

To want a more particular or specific goal for the Church is not to appreciate the arduousness of this task or the importance of the outcome. Emmanuel Mounier once wrote that nothing more could be asked of the Christian "who pretends to become an angel by fleeing man and cursing him, than that he become a man, fully a man."<sup>253</sup> One of the greatest problems facing the world today is the "inability

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250 Ibid., p. 113.

251 Ibid., p. 114.

252 Ibid., p. 35.

253 Constantin Amarin, The Church in the Service of Liberty, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1963, p. 29, quoted by Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 36.

to let human beings be human,"<sup>254</sup> as is evident in the problems of segregation, discrimination and domination. Many of the rebellions in cities and on campuses are a struggle for "whole human persons in a whole human society. Uniting all the protests is a plea for trust in the human animal."<sup>255</sup>

The Church is in a position to act as a mighty protest against humanity on behalf of the whole of humanity. She can do this by supporting "all good things like sex, law or patriotism while being equally concerned that none of them is idolized."<sup>256</sup> Her faith and trust in human beings will enable her to set up flexible structures of dialogue<sup>257</sup> and responsibility. True dialogue confirms the other in his search for the truth. Truth comes through dialogue when love, confidence and fidelity are present. "Dialogue is co-extensive with freedom; both consist not in choosing pre-patterned alternatives but in generating new alternatives."<sup>258</sup> With every increase of freedom, the

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254 Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 45.

255 Ibid., p. 47.

256 Ibid.

257 Avery Dulles, "The Contemporary Magisterium," Theology Digest, Vol. 17, 1969, p. 304. "He [John XXIII] shifted the course of the church in a radically new direction, toward a dialogue with, and involvement in, the modern world."

258 Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 121.

world is brought closer to God through and with the freedom of Christ.

(ii) Eschatology.- Man's way of growing is not only a being with but a being toward. Hence, eschatology is closely related to secularity. The aspect of eschatology is what makes the difference in the Christian affirmation of the secular. Man who is ontologically bound to the world "reflexively discovers himself absorbed in the destiny of the world and driven by a thirst he cannot completely understand."<sup>259</sup>

The affirming of the end time is the moving power of history and the basis of change. History progresses not by the application of self-evident principles but by a dream of the future. The God of Israel and Christianity is the power of man's future who calls men to more than a prolongation of their possibilities.<sup>260</sup>

Faith in the God of promise predominates in the Judaic-Christian tradition giving a feeling for history that goes somewhere. In the New Testament, it is faith in the person of the risen Lord that keeps man's future open. "If such a belief were always central, then the task of Christians would clearly be to keep moving forward toward the completion of that promise."<sup>261</sup>

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259 Moran, Vision and Tactics, p. 11.

260 -----, Experience in Community, p. 62.

261 Ibid., p. 63.



The mark of the man straining forward is hope.<sup>262</sup>

The characteristics of a hope that waits in confident expectation that the material universe is being redeemed is its communal nature and its historical dimension.<sup>263</sup>

God's promise exists in the living community enroute. It is not a promise standing outside of time which will be given to man when he dies, nor is it something that was given in the past and is still operative today.<sup>264</sup> It is "what man is to co-operate in bringing about";<sup>265</sup> "it is a community now being transformed."<sup>266</sup> It does not allow the Christian to be unconcerned with the world; united with all men he is to co-operate in the redeeming of earthly reality. For this reason, his hope is inextricably joined with social revolution in protest against all forms of

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262 See Jurgen Moltman, Theology of Hope, New York, Harper, 1967, p. 46. "From first to last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present. The eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses everything here in the dawn of an expected new day."

263 Moran, Vision and Tactics, p. 103.

264 See Moltman, op. cit., p. 88. "The remembrance of the promise that has been given--of the promise in its givenness, not in its pastness--bores like a thorn in the flesh of every present and opens it for the future."

265 Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 64.

266 Ibid., p. 63.

inhumanity. The sign of the coming of the kingdom is not an obedient functionary but a loyal rebel.<sup>267</sup> The Christian cannot sit back in complacent idle satisfaction with the 'status quo.' In his concern to affirm all human values and to bring about the needed social reforms, he is out front, an all-out revolutionary<sup>268</sup> and an all-out secular man, the one who knows neither rest nor repose. His rebellion is not for the sake of rebellion because his incentive is "to open understanding and freedom to the boundless reality of personal value and communal love."<sup>269</sup> His rebellion is not a flight from present responsibilities but a deeper involvement with history.

A hope that is communal is a hope that is historical. The man filled with Christian hope has the courage to accept time because he believes that a real God speaks to real men in their real lives.<sup>270</sup> A God who speaks to a

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267 Ibid., p. 67.

268 See Moltman, op. cit., p. 330. Man is "to transform in opposition and creative expectation the face of the world in the midst of which one believes, hopes and loves.

269 Moran, Vision and Tactics, p. 75.

270 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1963, p. 87. "Time, in fact is either real time, in which man encounters God and accepts his will, or it is unreal time, lost and corrupted: time as the finite in self-contradiction, an unredeemed promise, a space full of nothing, duration leading nowhere, that is the time of sinners, the time in which God is not to be found because man flees the encounter; the time that becomes punishment for him. Hence he will try to escape

a man in his real life is a God who speaks to man in his present. "The insistence upon the present is not a negation of past and future but is instead an affirmation of man. Man has a present (and presence) because he can recognize his past and choose a future."<sup>271</sup> The only way man can have a past is if he finds his past in the present as he faces the future.

By focusing on the present as a communal movement toward the future, we do not disregard the past. Rather, we retain the past in the only way in which it can exist: as sedimented in the flesh and psyche of men who accept an historical community.<sup>272</sup>

Man has a model to show him how his past can be subsumed in the present as it opens out to the future. This model is Christ. "Belief in a risen Lord means that there is a way in which to hold together the record of faith from the past, the human resources of the present and the promise for the future."<sup>273</sup>

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from it by withdrawing into some timeless philosophical or mystical 'eternity,' but this is not for him, existential time, so it throws him back again into the experience of empty annihilating time, that time in which man makes himself and is thrown back upon himself. This is the time in which the Gentiles lived 'having no hope and without God in the world'--time as the eternal recurrence of the same thing being the same thing, the cumulative expression of meaningless existence."

271 Moran, Experiences in Community, p. 74.

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid., p. 75.

To say that Christ is the model is not stating that man is given any answers to his life. "Christ does not supply any ready-made answers. His life is proposed as an answer to the question which man's being presupposes."<sup>274</sup>

If there are any answers they have to be discovered out of the experience of a people who trust in their own life history where the Spirit now works. Reason, experience and memory are not done away with but are more important than ever. Memory brings the past into focus not as an answer to the present but to bring light upon decisions made in the present. Without reason, there is no conceptual understanding of experience.

What is implied in this conception of time forms the basis for creativity and a moral life that is dynamic and living rather than passive and static.

A life that is made to fit pre-established patterns is not able to be creative. Creativity demands a future-oriented world and a society centered upon the interpersonal.

Not just the teachers of physics and mathematics but even teachers of theology cannot pass on the body of correct answers to known problems. Education can only strive to shape a style of thinking in people so that when they meet future problems they may bring to them a creative response.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Moran, "The God of Revelation," p. 13.

<sup>275</sup> -----, Experiences in Community, p. 123.

This pertains also to morality. "Morality needs a religious life out of which it can grow organically."<sup>276</sup> Morality is more of a positive attitude toward life than a positive attitude toward commandment. This does not deny the presence of sin in the world, but sin, as here conceived, is the failure to affirm life; it is apparent as a counter force in every step of the way. It means, "as it does in the Bible, to lose one's path, to go off the track, to maintain the 'status quo' instead of going forward."<sup>277</sup> It is often the result of man's fear.

Because of fear, men constantly set up barriers that cut off part of the being that is human. Men are frightened of themselves and they are frightened of others. Therefore, they build walls of security and run away from their cowardice and ignorance.<sup>278</sup>

The way to overcome fear is not by hedging man in but by allowing him to grow "with the rhythm of time that God gives to man to progress toward maturity. It is by accepting this natural growth that the strength and impetus will be found to go beyond it."<sup>279</sup>

The sign of growth is joy and celebration.<sup>280</sup> The high point of Christian celebration is the Eucharist. From

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276 Moran, Vision and Tactics, p. 124.

277 -----, Personal interview ... taped, May 27, 1969.

278 -----, Experiences in Community, p. 59-60.

279 -----, Catechesis of Revelation, p. 50.

280 See Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

such celebrations of life comes the sustenance to grow as a historical man in a secular, eschatological way.

### C. Way of Knowing

Moran, unlike Fontinell<sup>281</sup> and others who have given up the word knowledge, stresses the importance of retaining the word.<sup>282</sup> He uses it to express man's way of being-in-the-world.<sup>283</sup> He uses it to define what he means by revelation: "Revelation is a personal union in knowledge between God and a participating subject in the revelational history of a community."<sup>284</sup>

Although Moran refers to revelation as knowledge, he denounces those who say that revelation consists of revealed truths or that revelation is contained in scripture. The notion of revealed truth, he says, is "inhibitive of personal faith and mature freedom, it is creative of an

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281 See, Fontinell, "Religious Truth in a Relational and Processive World," p. 287-291.

282 Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 83. "Whereas they tend to equate knowledge with words and concepts, or rather with static entities cut off from the real world, I deny that this equation should be made. [...] This use of words is a direct consequence of our failure to investigate truth and knowledge at the level at which they must be understood."

283 Moran, taped interview, June 7, 1969. "I take 'to know' simply 'to be' in an intense way."

284 Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 93.

idolatrous situation. For a revealed truth in Christianity can be nothing but an idol."<sup>285</sup>

Moran has been criticized for making such statements. It is, therefore, necessary to understand what he means when he says that revelation is knowledge. Understanding this is to understand the nature of all knowing which involves the whole man in his personal, social and historical dimensions. Following is an attempt, by way of summary, to discuss revelation as knowledge under the headings: (i) Knowledge: Primordial Experience; (ii) Knowledge and Conceptualization; and (iii) Knowledge and Doctrine.

(i) Knowledge: Primordial Experience.- "Human knowledge is the inner presence of being to itself mediated by its relation to the other."<sup>286</sup>

In order to understand how man knows, it is necessary to go back to a pre-conceptual experience, to the primordial ground of unity in man's being in the world, to that foundation which precedes any explicit knowledge. At this level man does not have any knowledge,<sup>287</sup> but he is

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285 Moran, "The God of Revelation," p. 12.

286 -----, Theology of Revelation, p. 84.

287 Ibid., p. 67. "Although there is a basic presence to self which inclines man toward knowing, he is born without any actual knowledge. The conjunction of the capacity or thirst for knowledge with bodily presence to the world brings him into conscious reflexive presence to himself and others." See also: Carlos Cirne-Lima, Personal Faith, New York, Herder and Herder, 1965, p. 61-136.

born with a great capacity to know which does not allow him to stand neutral before the whole of reality but pushes him forward in the direction of the absolute completion of his nature--a share in the life of the Trinity.<sup>288</sup> "Every man is born into a supernatural order and is oriented toward a supernatural end before he becomes consciously and reflexively aware of it."<sup>289</sup> Every man is "faced with the Christian mystery of revelation in terms which are conatural to him prior to any scriptural or doctrinal instruction."<sup>290</sup> The unevangelized man who stands open to the whole of reality and does what he thinks he should "has already experienced God's revelation and has already accepted God's grace."<sup>291</sup>

The relation man has to being, together with the thrust forward to the fullness of life, expresses itself in an urge to lay hold of the truth in the fullness of understanding. "This union is brought to full reflexive consciousness only by progressive conceptual expression and dialogue."<sup>292</sup> Neither the conceptual expression nor any

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288 Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 166. See also, Karl Rahner, "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," in Theological Investigations, trans. by Cornelius Ernst, Vol. I, Baltimore, Helicon, 1961, p. 297-317.

289 Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 166. See also, Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. by John W. Harvey, New York, Oxford Press, 1968.

290 Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 166-167.

291 -----, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 213.

292 -----, Theology of Revelation, p. 85.



form of objectification is the revelation since God does not exist as either someone outside man or inside man. God's presence "precedes the distinction of inner and outer."<sup>293</sup> God's presence is the ground of man's being which is a pre-predicative relation of man and being, a foundation which precedes the subject-object split. From the prior relationship, objective and subjective elements derive:

The basic relationship is that which constitutes a subject in being and relates subjects to one another. The affirmation of particular objective facts unfolds within the prior relationship which establishes the subject in truth.<sup>294</sup>

The subjective and objective elements are "the symbolic expressions of a revelation which both causes and is affected by this inner-outer manifestation."<sup>295</sup> They are the secondary processes of a primary experience. Although they are secondary, they are very important to the whole knowing process and must, therefore, be studied next.

(ii) Knowledge and Conceptualization.- Although human knowledge presupposes a pre-predicative comprehension of truth, there can be no human knowledge without verbalization and conceptualization. Without the word, the primordial

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293 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 223.

294 Ibid.

295 Ibid.

experience, or the simple global awareness is submerged in obscurity.

Each concept is an advance and a dynamic tendency in which perceived data are set against the total horizon [...] Conceptualization is an attempt to express various aspects of a known reality; such an attempt is always 'an infinite search which approaches its goal only asymptotically.'<sup>296</sup>

Although words cannot adequately express a deep experience, they, nevertheless, help to clarify the experience. They are the necessary medium by which to reveal something to another. They are also necessary for any kind of growth in knowledge:

Mere conceptualization is not to be attacked, therefore, since this is to attack the human condition. Concepts are rather to be understood within an originating, primitive cognitive intention which carries the knowing process forward. A continuous process of differentiation and integration gradually fills out man's pre-grasp or drive toward the plenitude of being.<sup>297</sup>

Through the symbolism of language man's knowledge is able to become a full human reality. Language helps "to forge the individual consciousness and its religious experience."<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 87. See also, Karl Rahner, "Development of Dogma," in Theological Investigations, Vol. I, p. 64.

<sup>297</sup> Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 88. See also, Albert Dondeyne, Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith, trans. by E. McMullen and J. Burheim, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University, 1958, p. 153.

<sup>298</sup> Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 105.

Words are, therefore, intrinsic to human knowledge. Christ was not immune to the necessity of words. "The direct awareness of God in the human understanding of Christ became truly human knowledge only when it was brought to light by human words."<sup>299</sup> When the apostles preached they did not deliver truths that were given to them but they tried to express the revelational experience they had. Their words "were neither words about God nor words dictated by God,"<sup>300</sup> nor human words on a divine truth but were words which could "set before him Jesus Christ."<sup>301</sup>

When the preaching of the apostles became fixed in writing, the spoken words were preserved intact. This deposit ensures that the Spirit of Jesus will be recognized; it is the objective structure which does not inhibit man's growth forward but "rather guarantees the revelational process."<sup>302</sup> This is so, because:

The word points below and above itself not because of its emptiness but because of its wealth of meaning. The word originates out of the depths of man's pre-conscious bodily presence in the world and carries within itself an intrinsic reference to an end beyond itself.<sup>303</sup>

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299 Ibid., p. 117.

300 Ibid.

301 Ibid., p. 118.

302 Ibid., p. 107.

303 Ibid., p. 119.

This is not only true on the natural level but is true of the Scriptures. Holy Scripture does not contain revelation but it mirrors the revealing God.<sup>304</sup> The purpose of words is not to close off the revelation of the person but "to open out on life and communicate more than could ever be put in words [...] 'The proposition is always a kind of window through which a view may be gained of the thing itself, and implies in its full sense (as Communication) this view of the thing through proposition (in its stated sense)<sup>305</sup>."<sup>306</sup>

Although the words do not contain the revelation, they can be the cause of revelation. Language not only expresses thought but helps to shape thought. It not only expresses the community but helps to shape the community. The scriptural texts emerged from the community and they continually point back to that life. "The purpose of the New Testament writing was to express, to reflect, and to deepen the communal life in the Spirit; and the purpose of the canon was to guarantee that this more than written reality would continue."<sup>307</sup>

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304 Ibid.

305 Rahner, Development of Dogma, p. 69.

306 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 127.

307 -----, Theology of Revelation, p. 109.

Belief, therefore, is not to a written text but to God who is ever present revealing himself. To equate revelation or knowledge with the written or spoken word is to deny its personal, social and historical character. Revelation is not something static, an object or a thing. Revelation is a personal reality that happens between persons. "If there is revelation anywhere in the Church today, it can only be in the conscious experience of people."<sup>308</sup> Scripture serves in the mediation of God's word. Scripture becomes living when it is "bodied forth in transforming man."<sup>309</sup> The role of doctrine is to aid in this embodiment.

(iii) Knowledge and Doctrine.- Because of the insistence of the Catholic Church's teaching upon doctrine, she has been charged with equating revelation with doctrine and truths, and of reducing faith to the acceptance of these truths and doctrines. What does Moran answer to such a charge?

It is not enough to say that revelation is knowledge for there is the danger that knowledge will be equated with an amassing of facts and data. Neither can one stop at repeating that "revelation is a personal communion of knowledge, an interrelationship of God and the individual within a believing community."<sup>310</sup>

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308 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 149.

309 Ibid., p. 154.

310 Moran, Catechesis of Revelation, p. 13.

What needs to be understood is the role of doctrine in the Church. Moran discusses the doctrinal aspect of revelation under the following three headings: (a) the doctrinal aspect of revelation to the apostles; (b) the doctrinal development through the reflection of Christian people and especially theologians; and (c) the official and authoritative teaching in the Church.

(a) Doctrinal Understanding of the Apostles.- The apostles met God in Jesus Christ who is "the mystery of God."<sup>311</sup> They met God through a personal relationship of love and knowledge which can never be understood in words, first, because a personal relationship is a mystery, the depth of which cannot be surfaced in words, and secondly, "man cannot grasp the revelation from without because he is within it."<sup>312</sup>

Christ himself did not grasp God in the form of doctrines about God. His awareness of himself was only gradually assimilated into a knowledge that was communicable and objective.<sup>313</sup> Although his experience of the Godhead could not be exhausted by human statements, nevertheless, "he could and did make true statements about God, that is, statements which were neither false nor empty."<sup>314</sup>

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311 Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 165.

312 Ibid., p. 166.

313 Ibid., p. 168.

314 Ibid.

The apostles shared in Christ's knowledge not by sharing in statements about Christ but through their relationship with him. "He gave them a participation in his life not primarily by instructing them in doctrine, but by living with them."<sup>315</sup> Although their experience of him could never be reduced to doctrines or truths, yet these are a necessary element in their knowing experience. Man "cannot avoid representing his knowledge in concepts and words, yet the least reflection will make him realize that his concepts are rooted in a more primordial consciousness not completely expressible."<sup>316</sup> Hence, the need for continual reflection.

(b) Doctrinal Development in the Church.- If revelation is a communion in knowledge between man and God, there is need for continual reflection upon the experience. The purpose of the continual reflection is "to deepen the understanding of revelation itself."<sup>317</sup> The result of the reflection is the formulation of truths which help to bring out the implicit meaning of what is given in experience. Just as in the past there arose prophets who reflected deeply upon their own lives and the lives of their brothers and spoke interpretive words, so too, God continues to raise up men to help make explicit what is implicit. Although this is the work of

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315 Ibid.

316 Ibid., p. 169.

317 Ibid., p. 173.

all adult Christians, it is especially the work of the theologian. "The theologian is an adult Christian who, taking cognizance of what he possesses, reflects upon it, analyzes the complex content of his faith, builds it up, unifies it."<sup>318</sup> The work of the theologian is not the science of drawing logical conclusions with the means taken for the end, but with the help of the Spirit who "is the principle of all continuity in all doctrinal development"<sup>319</sup> aids in the movement from a "living possession of truth on the part of the faithful to a more explicit formulation."<sup>320</sup>

Such a task does not cease. As man lives out his history, there is need for new concepts and words to express God's continuing revelation which has been present from the beginning.

(c) Authoritative Doctrinal Teaching.- God's revelation is to every member of the Church. The Holy Spirit has been present from the beginning giving understanding to the whole Church. But "if the Church is to be truly human, the divine guidance must find human expression in an authority structure."<sup>321</sup> This authority structure is not opposed to God's revelation within the whole Church. The function of

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<sup>318</sup> M.D. Chenu, Is Theology a Science?, New York, Hawthorn, 1958, p. 18, quoted by Moran, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 173.

<sup>319</sup> Moran, Theology of Revelation, p. 138.

<sup>320</sup> -----, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 174.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., p. 175.



the hierarchy "is not to possess and hand down the revelation, but to listen to, to guide, and to protect the faith of the whole Church in the living of revelation."<sup>322</sup> The role of the teaching authority is "not to decide the truth or falsity of what is in Scripture, but to ascertain the truth or falsity of individual interpretations that appear in the course of time."<sup>323</sup> Far from being inhibiting, this

[...] ought to be the guarantee that every sector of the Church and every individual within the Church can contribute an understanding of revelation. In this way it is the Church which provides the interpretative norm and not someone's school of theology.<sup>324</sup>

It is through the teaching authority of the Church that the revelation between living people emerges in the Church. It is through the word that knowledge becomes social. The doctrinal word is not the revelation itself, but it "is the outer, corporeal aspect of a reality that transcends all words and yet must be symbolized verbally if it is thoroughly to penetrate human existence."<sup>325</sup>

The teaching authority of the Church, therefore, is not present to curtail the freedom of the individual but to lead the individual in the community to freedom in faith.

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322 Ibid., p. 176.

323 Ibid.

324 Ibid., p. 177.

325 Ibid., p. 178.

Her doctrinal statements and her conciliar definitions are

[...] more in the nature of starting points or frameworks within which to live and work than of conclusions. Each of the truths reached in the Church's progress is intended to bring into a greater unity the witness to a revelation which is refracted through but never bottled up in human statements.<sup>326</sup>

Always present is the temptation to substitute the truths for the living God. "To fall into this trap [is] to close off history and introduce a God above man."<sup>327</sup> The formulation of truth is not to close off, but to aid, the forward movement of experience. Its expression is an intrinsic element in the knowing process where knowing is understood as "man's primordial receptiveness to being and man's thrust forward to the fullness of life."<sup>328</sup>

In conclusion, throughout Moran's whole presentation is an emphasis or a call to return to experience. Such a call, however, is not new, as is witnessed by the Modernist movement with its attempt to rethink the foundations of Catholic doctrine in a way that would take more account of historical development and the conscious subject. After the condemnation of modernism for its intrinsicism, the call to

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326 Ibid., p. 183.

327 Moran, "The God of Revelation," p. 15.

328 Ibid., p. 11.

experience again becomes eclipsed by an over-emphasis on an extrinsic notion of revelation. But, once again, the call is renewed. In these pages, the call is heard through the writings of Newman, Blondel, Rahner and the North American theologians, all of whom attempt to return to experience while avoiding the pitfalls of both extrinsicism and intrinsicism. These efforts are reflected in the writings of Moran who discusses the nature of revelation by going back to a point which undercuts the subject-object dichotomy, that of the pre-predicative relation of man and being. When experience is seen as connoting the relational, God is understood as neither inside man nor outside man, but as preceding the distinction of inner and outer. God is he who is present to man from within human history in the intimacy of a person-to-person relation inviting each man forward to the fullness of his humanity. In this sense, revelation can be described as historical, as personal communion and as an interrelationship of God and the individual within a believing community.

## CHAPTER II

### CARL ROGERS: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DYNAMIC IMAGE OF MAN

#### 1. Historical Survey.

In discussing the dynamic image of man present in the writings of Carl Rogers, the following procedure is used: first, the presentation of those theorists who influenced or are reflected in Rogers' conception of man, and secondly, Rogers' own view. Since there are many approaches to an understanding of man, it should be pointed out that two broadly contrasting philosophical approaches to man's becoming are kept in mind, that of the Lockean and Leibnitzian traditions, as described by Gordon Allport.

According to Allport,<sup>1</sup> all personality theories gravitate towards one or the other of these two poles. Followers of the Lockean tradition view man's mind as a tabula rasa at birth, a passive entity acquiring content and shape through the impact of sensation reaching it from the outside world. In line with this tradition, motives are regarded as nothing more than drives, learning is simply the substitution of one affective stimulus for another or of one response for another, what is small and molecular is considered more fundamental

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<sup>1</sup> See, Gordon Allport, Becoming: Basic Consideration for a Psychology of Personality, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1967, c.1955. See p. 7-17 for what follows.

than what is large and molar and, what is earlier is more fundamental than what is later in development. Representatives of this trend are found in associationism of all types, including environmentalism, behaviorism, stimulus-response (familiarily abbreviated as S-R) psychology, and all other stimulus oriented psychologies. The image of man that predominates in this type of psychology is one that can be described as passive and reactive, as finished and closed.

In contrast, the followers of the Leibnitzian tradition view man's intellect as active and self-propelled, as purposive and future-oriented. According to this tradition, man is not a collection of acts, nor simply the locus of acts, but he is the source of his acts. Representatives of this trend are found particularly in the self-actualizing and processive psychologies. Adjectives that describe the image of man that emerges in this trend can be labelled as active, spontaneous and processive.

What Gordon Allport distinguishes as the Lockean and Leibnitzian approaches, William Snyder<sup>2</sup> polarizes as the Authoritarian and the Self-Deterministic poles. He distinguishes these two poles, authoritarianism versus self-determinism respectively, in the following areas of thought:

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<sup>2</sup> W.U. Snyder, in his commentary on an article written by Donald E. Walker, "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 89-91. (The commentary referred to is on pages 91-92, following this article.)

in philosophy, Logical Positivism(Locke) vs. Idealism(Kant); in politics, Paternalistic Government(Plato) vs. Democratic Government(Jefferson); in education, Scholasticism(tabula rasa) vs. Progressive Education(Dewey); in early twentieth century psychology, Behaviorism(Watson) vs. Hormic Psychology (McDougall); in early psychiatry, Psychobiology(Meyer) vs. Psychoanalytic Therapy(Freud); in modern psychology, Learning Theory(Dollard et al.) vs. Phenomenology(Syngg and Combs); and in modern psychotherapy, Directive Counseling(hypnosis, narco-synthesis, etc.) vs. "Self-Actualization"(Rogers).

According to this scheme, Freud and Rogers have more in common, for example, than Rogers and Dollard. Both Freud and Rogers are, therefore, considered as presenting a dynamic image of man, and are presented as belonging to the Leitnitzian, self-deterministic trend described above. Although they belong to the same stream, there are varying degrees of the Leibnitzian elements in each. Freud with his theory of plural instincts tends to occupy a halfway station between the poles of activity and reactivity, while Rogers, with his notion of self-actualization, occupies a position of extreme Leibnitzian.

This chapter concerns itself with what has been called the Leibnitzian trend, which is similar in many respects to the Dionysian trend described above.<sup>3</sup> The first part of the chapter, in tracing an ever-widening trend

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<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 1-3.

towards a dynamic image of man, begins with Freud as the originator of this trend. Following this is a brief consideration of the personality theories of Jung, Adler, Allport, Goldstein and Rollo May. The second part of the chapter considers the concept of man in the works of Carl Rogers. His works are seen as representative of a shift in psychology away from a static concept of man to a dynamic concept. Carl Rogers himself describes this trend:

I believe these papers belong in a trend which is having and will have its impact on psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, education, and other fields. I hesitate to label such a trend but in my mind there are associated with it adjectives such as phenomenological, existential, person-centered; concepts such as self-actualization, becoming, growth.<sup>4</sup>

#### A. Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory

Freud develops his theory of personality during one of the most creative periods in the history of man. At this time Charles Darwin publishes his Origin of Species<sup>5</sup> and Hermon von Helmholtz formulates the principle of the conservation of energy. The influence of these men and times upon Freud's intellectual development is evident. Through the evolutionary doctrine of Darwin man again becomes part of

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<sup>4</sup> Carl Rogers, Man Becoming: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. ix.

<sup>5</sup> Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, New York, The Modern Library, 1936, xvi-1000 p.

nature, an animal among animals, an object to be studied. Through the theory of the conservation of energy man appears as an energy system where energy which disappears from one part of the system reappears elsewhere. This principle of the conservation of energy forms the basis of the dynamic image of man portrayed by Freud.

In discussing this image, the following section limits itself to a brief presentation of the structure, dynamics and development of personality. Personality structure, according to Freud, comprises three separate but interacting systems: the id, the ego, and the superego.<sup>6</sup> The id is the original system of the personality. It is the material out of which the ego and superego are differentiated. It is the phenomenal energy system, the energy of which is obtained from the instincts and is completely unconscious. The id knows only the pleasure principle; it knows no laws, follows no rules, and considers only its own appetites. "[...] it is simply the pleasure-principle which draws up the programme of life's purpose [...] it aims, on the one hand, at eliminating pain and discomfort, on the other at the experience of intense pleasures."<sup>7</sup> It is the principle which

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6 Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. by James Strachey, New York, Norton, 1949, p. 12-123.

7 -----, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. from German by Joan Riviere, London, Hogarth Press, 1930, p. 27.



dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the very beginning and without the controlling power of the ego it would, because of its blind demands, destroy the whole organism.

The ego is developed from the cortical area of the id. Unlike the id, much of the ego is conscious. Its psychological function consists

[...] in raising the processes in the id to a higher dynamic level; its constructive function consists in interposing, between the demand made by an instinct and the action that satisfies it, an intellectual activity which, after considering the present state of things and weighing up earlier experiences, endeavors by means of experimental actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed line of conduct.<sup>8</sup>

Because of this function, the ego is known as the reality principle. It is the executive of the personality controlling the gateways from the id to the outer world and selecting the features of the environment to which it will respond. It decides what needs will be satisfied and in what manner. Its principal role is to mediate between the demanding needs of the organism and the surrounding environment.

The superego is man's conscience. Through the process of identification it incorporates into itself the traditional values and ideals of society as interpreted by the parents and enforced by means of a system of rewards and punishments. As the new mental agency it

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

[...] continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the corresponding people in the external world; it observes the ego, gives it orders, corrects it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like parents whose place it has taken.<sup>9</sup>

It replaces parental control with self-control. Unlike the ego, it does not merely postpone gratification of the instincts, it inhibits all instinctual gratification and tries to persuade the ego to strive for perfection.

Thus the id, the ego and the superego comprise the structure of personality. When the individual is in a state of health these three systems work together as a team under the tutelage of the ego for the benefit of the whole organism.

The most important feature of personality dynamics is the displacement of energy from one object choice to another, and the main energy source for man's behavior is the instincts. Freud writes:

Nous donnons aux forces qui agissent à l'arrière-plan des besoins impérieux du ça et qui représentent dans le psychisme les exigences d'ordre somatique, le nom d'instincts.<sup>10</sup>

He divides the instincts into two classes, the death instincts on the one hand, and the sexual instincts on the other.<sup>11</sup>

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9 Ibid., p. 10.

10 Sigmund Freud, Abrégé de Psychanalyses, traduit de l'allemand par Anne Berman, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1950, p. 7.

11 -----, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1922, p. 54.

The life or sex instincts serve the goals of individual survival and propagation of the race. The force by which the life instincts operate is called libido, or sexual longing, and is associated with the force of hunger and the will to power.<sup>12</sup>

The death instincts or the instincts of destruction work in silence, and for this reason little is known about them other than that they ultimately accomplish their aim, which is to bring the organism back to the inorganic state.<sup>13</sup> Freud postulates that organic matter evolved out of inorganic matter and that the death instinct is a manifestation of the unconscious wish to return to the inorganic. "The goal of all life is death,"<sup>14</sup> is one of Freud's most famous sayings. The instincts are but an "impulsion towards the restoration of a situation which once existed but was brought to an end by some external disturbance."<sup>15</sup> This is exemplified in the instincts by the phenomenon of the compulsion to repetition. In this sense, an instinct is regressive because it returns the person to a prior state, one that existed before the instinct appeared. It is also conservative because its aim

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12 Ibid., p. 316.

13 Sigmund Freud, An Autobiographical Study, trans. by James Strachey, London, Hogarth, 1953, p. 105.

14 -----, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 47.

15 -----, An Autobiographical Study, p. 105.

is to conserve the equilibrium of the organism by abolishing tensions.

The life and death instincts may work together, as for example, in eating, where food taken in to satisfy hunger must be destroyed before it can satisfy. These instincts can also neutralize each other or replace each other. Love, a derivative of the sex instinct, can replace or neutralize hate, the death instinct. Life is but the result of the working of the life instinct and the death instinct together or against each other.<sup>16</sup>

All the energy available for the development of the organism is contained in the life and death instincts. The id is the reservoir of this energy. All that happens in the personality can be seen in terms of the energy at work throughout the different systems. The instincts of the id demand gratification. The ego enables these needs to be satisfied by enabling the organism to perform transactions with the external environment. The transactions with the environment not only reduce tension but may also increase tension by threatening or harming the person.<sup>17</sup>

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16 Ibid., p. 105.

17 Sigmund Freud, "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety," in James Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 20, London, Hogarth, 1952, p. 93.

The function of anxiety is to warn the person of danger.<sup>18</sup> When the strength of the anxiety becomes too great, the ego tries to protect itself through the use of defense mechanisms which either distort reality or operate unconsciously to prevent the person from becoming aware of what is taking place.<sup>19</sup> These defense mechanisms may be used at any of the stages of development, thus preventing the person from proceeding to the next stage.

These stages of development through which the person passes on the way to adulthood, Freud calls the oral, the anal, the phallic, and the genital.<sup>20</sup> The first three stages are known as the pregenital period and occur very early in life. These first few years of life are decisive for the formation of personality. In fact, Freud feels that personality is pretty well formed by the end of the fifth year, and that subsequent growth consists for the most part of elaborating this basic structure.

If the person is able to pass successfully through these stages he enters what is known as the genital stage. This is the stage when the person passes from a pleasure-

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18 Ibid., p. 29-30; 138-141.

19 Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis, trans. by Joan Riviere, New York, Liveright, 1935, p. 253-262.

20 -----, New Introductory Letters on Psycho-Analysis, trans. by W.J.H. Sprout, New York, Norton, 1933, p. 134-136.

seeking, narcissistic individual into a reality-oriented socialized adult. However, it should not be thought that this stage is divorced from the previous stages. It rather represents the fusion and synthesis of the contributions of the oral, anal, and phallic stages.

Freud, in differentiating these four stages, is the first psychological theorist to emphasize the developmental aspects of personality and the importance of the early years of development. He is also the first to elaborate on the two principal mechanisms, identification and displacement, by which development takes place. Identification is the process by which the individual incorporates into his own personality the features of another person. The final personality represents an accumulation of numerous identifications made at the various stages of development. In the early years of life, the child usually identifies with his parents. Later on, the object of identification changes to meet new needs. The purpose of identification is to reduce tension by modeling behavior after that of someone else, and it is also a method by which one may regain a lost object.<sup>21</sup>

Displacement refers to the transfer of energy from one object to another. When an original object choice is unavailable a displacement takes place and a new cathexis is formed towards a substitute object. Displacement thus becomes

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 90-92.

one of the most important features of personality dynamics. By means of displacement both the variability and the diversity of behavior, as well as man's restlessness are accounted for. Practically all the adult person's behavior, his interests, tastes, habits, are the result of the displacement of energy from an original instinctual object choice. When the displacement results in an achievement which is no longer sexual but has a higher social or ethical valuation, what is known as sublimation occurs.<sup>22</sup> Civilization and works of art are the results of sublimated primitive instinct choices.

This rough sketch of the main ideas of Freud's personality theory cannot do justice to the subject. However, it is sufficient to indicate the strong biological orientation Freud gives to his theories and the dynamic theory of personality that he presents. It is also valuable in this thesis as a point of reference for what is to follow.

#### B. Jung's Analytic Theory

Originally a follower of Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung subsequently differs on basic tenets of Freud's personality theory and develops his own school of psychoanalysis, known as analytical psychology.

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<sup>22</sup> Sigmund Freud, "Two Encyclopaedia Articles," in Ernest Jones (ed.), The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud, New York, Basic Books, 1959, p. 131-133.

According to Jung, man's total personality consists of a number of differentiated but interacting systems. The main ones are the ego, the personal unconscious and its complexes, and the collective unconscious and its archetypes.

The ego is the center of the conscious mind; it is [...] the complex factor to which all conscious contents are related. It forms, as it were, the center of the field of consciousness, and insofar as this comprises the empirical personality, the ego is the subject of all personal acts of consciousness.<sup>23</sup>

The personal unconscious, a region adjoining the ego, is formed as the result of repressing, suppressing or forgetting experiences that were once conscious. Its contents can become conscious through dreams, fantasies or sometimes only as the result of analytic therapy. When it does emerge into consciousness, it often does so in the form of a complex which is a concept or idea with associated attitudes and emotions. Such complexes have the ability to initiate and organize behavior.

Below the personal unconscious is a deeper stratum of the unconscious. It is called collective because its contents are more or less universal, constituting a common

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<sup>23</sup> Violet S. de Laszlo (ed.), Psyche and Symbol: A Selection from the Writings of C.G. Jung, New York, Anchor Books, 1958, p. 2.



psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is identical in all men and present in every one.<sup>24</sup>

The contents of this collective unconscious are made up essentially of archetypes.<sup>25</sup> The archetypes are analogous to the instincts, so much so, that there "is good reason for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves; in other words, they are patterns of instinctual behavior."<sup>26</sup> They predispose man to react to his experiences in selected ways, such as, perceiving or reacting to a mother figure, experiencing the world as three-dimensional, or believing or worshipping a supreme being.

Some of these archetypes have become independent to the extent that they can be thought of as separate systems, the best known are: the persona, the anima and animus, the shadow and the self.

The persona<sup>27</sup> is the person's public personality; it represents the roles which the individual acts out in the family circle, at work and in social activities. Although the persona is necessary to enable the individual to adapt to

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<sup>24</sup> C.G. Jung, "The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," in Sir Herbert Read et al. (eds.), Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Vol. 9, Part I, New York, Pantheon Books, 1959, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 42-43.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 43-44.

<sup>27</sup> C. G. Jung, "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology," in Sir Herbert Read et al. (eds.), Vol. 7, p. 43.

various situations, it can be used as a mask to hide behind or as a barrier to keep others out. When too much energy is invested in maintaining the persona, other aspects of the personality go undeveloped and the person becomes alienated from himself.

The archetypes anima and animus refer to the bisexual nature of the person. The feminine archetype in man is called the anima, while the masculine archetype in woman is called the animus. These archetypes not only cause each sex to manifest characteristics of the opposite sex but they also motivate each sex to respond to the other.

While the persona represents the conscious ego with its numerous variations, the shadow represents the personal unconscious. The shadow<sup>28</sup> is the dark side of man, that is, all that man is ashamed of, all his uncivilized desires and emotions, all his animal instincts. Although its presence can be inferred from the contents of the personal unconscious, man has difficulty in recognizing and accepting it in his life. When he refuses to recognize the shadow, he projects it onto others which "projections change the world into the replica of one's own kingdom."<sup>29</sup> Jung says:

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<sup>28</sup> Jung, "The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," p. 20ff.

<sup>29</sup> de Laszlo, op. cit., p. 8.

The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real.<sup>30</sup>

To recognize and accept the shadow in oneself is, therefore, an important step to wholeness and completion.<sup>31</sup>

The archetype that represents man's wholeness and completion, Jung calls the self. The concept of the self, which cannot be grasped since it represents wholeness, is no more than a construct that serves to express an unknowable essence. It is a term that includes the totality of the psyche insofar as this manifests itself in an individual. It is not only the centre, but also the circumference that encloses consciousness and the unconscious; it is the centre of this totality, as the ego is the centre of consciousness.<sup>32</sup>

To attain the self is the goal of life. Like all archetypes, the self motivates man's behavior and causes him to search for wholeness and completion. Hence, the archetype of the self does not become evident until the person reaches middle age or until the different components of personality become more or less fully developed and integrated. When it does appear it can be characterized as a kind of

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30 Ibid., p. 7.

31 Jung, "The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious," p. 20.

32 -----, "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology," p. 236.

compensation for the conflict between inside and outside, and as the goal of something that has come to pass very gradually and with the experience of much pain. It is the most complete expression of individuality, the full flowering not only of the single individual, but of the group, in which each adds his portion to the whole.

The process by which the self is attained is called Individuation:

Individuation means becoming a single, homogeneous being, and, insofar as individuality embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own self. We could therefore, translate individuation as 'coming selfhood' or 'self-realization.'<sup>33</sup>

As individuation takes place, there is a shift in the centre of the total personality where the centre no longer coincides with the ego, but with the self, a point midway between the conscious and the unconscious. The self at this stage of development becomes the point of a new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a "virtual centre, which, on account of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation."<sup>34</sup>

Such a movement away from ego-centeredness to self-centeredness points to the importance of the concept of the self in Jung's psychology. It represents not only one of

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33 Ibid., p. 171.

34 Ibid., p. 219.

his most important psychological discoveries, but also the culmination of his study of archetypes. The struggle to become that self which one truly is gives to man's personality a forward-going character, whereby man, motivated by this goal, is constantly progressing or attempting to progress from a less complete stage to a more complete stage of development.

The recognition of this desire towards self-realization differentiates Jung from Freud in one aspect. Whereas Freud sees man only in terms of the endless repetition of instinctual drives that lead ultimately to death, Jung sees man in terms of creative potential seeking and striving for completion and rebirth. In another aspect, however, Jung's image of man is similar to Freud's in that both see man's development as biophysical in origin. Heredity is important to Jung for it is responsible for both the biological instincts and the archetypes that represent man's ancestral experiences. Development is but the unfolding of the original undifferentiated wholeness with which man is born.

It is not until the end of the nineteenth century that two new sciences begin to develop, that of sociology and anthropology. According to the theories of these new sciences an emphasis is put upon the social factors rather than the biological in the development of personality.

The following section deals with the social side of man by focusing in on the personality theory of Alfred Adler,

one of the first psychoanalysts to emphasize man's nature as fundamentally social. Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan are mentioned also because of their contribution to a social theory of man.

### C. Alfred Adler and Social Psychology

Alfred Adler's unique contribution to personality theory is the concept that man is inherently social in nature. Hall and Lindzey, commenting on this aspect in Adler's theory, write:

Man is, according to Adler, inherently a social being. He relates himself to other people, engages in co-operative social activities, places social welfare above selfish interest, and acquires a style of life which is predominantly social in orientation. Adler did not say that man becomes socialized merely by being exposed to social processes; social interest is inborn although the specific types of relationships with people and social institutions which develop are determined by the nature of the society into which a person is born. In one sense, then, Adler is just as biological in his viewpoint as are Freud and Jung. All three assume that man has an inherent nature which shapes his personality. Freud emphasized sex, Jung emphasized primordial thought patterns, and Adler stressed social interest. This emphasis upon the social determinants of behavior which has been overlooked or minimized by Freud and Jung is probably Adler's greatest contribution to psychological theory.<sup>35</sup>

Other aspects of man's behavior which Adler stresses are what he calls fictional finalism, striving for superiority,

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<sup>35</sup> C.S. Hall and G. Lindzey, Theories of Personality, 2nd ed., New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1970, c.1957, p. 120.

style of life and the creative self. Because of the importance of these concepts in rounding out Adler's image of man, they must each be given some consideration.

The theory of fictional finalism is the theory that man is motivated more by his expectations of the future than he is by experiences of the past. Goals themselves do not exist in the future but are subjectively present in the here-and-now as strivings or ideals which affect present behavior. The final goal, the principle of unity of the personality and the prepotent dynamic force of personality may be a fiction, that is, an ideal which is impossible to realize but which does affect man's striving and explains his conduct. Because it marks the line of direction for all man's actions and movements, it enables him to understand the hidden meaning behind his various separate acts and to see them as parts of a whole. Adler writes:

The science of Individual Psychology developed out of the effort to understand that mysterious creative power of life--that power which expresses itself in the desire to develop, to strive and to achieve--and even to compensate for defeats in one direction by striving for success in another. This power is teleological--it expresses itself in the striving after a goal, and in this striving every bodily and psychic movement is made to co-operate [...]<sup>36</sup>

The goal towards which man strives is that of superiority. This striving for superiority is present in

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<sup>36</sup> Alfred Adler, The Science of Living, New York, Anchor Books, 1969, c.1929, p. 1.

every psychological phenomenon:

It runs parallel to physical growth and is an intrinsic necessity of life itself. It lies at the root of all solutions of life's problems. All our functions follow its direction. They strive for conquest, increase, either in the right direction or in the wrong direction. The impetus from minus to plus never ends. The urge from below to above never ceases. Whatever premises all our philosophers and psychologists dream of--self preservation, pleasure principle, equalization--all these are but vague representations, attempts to express the great upward drive.<sup>37</sup>

By superiority, Adler means a striving for perfection or completion, a meaning akin to Jung's theory of self-realization and to Goldstein's principle of self-actualization.<sup>38</sup> It is a striving found in every individual and is "innate in the sense that it is a part of life, a striving, an urge, a something without which life would be unthinkable."<sup>39</sup>

This drive can be said to be the only drive in man and the one to which all other strivings are related. In the normal person it manifests itself in social interest so that the final fictional goal is the perfection of mankind. The neurotic, on the other hand, also strives for superiority but in ways that serve the enhancement of self-esteem and in the exaggerated 'masculine protest' for power and self-aggrandizement.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> H.L. Ansbacher and R.R. Ansbacher, The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 103.

<sup>38</sup> See below, p. 148-149.

<sup>39</sup> Ansbacher and Ansbacher, op. cit., p. 104.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 108-109.



The desire for superiority grows out of feelings of inferiority. These feelings of inferiority which man inherits both biologically and psychologically, are followed after birth by a feeling of being incomplete. "To be a human being," says Adler, "means to feel oneself inferior."<sup>41</sup> Feelings of inferiority cause the individual to strive for a higher level of development. As soon as this level has been reached, the individual again feels inferior and the upward movement begins over. Such feelings are therefore the cause of all improvement in man's lot.

Science itself, for example, can arise only when people feel their ignorance and their need to foresee the future; it is the result of the strivings of human beings to improve their whole situation, to know more of the universe, and to be able to control it better. Indeed, it seems that all our human culture is based upon feelings of inferiority.<sup>42</sup>

The manner in which an individual moves towards superiority depends on his style of life. The style of life includes not only the individual's unique way of striving for the goal in his particular situation, but also the individual's opinion of himself and the world. Once the style of life is set (it is set by the age of four or five), it determines the unique behavior of the individual. "When the prototype--that early personality which embodies the goal--is formed, the line of direction is established and the

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<sup>41</sup> Alfred Adler, Social Interest: A Challenge to Mankind, trans. by John Linton and Richard Vaughan, New York, Capricorn Books, 1964, p. 96.

<sup>42</sup> Ansbacher and Ansbacher, op. cit., p. 117.

individual becomes definitely oriented."<sup>43</sup> Although many different ways can be acquired to express the style of life, yet these ways are merely aspects of the same basic style acquired at an early age.

When Adler first describes the style of life, he describes it as developing in compensation for feelings of inferiority. He writes:

We have seen how human beings with weak organs, because they face difficulties and feel insecure, suffer from a feeling or complex of inferiority. But as human beings cannot endure this for long, the inferiority feeling stimulates them, as we have seen to movement and action. This results in a person having a goal. Individual psychology has long called the consistent movement toward the goal a plan of life. But because this name has sometimes led to mistakes among students, it is now called a style of life.<sup>44</sup>

Adler later develops the theory of the creative self, a more dynamic principle, to explain the style of life adopted by the individual. This concept becomes his most important one. It is:

[...] Adler's crowning achievement as a personality theorist. When he discovered the creative power of the self, all of his other concepts were subordinated to it; here at last was the prime mover, the philosopher's stone, the elixir of life, the first cause of everything human for which Adler had been searching. The unitary, consistent, creative self is sovereign in the personality structure.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Adler, The Science of Living, p. 35.

<sup>44</sup> Ansbacher and Ansbacher, op. cit., p. 173.

<sup>45</sup> Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., p. 127.

Adler invests the creative self with the power to give meaning to life, to create the goal of life and to choose the means to the goal. He sees it as the active principle which allows the personality to be subjective, dynamic, unified and personal, and as the principle that creates the individual's unique style of life.

Related to this concept is the role of consciousness in man. Adler places consciousness as the core of personality. Man's conscious reasons dominate his unconscious ones and motivate his behavior. Man is ordinarily aware of what he is doing, where he is going and how he is going. Because man does not attend to all facts at once does not mean there is a hidden buried unconscious. What is not in awareness can come to awareness at any given moment if the mental functions are efficient. He is fully aware of the meaning of his actions for his own self-realization. Conscious reasons over unconscious drives motivate man's behavior. In this principle, Adler differs radically from Freud.

Putting all these concepts together, that of fictional finalism, striving for superiority, style of life and the creative self, is a picture of man that differs in many respects from Freud's. In the words of Hall and Lindzey:

By endowing man with altruism, humanitarianism, co-operation, creativity, uniqueness, and awareness, Adler restored to man a sense of dignity and worth that psychoanalysis had pretty largely destroyed. In place of the dreary materialistic picture which horrified and repelled many readers of Freud, Adler

offered a portrait of man which was more satisfying, more hopeful, and far more complimentary to man. Adler's conception of the nature of personality coincided with the popular idea that man can be master, and not the victim, of his fate [...]<sup>46</sup>

Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan are two other psychologists who stress man's social nature.

The essential theme that runs through Erich Fromm's writings is that man feels lonely and isolated because he has become alienated from nature and man. The specific needs that arise from this condition are the need for relatedness, the need for transcendence, the need for rootedness, the need for identity, and the need for a frame of reference or orientation.<sup>47</sup> The ways in which these needs express themselves and find fulfillment are determined by the social arrangements under which man lives. Man can either unite himself with other people in the spirit of love and shared work or he can find security by submitting to authority and conforming to society. The latter way is escape from freedom and denial of personhood; the former way is the key to self-realization as a social, productively active human being. When man unites with others in the spirit of love and co-operation, a type of society is formed

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>47</sup> Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, New York, Rinehart and Co., 1941, *passim*.

[...] in which man relates to man lovingly, in which he is rooted in bonds of brotherliness and solidarity [...] a society which gives him the possibility of transcending nature by creating rather than by destroying, in which everyone gains a sense of self by experiencing himself as the subject of his powers rather than by conformity, in which a system of orientation and devotion exists without man's needing to distort reality and to worship idols.<sup>48</sup>

Harry Stack Sullivan, another social psychologist, is best known for his interpersonal theory.<sup>49</sup> According to this theory, all that the individual is, has been, and will be, is mainly the result of his interpersonal contacts. Through these contacts, the individual is given opportunities to pass from an animal organism into a human being.<sup>50</sup>

The main purpose of the psychiatric interview is to provide the type of relationship needed by the individual to help him overcome failure and cope with the tensions that are inevitable in relating to others. When reciprocal emotion can occur between the therapist and the client, the client is in a position to bring to awareness information which will clarify the more troublesome aspects of his life

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<sup>48</sup> Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, New York, Rinehart and Co., 1955, p. 362.

<sup>49</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry, ed. by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel, New York, W.W. Norton Inc., 1953, see esp. p. 16-20.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 49-310.

and which will allow him to face the tensions which are part of living.<sup>51</sup>

In conclusion, Adler, Fromm and Sullivan all stress man's social nature. All three oppose Freud's instinct doctrine and the fixity of human nature; all agree that heredity is important, not so much for the specific traits and needs it presents but more for the potentiality with which it invests man; all assert that human nature is malleable; and all emphasize the conscious over the unconscious in man. Man knows what he wants and he moves consciously towards the goals he has chosen. Sullivan, in particular, underscores the uniqueness and creativity of the individual. Despite the determining factors in the person's life, he is able to retain some degree of creativity. Indeed, it is through his creative powers that man is able to change society so that it, too, is malleable and plastic.

A psychologist who emphasizes the uniqueness of man is Gordon Allport. Through his theory of traits man stands out as unique and different from every other person. To his theory we now turn.

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<sup>51</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry: The First William Alanson White Memorial Lectures, published by the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1940, p. 91.

## D. Gordon Allport and Trait Psychology

The writings of Gordon Allport stress the uniqueness and complexity of the normal individual who is motivated more by conscious determinants than by the unconscious ones. Flowing from this emphasis upon the conscious over the unconscious is Allport's definition of the healthy personality which he defines as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought."<sup>52</sup> In this definition, the phrase dynamic organization refers to the organized personality that is developing and changing in an integrated fashion. Psychophysical is a reminder that personality is "neither exclusively mental or exclusively neural. The organization entails the function of both mind and body in some inextricable unity."<sup>53</sup> The word determine stresses the determining tendencies that influence the individual's behavior. "Personality is something and does something."<sup>54</sup> What the individual does and is is characteristic and unique to him. Even his shared acts and concepts are "at bottom individual and idiomatic."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, p. 28.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p. 28-29.

This definition of the healthy personality is brought out even more clearly in the meaning Allport gives to the concepts of traits, the proprium and functional autonomy and in his description of the mature personality.

Trait<sup>56</sup> refers to those predispositions to behavior which are shared by a number of individuals, while personal disposition, a unit of the same order as trait, refers to a predisposition which is peculiar to the individual. Personal dispositions are distinguished as cardinal, central and secondary. A cardinal disposition is so pervasive that almost every act of a person is traceable to its influence; for example, Tolstoy is known to have had only one cardinal disposition as he neared the end of his life, that of simplification. Few people, however, can trace their behavior to a single disposition. More typical are the central dispositions, usually not more than five or ten in number, which are of the type mentioned in writing a letter of recommendation or the terms used to describe the main interests which dominate a person's life. Secondary dispositions are more limited yet in their occurrence and are less crucial in their influence on personality.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 332-356.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 357-375.



All personal dispositions have motivational power in varying degrees,<sup>58</sup> the most dynamic ones, such as ambitions and interests, initiate behavior, while the less dynamic ones direct behavior rather than initiate it.

The proprium is the self which is constantly in a state of development. The first aspect of the self to develop is the sense of bodily self. Following this is a movement towards a continuing development of self-identity, self-esteem, self-extension, self-image, rational coping, and finally, propiate striving.<sup>59</sup> These seven aspects of selfhood, Allport unites in the term "proprium."<sup>60</sup> The proprium, combining as it does all the ego functions, avoids the equating of the term ego or self to a homunculus who directs and organizes personality. Although the proprium first emerges through quasi-mechanical principles, it gradually becomes functionally autonomous and is then the main source of subsequent learning and the principle of unity within the personality.

The phrase functional autonomy has to do with motivation. An adequate theory of motivation has several requirements. It acknowledges the contemporaneity of motives.

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58 Ibid., p. 370-375.

59 Ibid., p. 110-127.

60 Ibid., p. 127-138.

"Whatever moves us must move us now [...] the past is not important unless somehow it can be shown to be dynamically active in the present."<sup>61</sup> It is a pluralistic theory which includes both the deficit motives and interests. It ascribes dynamic force to the cognitive processes such as planning and intention, two processes which refer to what the individual is trying to do, and where he is going. And finally, an adequate theory allows for the concrete uniqueness of motives.<sup>62</sup>

All these requirements for a theory of motivation are contained in Allport's concept of "functional autonomy,"<sup>63</sup> which allows for the concrete uniqueness of personal motives and recognizes "the spontaneous, changing, forward-looking, concrete character that adult motivation surely has."<sup>64</sup>

Functional autonomy regards adult motives as varied, and as self-sustaining, contemporary systems, growing out of antecedent systems, but functionally independent of them. Just as a child gradually outgrows dependence on his parents, becomes self-determining, and outlives his parents, so it is with many motives. The transition may be gradual but it is nonetheless drastic.. As the individual (or the motive) matures, the bond with the past is broken. The tie is historical, not functional.<sup>65</sup>

Such a concept marks a shift of emphasis in the theory of motivation from geneticism in its various forms to the

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61 Ibid., p. 220.

62 Ibid., p. 220-226.

63 Ibid., p. 226.

64 Ibid., p. 227.

65 Ibid.

present go of interests that contemporaneously initiate and sustain behavior. By permitting a relative divorce from the past of the organism, the way is made clear for the unique, mature person emphasized in Allport's theory of the person.

This mature unique person can be identified by the following characteristics.<sup>66</sup> He has a widely extended sense of self which includes the ability to participate in and enjoy a wide variety of activities and to project into the future through planning and hoping. This is to say that "maturity advances in proportion as lives are decentered from the clamorous immediacy of the body and of ego centeredness."<sup>67</sup> He is able to relate warmly to others in both intimate and non-intimate contacts and he possesses a fundamental emotional security and acceptance of himself. He is able to perceive, think and act realistically. He is capable of self-objectification, of which insight, the ability to understand oneself, and a sense of humor, a correlate of insight, are main components.<sup>68</sup> And finally, he has a unifying philosophy of life that gives purpose and meaning to his life. The form this philosophy takes is often that of religion which represents one of the most comprehensive

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66 Ibid., p. 275-307.

67 Ibid., p. 285.

68 Ibid., p. 291.

sources of unifying philosophies, although there are many others, such as the esthetic and the social.

This sketch of Allport's personality theory is sufficient to point to his main contribution to an understanding of man. Through his theory of functional autonomy, he gives importance to the conscious determinants of behavior, and as a corollary to this, to the techniques of self-report. His theory of traits and personal dispositions is a plea for the detailed study of the individual person. Like Jung, Allport places great emphasis upon the forward-looking character of personality. And finally, Allport's work "stands as a monument to a wise and sensitive scholar who [is] committed to representing the positive aspects of human behavior in terms that [respect] the uniqueness of every living organism."<sup>69</sup>

Choosing from what has been said about man thus far, is a description of man possessing the following characteristics: man is dynamic (Freud); he is forward-looking and possesses an urge to self-realization (Jung and Sullivan); he is basically social in nature and suffers when he lacks these relationships (Adler, Fromm); and finally, he is unique and individual (Allport).

As man moves towards self-actualization, he does so, not as a fragmented and divided person, but as a unified whole.

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69 Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., p. 295.

This is the main contribution of Kurt Goldstein and the organismic theorists which follow.

#### E. Kurt Goldstein and Organismic Theory

Kurt Goldstein through his work on brain-injured soldiers of the First World War comes to the conclusion that man behaves as a unified whole and not as a series of integrated parts. He writes:

After all, what is the character of the picture of the organism we are seeking? It is not by a mere addition of brick to brick that we try to construct this building, but it is rather the actual Gestalt of the intrinsic architecture of this building that we try to discover, a Gestalt from which the phenomena, which were formerly equivocal, would now become intelligible as belonging to a unitary, ordered, relatively constant formation of a specific structure.<sup>70</sup>

The relationship of one part of the organism or its function to the rest of the organism is that of figure and ground.<sup>71</sup> The figure is that which emerges and stands out against a background, for example, the perception of a fireplace against the background of the rest of the room. Just as a fireplace cannot be viewed in isolation from the background of the room so neither should one part of an organism be treated in isolation from the rest of the body. Figure

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<sup>70</sup> K. Goldstein, The Organism, A Holistic Approach to Biology, New York, American Book Co., 1939, p. 403.

<sup>71</sup> -----, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940, p. 12.

and ground are so intimately connected that neither can be properly evaluated without the other. The connection is so close that when either the figure or background changes the other also changes. What is meant can be seen by observing the change of color when presented on different backgrounds or the excitation in a near part of the nervous system giving rise to excitation in the distant parts.

To treat a particular symptom, therefore, as a separate entity is inadequate. Each single symptom has to be considered in terms of its functional significance for the total personality. The physician must know "the organism as a whole, the total personality of his patient, and the change which this organism as a whole has suffered through disease."<sup>72</sup> Not only is it necessary to know and observe the organism as a whole but to know and observe the individual as part of the whole of nature, particularly of the human society to which he belongs. Such a view "leads to the study of the interrelationships between the individual and society, the differences between nations and races, and the variations in individuals themselves."<sup>73</sup>

When the individual is studied as a whole it becomes evident that all the performances of the organism are but the

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72 Ibid., p. 6.

73 Ibid.

expressions of the activity of the organism to self-actualization.

Since the tendency to actualize itself as fully as possible is the basic drive, the only drive by which the sick organism is moved, and since the life of the normal organism is determined in the same way, it is clear that the goal of the drive is not a discharge of tension, and that we have to assume only one drive, the drive of self-actualization.<sup>74</sup>

The movement towards self-actualization is attained through two processes: equalization and coming to terms with the environment.

Through the equalization process, energy in the organism becomes balanced; when energy is balanced, an average state of tension is maintained which enables the organism to actualize itself according to its nature. The

[...] equalization process fixes the threshold and, with this, creates constancy, ordered behavior, and secures the very existence of the organism. Normal equalization demands the working of the whole organism; it is, in fact, an equalization between the excitation in near and distant parts. Normal life is ordered life because the equalization process takes place in relation to the tasks of the whole organism.<sup>75</sup>

The sick organism denotes a deviation from a state of balance. In abnormal conditions the organism has exaggerated some aspects of its behavior. It is, therefore, in a sense, in a state of disequilibrium which hinders its ability to come to terms with its environment.

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74 Ibid., p. 14.

75 Ibid., p. 5.

Coming to terms with the environment is essential to self-actualization. The milieu must be such that it allows for ordered behavior and for normal equalization. When the organism is placed in a situation in which it is not able to react in accordance with its essential capacities, it experiences anxiety, an inner experience of being faced with nothingness. In normal life, every individual has to go through such states of disorder or catastrophe. Individuals differ as to how much anxiety they can bear. "The capacity for bearing anxiety is the manifestation of genuine courage, in which ultimately one is concerned not with the things of the world but with a threat to existence."<sup>76</sup> The sick person is unable to cope with anxiety. His organism "achieves ordered behavior only by a shrinkage of its milieu in proportion to the defects."<sup>77</sup> The shrinkage can be noticed by a withdrawal from life and, particularly a withdrawal from human relationships. The only form of actualization of capacities which remains to the sick organism is the maintenance of the existent state. The healthy person, on the other hand, is able to cope with existence. Courage for him is nothing but "an affirmative answer to the shocks of existence,

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76 Ibid., p. 113.

77 Goldstein, The Organism, A Holistic Approach to Biology, p. 86.



to the shocks which it is necessary to bear for the sake of realizing one's own nature."<sup>78</sup>

But whether the person is healthy or sick, Goldstein insists that the person must be considered as a whole. Goldstein's emphasis on the unity of the organism as it moves towards self-actualization through the processes of equalization and coming to terms with the environment, presents an image of man, no longer fragmented and divided, but an image of man as a whole individual.

Two other organismic theorists who feel the need for embracing the person as a whole are Andreas Angyal and Abraham Maslow. Angyal writes:

The existential form of the organism is dynamic; life is a process and must be studied as a dynamic whole [...] Every organismic part process is a manifestation of the dynamism of the total organism. The part processes gain their meaning from the general pattern of functional organization and can be correctly understood only in the context of this organization.<sup>79</sup>

Angyal differs from Goldstein in that he places more emphasis on the unity of the organism with its environment. "The organism is considered not as a static structure but as a dynamic organization, a process which takes place not within

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<sup>78</sup> Goldstein, Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, p. 113.

<sup>79</sup> A. Angyal, Neurosis and Treatment: a Holistic Approach, New York, Wiley, 1965, p. 3.

the confines of the body but between the 'organism' and the 'environment'."<sup>80</sup>

The organism and the environment taken together are called the biosphere.<sup>81</sup> The two poles of the biosphere are the organism and the environment, the organism being the subject and the environment, the object. The constant interaction of one pole upon another provides the dynamism of the biosphere. Personality develops from the stresses and strains that occur between the two poles, one pole of which represents the organism which strives for autonomy and self-determination and, the other pole, representing the environment which pulls in the direction of homonomy and self-surrender.<sup>82</sup>

Two patterns of personality develop from the interaction of the two poles upon one another: one, a healthy personality that is realizing its autonomous and homonomous strivings, and the other, a neurotic personality which develops from a feeling of isolation and helplessness. Both these patterns exist in the same person, but one pattern dominates the other:

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80 Ibid., p. 7.

81 Ibid., p. 8.

82 Ibid., Chapter 1 and 2, p. 15-29.

Health and neurosis are to be thought of as two organized processes, two dynamic Gestalts organizing the same material, so that each item has a position within two different patterns. There can be shifts between the two, lasting or short lived, in either direction, but at any given moment the person is either healthy or neurotic, depending on which system is dominant.<sup>83</sup>

The study of the sick personality dominates the writings of both Angyal and Goldstein. From such studies emerges their theory of the healthy personality.

Abraham Maslow, unlike both Goldstein and Angyal, bases his theory of man on the study of healthy and creative persons. In common with them he espouses a holistic-dynamic point of view. The most distinctive features of his image of man are: Man has an essential nature of his own that differentiates him from all other animals. He is a human being. His needs are good or neutral rather than evil. This inner nature of man is not strong like the instincts of animals but is weak and easily transformed by habit, cultural pressure, and wrong attitudes. Still, there is an active will towards health, an impulse toward the actualization of human potentialities.

Since this inner nature is good or neutral rather than bad it is best to bring it out and to encourage it rather than to suppress it. If it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful and happy.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 101-103.

<sup>84</sup> A.H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1968, p. 4.

Destructive or evil behavior is not intrinsic to man's nature but results when the essential core of man, which is basically good, is denied or suppressed.<sup>85</sup>

To release man's potential is to help man grow and develop. A person whose potentialities are coming to full development or a person whose inner nature expresses itself freely, rather than being warped, suppressed or denied, is the model of growth and human development.

This picture of the healthy person is, Maslow believes, a view which often is neglected in psychology. Whereas Freud supplies an image of the sick half of man, Maslow fills out the healthy half. When the healthy side of man is stressed, the question of psychology is "How can free development be encouraged?", rather than, "How do we get unsick?"<sup>86</sup>

Drawing together the image of man presented by Goldstein, Angyal, and Maslow, is an organismic theory of man, the principal features of which may be summarized as follows:<sup>87</sup>

(1) The normal personality possesses unity, integration, consistency and coherence. Not to possess these is to be abnormal.

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85 Ibid., p. 3-4.

86 Ibid., p. 5.

87 Hall and Lindzey, op. cit., p. 300-301.

(2) Since the organism is an organized system it must be analyzed from the whole to the parts and not vice versa. A part must not be studied in isolation from the rest of the organism since the organism is not the sum of its parts, but functions according to laws that cannot be found in the parts.

(3) Not only must the organism be studied as a whole, but it must be studied in relation to the environment since it is in constant interaction with the environment.

(4) The organism is motivated by one basic drive. Goldstein's name for this is self-actualization or self-realization which is a striving of the organism to realize its inherent potentialities.

(5) The organism is basically good. There is nothing inherently evil; it is made bad by an inadequate environment. The potentialities of the organism if allowed to unfold in an orderly way, will produce a healthy, integrated personality.

(6) It is more important to make a comprehensive study of one person than it is to make an extensive study of one function in many individuals.

Many of the tenets of organismic theory, and its reactions against a dualistic notion of man and all forms of stimulus-response behaviorism are reflected in existential psychology, a brief treatment of which follows.

## F. Rollo May and Existential Theory

Many of the psychologists mentioned above have been influenced in varying degrees by existentialism. It is necessary therefore to mention some of the main tenets of the existential view of man. For this purpose, the writings of Rollo May, an ardent American exponent of existentialism, are being used.

According to Rollo May, existentialism "is the endeavor to understand man by cutting below the cleavage between subject and object which has bedevilled Western thought and science since shortly after the Renaissance."<sup>88</sup> As a psychology, existentialism attempts to portray the human being not as a collection of static substances or mechanisms but rather as emerging and becoming, that is to say, as existing. It does not rule out the dynamics, drives and patterns of behavior, but it holds that these can be understood only in terms of a person who happens to exist, that is to be, and unless this is kept in mind, everything else about the person loses its meaning.

The fundamental structure of human existence, for existentialism, is based on the concept "being-in-the-world."<sup>89</sup> Simply put, it states that man has no existence

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<sup>88</sup> Rollo May, "Origins of the Existential Movement in Psychology," in Rollo May, Ernest Angel, and Henri F. Ellenberger (eds.), Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, New York, Basic Books, 1962, c.1958, p. 11.

<sup>89</sup> -----, Existential Psychotherapy, Toronto, McCorquodale & Blades Printers Ltd., CBC Publications, , p. 4.

apart from the world. He is a being-in-the-world. The hyphenated words restore the oneness of man and the world; man is not apart and over against the world but one with it. Neither is the world in which man has his being a world of objects, but rather a world structured by meaningful relationships.<sup>90</sup>

Three aspects of this world can be distinguished: the environment or physical and biological surroundings, the umwelt; the human environment or the world of our fellow man, the mitwelt; and, the world of the person himself, the eigenwelt.

The first, umwelt referring as it does to the natural world belongs to all organisms. It includes biological needs, drives and instincts. While this world is important to existentialism yet it is never viewed in isolation from the context of human awareness.<sup>92</sup> To deal with the umwelt as though it were the only mode of existence is, existentialism feels, to oversimplify the lives of human beings.

The mitwelt is the world of human relations. While the person can adjust or adapt to the environment, adjustment

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90 Ibid., p. 5.

91 Ibid.

92 Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy," in Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology, p. 62.

is not possible in the interpersonal world, unless the person is treated as an object which means viewing someone as no longer a person. The right word to use is "relationship."<sup>93</sup>

The essence of the relationship is that in the encounter both persons are changed. Relationship always involves a mutual awareness, and this already is the process of being mutually affected by the encounter.<sup>94</sup>

Not only is it important to relate to one's fellow man but to relate to oneself, the eigenwelt, and to be able to see the world in relation to the self.. To be able to see the world in relation to oneself avoids the subject-object dichotomy and helps prevent alienation and separateness from this world.

The leaving of Eigenwelt, the 'own-world,' out of the picture not only contributes to arid intellectualism but also to the loss of vitality, and has much to do with the loss of the sense of reality of people's experiences.<sup>95</sup>

These three modes of world are always interrelated and always condition each other. They are not three different worlds, but simultaneous modes of being-in-the-world.<sup>96</sup> Hence, if one of these modes is emphasized to the exclusion of the other, the reality of being-in-the-world is lost.

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93 Rollo May, Existential Psychotherapy, p. 6.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid., p. 7.

96 Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy," p. 63..



Rollo May points to Freud, who with his emphasis on the umwelt neglects the mitwelt, and Sullivan, who stresses the mitwelt in his interpersonal theory, and yet omits the eigenwelt in his efforts to define the self in terms of the roles that persons play.<sup>97</sup>

This kind of emphasis upon man's mode of being-in-the-world adds a new dimension to the concept of truth. Truth for the existential psychologist is not something extrinsic to man nor can truth be identified with abstract concepts. Neither is truth arrived at through intellectual exercises but is disclosed or revealed in the phenomena themselves. Only that which can be experienced is real. "There is no such thing as truth or reality for a living human being except as he participates in it, is conscious of it, has some relationship to it."<sup>98</sup> Moreover, theory as such, can prevent the discovery of truth in experience. Wounds and sufferings are not healed through the simple application of theories or principles or laws. Only in immediate interaction is understanding of human beings attained.

Other aspects of man that existential psychology stresses are the role of will and decision, and the concept of time. In opposing the undermining of will and decision

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97 Ibid., p. 64-65.

98 Rollo May, Existential Psychology, p. 17.

which occurred as the result of the mounting importance given to Freud's theory of unconscious drives, existential psychology insists that man always has some power to take a stand and to make a decision. However weak this power may be, it is important to use it, for it is during the moment of decision that man becomes human. And no matter how small the decision may be, there is always an element that is not only not determined

[...] by the outside situation, but is not even 'given' in the external situation. It involves some element of leap, some taking of a chance, some movement of one's self in a direction the ultimate outcome of which you never can fully predict before the leap.<sup>99</sup>

The leap need not be big--it is present even in the entertaining of a new idea.

It is important to remember, however, that will and decision must not be emphasized to the extent that they militate against the wishes of the organism. Wish and will go together. "If you have only will and no wish, you have the dried up, Victorian, post-Puritan man. If you have only wish and no will, you have the driven, unfree, infantile human being who, as an adult, may become the robot man."<sup>100</sup> Decision, therefore, must stand for the human act which brings both will and wish together. In this way the taking

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<sup>99</sup> Rollo May, Existential Psychotherapy, p. 36.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

of a decision does not deny or suppress wish but includes and transcends it.

Another area emphasized is the concept of time. Time is considered more important than space for it is in time that the most profound human experiences such as joy and depression occur. It is also in time that man whose being is a being-in-the-world becomes and emerges. Because of the element of becoming, future time is more important than either past or present. Man understands himself only in terms of the future, the goal towards which he is moving. Present and past are not denied importance because of this emphasis upon the future but are rather given greater significance. Not to have a future is to deny significance to the past. "[...]" whether or not a patient can even recall significant events of the past depends upon his decision with regard to the future."<sup>101</sup> It is in terms of the future that man understands himself. To stop moving or developing is to make time unimportant.

Still another notion that is emphasized is the notion of "presence."<sup>102</sup> What is meant by this term can be understood by looking for a moment at some attitudes that mark the existential therapist. He does not enter the therapy room with determined presuppositions which he uses to solve

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101 Ibid., p. 8.

102 Rollo May, Existential Psychology, p. 9.

the patient's problems, be it hysteria, a phobia or any other type of illness. His main concern is not with the 'why's' and 'how's' of the patient's illness but the person's whole being in the world. To be concerned only with the patient's problem is "to have grasped everything except the most important thing of all, the existing person"<sup>103</sup> who is now before him emerging, becoming and experiencing.

In order to experience the person as he is, the therapist uses the method of phenomenology. Phenomenology is the first stage in the existential psychotherapeutic movement.

Phenomenology is the endeavor to take the phenomena as given. It is the disciplined effort to clear one's mind of the presuppositions that so often cause us to see in the patient only our own theories or the dogmas of our own systems, the effort to experience instead the phenomena in their full reality as they present themselves. It is the attitude of openness and readiness to hear--aspects of the art of listening in psycho-therapy that are generally taken for granted and sound so easy but are exceedingly difficult.<sup>104</sup>

In using this method, the therapist attempts to experience the phenomena rather than merely observe. The more he can clear his mind of presuppositions and listen, the greater the chances the person will come alive in a way very different from the facts known about him. As the person is experienced, the facts that are known form into other and new patterns. In the words of Rollo May, "While one must have

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103 Ibid., p. 25.

104 Ibid., p. 26.

constructs as he listens, one's aim in therapy is to make one's own constructs sufficiently flexible so that he can listen in terms of the patient's constructs and hear the patient's language."<sup>105</sup>

To be able to experience the communication of the patient in this fashion is what is known as being present. To be present means that the relationship of the therapist to the patient is a real one:

The therapist is not a shadowy reflector, not a shadow like all the other people in the world, but an alive human being who at that hour happens to be concerned not with his own problems but with understanding and experiencing so far as possible the being and the world of the patient.<sup>106</sup>

To the degree the therapist is a presence to the other to that degree he is a bridge between the isolated patient and the world.

In conclusion, the existential concept of man differs radically from a passive static concept of man. Existentialism rejects the concept of causality as the motivating power of man's behavior. It also rejects the subject-object dichotomy of reality. Any view that destroys the unity of man as a being-in-the-world is seen as adding to man's alienation and sickness. It also resents treating the problems of man as units in themselves. Man is an

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105 Ibid., p. 27.

106 Ibid., p. 9.

existential whole; phenomena relating to the parts should be described as carefully and fully as possible in terms of the whole. It suspects any form of theory which is used to deal with life and its problems. Truth is not something passed on or arrived at simply as an exercise of the intellect but is revealed in experience. Preconceptions can blind the therapist to the real existing person before him. An understanding of the person does not follow the application of theory or technique, but theory and technique follow understanding. And finally, existentialism rejects man as an object to be acted upon. Man is free, limited only by the ground of his existence, and alone responsible for his life.

#### G. Summary

Throughout the above presentation can be seen two different types of development. There is the development towards an ever-increasing dynamic image of man, and there is the development or shift away from a cyclic concept of man to a process concept of man.

Let us first consider the development towards an increasing dynamic image of man.

The introduction to this chapter notes that Freud, Jung, Adler, Allport, Goldstein and Rollo May belong to a trend in psychology known as Leibnitzian and self-deterministic or dynamic. According to this trend, man's

Personality is seen as active and self-propelled, and as purposive and future-oriented. Clearly, not all the theorists presented here fit this description. However, by choosing and putting together the main contributions of these men, a more and more dynamic image of man begins to appear.

Such an image of man is presented above as originating with Freud who regards man as a dynamic system subject to the laws of nature. Jung adds to this image with his most prominent and distinctive contribution, that of self-actualization, a concept which differs notably from Freud's theory and one that is further developed in many of the above theorists. The main contribution of Adler and the social psychologists is that man is basically social in nature rather than biological or instinctivist in orientation. Sullivan's theory of interpersonal relations consolidates the position of a personality theory grounded in the social processes. Allport stresses the uniqueness and complexity of the normal individual who is capable of self-extension and self-objectification. And finally, Goldstein, Rollo May and their followers emphasize the unity, integration, consistency and coherence in man's nature.

The second development evident in the preceding pages can be traced as a shift away from a cyclic model of man to a process model of man. This shift can be recognized by examining the theory of motivation presented by Freud, Jung and the self-actualization theorists.

Freud sees the instincts, most of which are unconscious, as the sole motivating force in man's life. Excitation in the instinct causes the organism to seek satisfaction. When an object of satisfaction is found, the organism returns to the prior state which existed before the excitation occurred, which is one of relative quiescence. However, because of Freud's emphasis upon the developmental aspects of life, his model is more in the nature of an ellipse than a cycle. Thus there is a movement away from a completely cyclic model. This movement becomes even more evident in Jung's theory of motivation wherein he combines teleology with causality. Man's behavior is motivated not only by his racial and individual history (archetypes and biological instincts) but also by a drive which constantly causes him to progress from a less complete state to a more complete stage of development. The movement towards a process model is almost complete in Allport's notion of functional autonomy, and in the notion of self-realization.

The concept of self-realization is a term that pervades the preceding pages. It is akin to Adler's concept of fictional finalism, Goldstein's and Maslow's principle of self-actualization, and Allport's concepts of functional autonomy and intention. It is a theory that interprets man's personality in terms of where it is going, and not where it has been. Whereas Freud looks into man's past to



account for man's behavior, the self-actualization theorists interpret behavior in terms of aims and aspirations. The difference between the two interpretations is the difference between the cyclic model of constant repetition and the process model of becoming. Whereas, Freud's cyclic theory of motivation is essentially regressive in character since it returns man to a prior state, the self-actualization model can be seen as progressive or processive in character since man is seen in terms of creative potential seeking and striving for completion.

The process model of becoming is further elaborated by Rollo May who, in his treatment of existentialism, centers upon the becoming, emerging aspects of man. Man's being is seen as a being-in-the-world, his growth towards self-realization takes place through meaningful relationships, and his knowledge is co-extensive with experience.

This concept of man and the description given of man in the preceding pages is reflected in the writings of Carl Rogers.

## 2. The Concept of Man in Carl Rogers.

Carl Rogers' description of man is similar in many respects to what is discussed in the preceding pages. Man is a being in process with an inner thrust toward self-actualization and autonomy. He is essentially social and

in need of others to provide that interpersonal relationship which is necessary for human growth. With safety, warm concern, with authentic communion and personal presence, he is allowed and invited to become who he radically and potentially is, a human being.

The full meaning of what is implied in the above paragraph is studied under the following headings: A. Way of Being; B. Way of Growing; and C. Way of Knowing.

A. Way of Being.

Carl Rogers describes man as living in a world of continually changing experience<sup>107</sup> in which his life is "a flowing, changing process in which nothing is fixed."<sup>108</sup>

Such a description is consistent with Rogers' theory regarding man's basic nature, that is, first, man's personality is positive in nature, and second, man possesses within himself a tendency towards self-actualization.

That man's personality is positive in nature is Rogers' most embracing concept of man's basic nature. He writes:

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107 Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice and Theory, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951, p. 483.

108 -----, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 27.

One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his 'animal nature,' is positive in nature--basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic.<sup>109</sup>

There is no need, therefore, to control man, but to allow his nature to unfold. There is no need, for example, to control his aggressive impulses, for as man becomes more open to all his impulses, his need to be liked by others and his tendency to give affection will be as strong as his impulses to strike out or to seize for himself.

The only control of impulses which would exist, or which would prove necessary, is the natural and internal balancing of one need against another, and the discovery of behaviors which follow the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of all needs. The experience of extreme satisfaction of one need (for aggression, or sex, etc.) in such a way as to do violence to the satisfaction of the other needs (for companionship, tender relationship, etc.)--an experience very common in the defensively organized person--would be greatly decreased. He would participate in the vastly complex self-regulatory activities of his organism--the psychological as well as physiological thermostatic controls--in such a fashion as to live in increasing harmony with himself and with others.<sup>110</sup>

Rogers does not, however, deny that man is capable of evil behavior. "I do not have a Pollyanna view of human nature," he insists. "I am quite aware that out of defensiveness and inner fear individuals can and do behave in ways

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109 Ibid., p. 91.

110 Ibid., p. 195.

which are incredibly cruel, horribly destructive, immature, regressive, anti-social, hurtful."<sup>111</sup>

While insisting that man's nature is basically positive in nature, and yet capable of evil behavior, Rogers adds yet another distinction to his theory. He does not hold a Rousseauian view of man.<sup>112</sup> Man's nature is not neutral, a quiet passive entity: "I do not discover man to be, in his basic nature, completely without a nature, a 'tabula rasa' on which anything may be written, nor malleable putty which can be shaped into 'any' form."<sup>113</sup> Man is not passive, but active. He has in him a self-actualizing tendency which not only maintains and enhances the human organism but pushes it to fulfillment.

The need of the organism to actualize itself is the main and most fundamental need and the one to which all organic and psychological needs are related. This tendency of the organism towards self-actualization is a tendency toward human maturity. Rogers writes:

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>112</sup> D.E. Walker, "Carl Rogers and the Nature of Man," Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 3, 1956, p. 89-92. In this article Walker compares Freud's view of man to that of Augustine and Rogers' view to that of Rousseau.

<sup>113</sup> Carl R. Rogers, "A Note on the 'Nature of Man'," Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 4, 1957, p. 202.

We are speaking of the tendency of the organism to move in the direction of maturation, as maturation is defined for each species. This involves self-actualization, though it should be understood that this too is a directional term. The organism does not develop to the full its capacity for suffering pain, nor does the human individual develop or actualize his capacity for terror, or on the physiological level, his capacity for vomiting.<sup>114</sup>

The organism moves rather in a direction of independence, of "increasing self-government, self-regulation, and autonomy."<sup>115</sup> It moves at the same time in the direction of socialization, broadly defined.<sup>116</sup>

The impulse that moves the organism in this direction is an impulse that is evident from conception to maturity. It is an impulse that is present even when the organism is sick and unhealthy. Upon the force of this impulse the therapist "relies most deeply and fundamentally,"<sup>117</sup> for he realizes that "when all the elements are clearly perceived, the balance seems invariably in the direction of the painful but ultimately rewarding path of self-actualization or growth."<sup>118</sup>

Difficulties and set-backs may and do occur. In fact, they are a necessary part of growth.

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<sup>114</sup> Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 488.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., p. 489.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., p. 490.

It would be grossly inaccurate to suppose that the organism operates smoothly in the direction of self-enhancement and growth. It would be perhaps more correct to say that the organism moves through struggle and pain toward enhancement and growth.<sup>119</sup>

The struggle and pain of growing is greatly lessened when there exists an environment which provides safety and freedom. In this soil, the person can accept himself as "a fluid process, not a fixed and static entity: a flowing river of change, not a block of solid material, a continually changing constellation of potentialities, not a fixed quality of traits."<sup>120</sup>

The following section describes the type of environment needed and the characteristics of the growth that takes place.

#### B. Way of Growing

The impetus for growth is the self-actualizing tendency inherent in man. The condition of growth is the proper psychological climate. In the absence of this climate, there is danger this tendency will become buried "under layer after layer of encrusted psychological defenses [...] or] hidden behind elaborate façades which deny its existence."<sup>121</sup>

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119 Ibid.

120 Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 122.

121 Ibid., p. 35.

When the proper conditions exist, this tendency is released and becomes actual rather than potential.

A suitable climate is one provided by a helping relationship. A helping relationship has the following characteristics: congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathetic understanding.

Congruence means that the person is what he is. The person's experience, his awareness of this experience and the communication of the experience are accurately matched.<sup>122</sup> The person is without front or façade, "openly being the feelings and attitudes which at that moment are flowing in him."<sup>123</sup> A person who is congruent is somehow transparent, that is, he is transparently fearful or loving or hungry. He is not angry inside and laughing joyfully outwardly. The outward behavior is an expression of the inward behavior of which the individual is aware.

When the therapist possesses congruence, growth can take place in the client:

The greater the congruence of experience, awareness and communication on the part of one individual, the more the ensuing relationship will involve: a tendency toward reciprocal communication with a quality of increasing congruence; a tendency toward more mutually accurate understanding of the communications; improved psychological satisfaction in the relationship.<sup>124</sup>

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122 Ibid., p. 282.

123 Ibid., p. 61.

124 Ibid., p. 344.

Unconditional positive regard means that the therapist totally accepts the client for what he is, and makes no attempt to change him. The therapist's acceptance and caring for the client is "as a separate person, with permission for him to have his own feelings and experiences, and to find his own meanings in them."<sup>125</sup> Where this caring is not possessive and where no personal gratification is sought or demanded, an atmosphere is created which demonstrates that the therapist has no conditions attached to his caring. He accepts the client no matter what feelings the client expresses, be these feelings of fear, hostility, confusion, pain, pride, joy or hatred. He prizes the client in a total rather than a conditional way. He accepts the client as a person, without reservations and without evaluations. His acceptance includes the manifestation of such attitudes as warmth, liking, respect and sympathy.

To the degree that the therapist possesses these qualities, to that degree a climate of safety is provided which allows the client to explore his own feelings and experiences.

Empathic understanding is the ability to permit oneself to understand another. Rogers writes:

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125 Ibid., p. 283.



I come now to a central learning which has had a great deal of significance for me. I can state this learning as follows: I have found it of enormous value when I can permit myself to understand another person.<sup>126</sup>

The word 'permit' is important. To permit oneself to understand another means, not to stand in judgment or to evaluate, but to enter thoroughly and empathically into the other's frame of reference so as to see his world as he sees it. Such an understanding is essentially an attitude of desiring to understand.<sup>127</sup> When this desire is absent, therapy is impossible.

To sense the client's private world as if it were your own, but without ever losing the 'as if' quality--this is empathy, and this seems essential to therapy. To sense the client's anger, fear, or confusion as if it were your own, yet without your own anger, fear, or confusion getting bound up in it, is the condition we are endeavoring to describe.<sup>128</sup>

Empathic understanding is difficult to attain but even only a minimal amount, "a bumbling and faulty attempt to catch the confused complexity of the client's meaning"<sup>129</sup> is helpful, though it becomes more helpful, the more clearly the meaningful experiences of the client which are often unclear and confused, are formulated.

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126 Ibid. , p. 18.

127 Ibid., p. 44.

128 Ibid., p. 284.

129 Ibid., p. 53.

And lastly, a fourth ingredient of a helping relationship is that the qualities of congruence, acceptance and empathy be communicated in some degree to the client. To the degree that the client perceives and experiences these qualities in the therapist, to that degree is he free to grow.

Signs of growth in the client are, an increasing openness to experience, increasingly existential living and an increasing trust in the organism.<sup>130</sup>

As growth takes place, the individual becomes more open to experience. One of the main causes preventing an individual from being open to experience is fear. Fear is so crippling that it causes the individual to employ defense mechanisms which are the means the individual uses to cope with experiences which he perceives or anticipates as threatening, or as incongruent with his existing picture of himself, or of himself in relationship to the world.<sup>131</sup> Through the use of defense mechanisms threatening experiences are either distorted or denied admittance to awareness. The more these experiences are distorted or denied the more defensively the person is organized.

When growth takes place, the individual moves from a position of defensiveness and rigidity to an increasing

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130 Ibid., p. 187-191.

131 Ibid., p. 187.

openness to experience. This means that the individual becomes more openly aware of his own feelings and attitudes, of his feelings of fear and discouragement, his feelings of courage, and tenderness, and awe as they exist in him at an organic level. He also becomes more aware of reality as it exists outside of himself, instead of perceiving it in pre-conceived categories.<sup>132</sup> He is able to develop an attitude of listening to himself and to others which, in turn, results in a respect for the complex processes of life:

It is a very paradoxical thing--that to the degree that each of us is willing to be himself, then he finds not only himself changing; but he finds that other people to whom he relates are also changing.<sup>133</sup>

A person who is open to experience and is without defensiveness can be said to be living in an increasingly existential way.<sup>134</sup> Each new moment is never a repetition of a past experience but is rather a complex configuration of inner and outer stimuli which has never existed before in just this fashion.

The implications of this realization are far-reaching. What the person will be in the next moment and what he will do, grows out of the moment and cannot be predicted in

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132 Ibid., p. 115.

133 Ibid., p. 22.

134 Ibid., p. 188-189.

advance. The self and personality emerge from the experience rather than the experience being translated or twisted to fit a preconceived self-structure. The individual becomes a participant in and an observer of the ongoing process of organismic experience rather than being in control of it.<sup>135</sup>

Such living in the moment means an absence of rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition of structure on experience. It means instead a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flowing, changing organization of self and personality.<sup>136</sup>

And lastly, a third sign of growth is the development of an increasing trust in the organism. As the individual opens himself up to experience and realizes his own inherent capacities, he moves away from an evaluation that is fixed and residing in an object to the recognition that value judgments are not necessarily fixed but are alterable to a personal evaluation that might be altered depending upon the evidence.<sup>137</sup> He discovers the worth of his own feelings as a trustworthy guide to behavior that is truly satisfying.<sup>138</sup> Mistakes are made because often there is the "inclusion of information which does not belong or the exclusion of information which does."<sup>139</sup> However, because of the organism's

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135 Ibid.

136 Ibid., p. 189.

137 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 150.

138 Ibid.

139 Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 190.

openness to experience and to the consequences of each of his actions, these mistakes in judgment are quickly corrected.

Rogers describes it this way:

The person who is fully open to his experience would have access to all of the available data in the situation, on which to base his behavior; the social demands, his own complex and possibly conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, his perception of the uniqueness of this situation. The data would be very complex indeed. But he could permit his total organism, his consciousness participating, to consider each stimulus, need and demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation [...] for enhancement, for affiliation, with others, and the like.<sup>140</sup>

The more the person does listen to his experience, and the more he trusts his own inner reactions, the more satisfying he finds his behavior to be.

These then are the characteristics of the growing person. In drawing these three threads together, an increasing openness to experience, increasingly existential living and an increasing trust in the organism, there is given a description of the 'good life' and what it means to be a process of becoming.

One who is leading the good life has a new perspective on freedom and creativity. He experiences a freedom that the defensively organized person cannot experience.

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140 Ibid.

Both he and the defensively organized person experience the determining factors in their lives, factors which they can do nothing about. The difference between the two is that the growing person chooses the way he will behave in the presence of these determining factors while the defensively organized person cannot choose the way he will behave.

While the growing person chooses "to follow the course of action which is the most economical vector in relationship to all the internal and external stimuli,"<sup>141</sup> the defensively organized person finds that he cannot behave in the fashion that he chooses because he is determined by factors which "include his defensiveness, his denial or distortion of some of the relevant data."<sup>142</sup> Because of the denial and distortion effective choices cannot be made.

The fully functioning person, on the other hand, not only experiences, but utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, voluntarily chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined.<sup>143</sup>

He also experiences a new sense of creativity.<sup>144</sup> The creative person possesses the three ingredients of openness to experience, an internal locus of evaluation and trust

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141 Ibid., p. 193.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid., p. 347-359.

in one's organism. First, the person who is open to experience is sensitive to the many gradations and varieties in experience. He is able to experience that a tree may be lavender and not green or that a college education need not necessarily be good. Such a person manifests "a lack of rigidity and permeability of boundaries in concepts, beliefs, perceptions, and hypotheses."<sup>145</sup> He manifests also, "a tolerance for ambiguity where ambiguity exists [and][...] an ability to receive much conflicting information without forcing closure upon the situation."<sup>146</sup>

Second, the person has an internal locus of evaluation. This means that the person does not need to be told what to create or produce but is able to express what to him feels right. Where the locus of evaluation is external, there is a tendency towards conformity and adaptation, but where the locus is internal, there is a tendency to create what is unique and individual. Third, the person possesses a trust in his own organismic experiencing. Without trust in one's ability, the creative urge is more likely than not to remain dormant and hidden.<sup>147</sup> But where openness to experience, where the locus is internal and where trust in

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145 Ibid., p. 353.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid., p. 351.

one's own abilities exists, there is evidence of creativity. Such persons are unlikely to simply exist or to be the passive recipients of reality; they are instead fit vanguards of human evolution.<sup>148</sup>

In summation, Rogers says that a person grows when he is provided with the proper atmosphere. In the proper atmosphere, the person becomes more integrated, more effective, invested with a realistic self-image--more like the person he wishes to be. He becomes more self-confident and self-directing, open to himself and others "not a façade of conformity to others, not a cynical denial of all feeling, nor a front of intellectual rationality, but a living, breathing, feeling, fluctuating process [...] in short, he becomes a Person."<sup>149</sup>

### C. Way of Knowing

Rogers' theory of the nature of man and how he grows develops over long years of experience in psychotherapy. Along with this development comes a shift in his notion of the way man knows. This shift from a logical positivism to a subjectively oriented existential thinking<sup>150</sup> is seen in

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148 Ibid., p. 194.

149 Ibid., p. 114.

150 Ibid., p. 199.



the sequence of his writings. In Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child, there is an emphasis on personality and diagnostic testing.<sup>151</sup> The purpose of such tests is to correct the clinician's judgment and to uncover unsuspected areas of maladjustment. In the "Clinical Psychologist's Approach to Personality Problems," testing is still important but the reason for testing is different.<sup>152</sup> "Tests are useful in corroborating subjective judgments, in indicating new avenues for study of the individual, and in suggesting modes of treatment."<sup>153</sup> In Counseling and Psychotherapy, testing is unimportant even in an advisory role.<sup>154</sup> In "Significant Aspects of Client-centered Therapy," diagnostic knowledge and skill are not necessary to good therapy.<sup>155</sup> And, finally, in Client-centered Therapy is seen a crystallization of a new thinking which is nondirective or client-centered.<sup>156</sup>

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151 C.R. Rogers, Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1939.

152 -----, "The Clinical Psychologist's Approach to Personality Problems," The Family, Vol. 18, 1937, p. 233-243.

153 Ibid.

154 -----, Counseling and Psychotherapy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1942.

155 -----, "Significant Aspects of Client-centered Therapy," American Psychologist, Vol. 1, 1946, p. 415-422.

156 -----, Client-centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951.

The movement in therapy has been from a testing program in which the therapist receives answers which he can use in direct counseling of the client to an approach where testing is unimportant and where direct counseling is replaced by the nondirective approach. This shift is indicative of a conflict Rogers suffers between what he calls a scientific vs. an experiential viewpoint.<sup>157</sup> He describes the conflict in these terms:

As I have acquired experience as a therapist, carrying on the exciting, rewarding experience of psychotherapy, and as I have worked as a scientific investigator to ferret out some of the truth about therapy, I have become increasingly conscious of the gap between these two roles. The better therapist I have become (as I believe I have) the more I have been vaguely aware of my complete subjectivity when I am at my best in this function. And as I have become a better investigator, more 'hard-headed' and more scientific (as I believe I have) I have felt an increasing discomfort at the distance between the rigorous objectivity of myself as scientist and the almost mystical subjectivity of myself as therapist.<sup>158</sup>

As Rogers resolves this conflict, he realizes that much of his difficulty is in seeing science as something out there, something spelled with a capital "S", a body of knowledge, existing somewhere in space and time.

It has seemed somewhat like a reservoir into which all and sundry may dip their buckets to obtain water--with a guarantee of 99% purity. When viewed in this external and impersonal fashion, it

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157 Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 29.

158 Ibid., p. 200.

seems not unreasonable to see Science not only as discovering knowledge in lofty fashion, but as involving depersonalization, a tendency to manipulate, a denial of the basic freedom of choice which I have met experientially in therapy.<sup>159</sup>

As Rogers struggles with this conflict between subjectivity and objectivity, he realizes he does not have to choose between the one or the other but that his view of science could somehow be broader, more inclusive in which both of these elements could be encompassed without damage to either. This new integrated view of knowing is discussed under the following headings: (i) knowledge and primordial experience; (ii) knowledge and conceptualization; and (iii) knowledge and science or the body of knowledge.

(i) Knowledge and Primordial Experience.- In several passages throughout Rogers' works there is an emphasis upon experience. Note, for example, the following statements:

Every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the center [...]. The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field is, for the individual, 'reality' [...]. The organism reacts as an organized whole to this phenomenal field.<sup>160</sup>

Implied in these statements is a conception of experience which is, first of all, an all-inclusive whole. It comprises both what is consciously perceived and what is not. And secondly it is, for the individual, reality. The

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid., p. 215-216.

<sup>160</sup> Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 483-486.

person does not react to something outside his experience, for what is outside his experience does not exist at all for him. Hence, experience is for the individual the highest authority. "No other person's ideas, and none of my own ideas," writes Rogers, "are as authoritative as my experience [...] Neither the bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man--can take precedence over my own direct experience."<sup>161</sup>

If the individual wants to know, therefore, it is to experience that he must turn, for to know is not simply to hold in one's mind a collection of facts nor to be an encyclopedia of information. Knowing has to do with a total organismic experiencing, of the type Rogers experiences as he encounters another. He describes it thus:

I let myself go into the immediacy of the relationship where it is my total organism which takes over and is sensitive to the relationship, not simply my consciousness. I am not consciously responding in a planful or analytic way, but simply react in an unreflective way to the other individual, my reaction based, (but not consciously) on my total organismic sensitivity to this other person. I live the relationship on this basis.<sup>162</sup>

The essence of this type of knowing is in the unity of experiencing. "The client is freely able to experience his feelings in its complete intensity, as a 'pure culture,'

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<sup>161</sup> Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 24.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

without intellectual inhibitions or cautions, without having it bounded by knowledge or contradictory feelings."<sup>163</sup>

The therapist is able with equal freedom to experience his understanding of this feeling, without any conscious thought about it, without any type of diagnostic or analytic thinking, without any cognitive or emotional barriers to a complete 'letting go' in understanding.<sup>164</sup>

In the singleness and fullness of such experiencing there is a "timeless living in the experience"<sup>165</sup> which is the opposite of seeing either person as an object. "It is the height of personal subjectivity."<sup>166</sup>

It is through many such experiences that the client comes to know. He learns not to solve problems but to become himself and to live a new way of living "in which there is more depth and more height in the experience of his feelings; more breadth and more range."<sup>167</sup>

The authority of the experience is the degree to which the experience is primary or direct:

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163 Ibid., p. 202.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.

167 Ibid., p. 203.

If I read a theory of psychotherapy, and if I formulate a theory of psychotherapy based on my work with clients, and if I also have a direct experience of psychotherapy with a client, then the degree of authority increases in the order in which I have listed these experiences.<sup>168</sup>

Experience, therefore, is not authoritative because it is infallible. "It is the basis of authority because it can always be checked in new primary ways. In this way its frequent error or fallibility is always open to correction."<sup>169</sup>

Besides being authoritative, experience possesses law and order. The thrill of discovery is the finding of orderliness or lawfulness in any large body of experience. The whole purpose of research is aimed toward the inward ordering of significant experience:

Research is the persistent disciplined effort to make sense and order out of the phenomena of subjective experience. It is justified because it is satisfying to perceive the world as having order, and because rewarding results often ensue when one understands the orderly relationships which appear in nature.<sup>170</sup>

The purpose of formulating theory, then, is not to convince others, to teach others, to gain prestige, or to get ahead professionally, but rather to satisfy a need for perceiving order and meaning in experience.

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168 Ibid., p. 24.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid., p. 24-25.

(ii) Knowledge and Conceptualization.- The purpose of theory from a phenomenological, existential viewpoint flows out of experience and not vice versa. The theories or hypotheses that are formulated are in constant need of being checked by using the ongoing flow of preconceptual experiencing as a referent.

The way these hypotheses are checked, Rogers calls the three ways of knowing, that is, subjective knowing, objective knowing, and interpersonal knowing.

Subjective knowing is a type of knowing that flows directly from a preconceptual experiencing, as for example, when a person says, "I like the flavor of this foreign dish, but I do not like its consistency." The only way the person knows this is by referring to the flow of inner experiencing. As the person tries to describe the experience there is a searching and seeking for the right word which will accurately describe what is being experienced, felt or perceived. When the word is found that closely matches the experience, there is provided "a more sharply differentiated meaning for the vague knowing which has been present."<sup>171</sup> Rogers describes this type of knowing in a person thus:

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<sup>171</sup> C.R. Rogers, "Toward a Science of the Person," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Fall, 1963, p. 74.

At first his 'knowledge' of the task is global, imprecise undifferentiated. Then he begins to sense pattern--that these events or these facts seem to go together, that these other events or facts, while they loom large on the surface, are probably not important. He acts tentatively to test these inner hypotheses, moving forward when the pattern is sensed as becoming stronger, or correcting his direction when his sense of the pattern fades. Polanyi has given an excellent description of the compelling pull which an inner sense of the significance of pattern has upon the scientist.<sup>172</sup>

This is one of the most basic ways of knowing, and it is a type of knowing that is a "deeply rooted organismic sensing, from which is formed and differentiated conscious symbolizations and conceptions."<sup>173</sup> All science has its beginning as an inner subjective hypothesis, "highly valued by the investigator because it makes patterned sense out of his experiencing."<sup>174</sup>

If these inner hypotheses are checked, not with one's own inner experiencing, but with others or with the external environment, another way of knowing takes over, the objective way. In the objective way of knowing, hypotheses are based upon an external frame of reference. This type of knowing is the "basis of all logical positivism, operationalism, and the vast structure of science"<sup>175</sup> as it is commonly understood.

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172 Ibid., p. 74.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid., p. 75.

175 Ibid.



An example of this type of knowing is exemplified by the physicist who says he knows that  $v=32t$  (where  $v$  = velocity in feet per second, and  $t$  = time in seconds).

This type of knowing transforms everything it studies into an object. Even the person himself, if he wishes to study himself in this way, must become an object. Whereas in subjective knowing, empathy is directed towards the self in an attempt to understand more deeply the implicit meanings of experience, in objective knowing, "empathic understanding is directed solely toward the reference group."<sup>176</sup>

This type of knowing is not necessarily superior to subjective knowing. It is not a type of knowing that exists "out there, firm, impersonal, and secure."<sup>177</sup>

Quite the contrary, it is a very human invention --one of enormous value, to be sure, and containing some of the best safeguards man has devised against deceiving himself--but it is nonetheless a fallible and human way of knowing, depending basically upon an intelligently intuitive personal selection of a reference group, and the empathic understanding of the experiences of that reference group when they actually (or more often in imagination) repeat the operations of experimenter.<sup>178</sup>

In subjective knowing, hypotheses are checked by relating them to inner experience. In objective knowing,

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176 Ibid.

177 Ibid., p. 77.

178 Ibid.

hypotheses are checked objectively. In interpersonal knowing, hypotheses are checked by using skill and empathic understanding to get inside the phenomenological field of the other person, that is, the world of private meanings of the other person. The essence of this type of knowing is to create a climate where the other person feels safe to reveal his internal frame of reference and to share his most personal feelings.

In this interpersonal or phenomenological way of knowing, then, the direction of the empathy is toward the other individual. Our hypotheses are tested by relating them to the most accurate picture we can obtain of the internal frame of reference of this individual. The knowledge it gives is of a particular individual, but from this knowledge generalizations can be formed which can be leverage in getting at the nonobservable events which go on within the individual.<sup>179</sup>

This type of knowing is limited only by one's capacity for empathy and the degree one is able to attain the internal frame of reference of the organism.

These three ways of knowing are related:

[...] the psychologically mature person, like the mature science, uses these three modes of knowing in an integrated fashion. The mature person trusts his experiencing, and the meanings and hypotheses for living in his empathic relationship to the significant others in his life. He recognizes that all hypotheses are put to their most severe test in the objective world, and he, like the good scientist, remains open and receptive to the experiences which confirm or disconfirm his tentatively held hypotheses. Thus the psychologically

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179 Ibid.

healthy person is open to the finer differentiations of meaning in his inner experience which check and sharpen his hypotheses, to the rich sources of hypotheses formation and testing which exist in the other person, and to the testing of his hypotheses in real actions in a real world.<sup>180</sup>

It would be a mistake to use one mode of knowing in isolation from the others or to confuse or equate the different modes of knowing. But whatever mode of knowing is used, or whatever hypotheses are formulated, they are never infallible. Theory or concepts are an attempt to catch the significance of an experience. They are never the experiences themselves, nor are they the truth.

(iii) Knowledge and Science.- When a body of knowledge develops it is the result of three steps: immersion, emergence of a sense of pattern, and putting the pattern to the test.

In the first step, the scientist immerses himself in the phenomena of the particular field in which he is interested. The more complete the immersion, the longer it lasts, the more he loves the whole field, the more open he is to all the subtleties of his experiencing, the more likely he is to discover new knowledge.

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180 Ibid., p. 78.

This means a tolerance for ambiguity and contradiction, a resistance to the need for closure. It means soaking up experience like a sponge so that it is taken in all its complexity, with my total organism freely participating in the experiencing of the phenomena, not simply my conscious mind.<sup>181</sup>

From this immersion, the scientist can somehow intuitively sense a pattern long before he can consciously formulate it. That this pattern may emerge, rigidly held preconceptions and clear-cut constructs must be laid aside. It is necessary to let oneself go, to wipe the mind clean so that it is sensitive as unexposed film to take up the impressions around and to let what will, come in.<sup>182</sup> Rogers says:

I have come to realize that all science is based on a recognition--usually prelogical, intuitive, involving all the capacities of the organism--of a dimly sensed gestalt, a hidden reality. This gestalt or pattern appears to give meaning to disconnected phenomena. The more that this total apprehension of a pattern is free from cultural values and is free from past scientific values, the more adequate it is likely to be. The more that it is based on all sensory avenues, upon unconscious direction, as well as cognitive insights, the more adequate it is likely to be. I regard this sensing of a pattern of relationships as perhaps the heart of all true science. I believe this view would be supported by Polanyi and many others in the physical sciences.<sup>183</sup>

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181 C.R. Rogers, "Some Thoughts Regarding the Current Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Fall 1965, p. 187.

182 Ibid., p. 188.

183 Ibid., p. 189.

This sensing of a pattern or a particular vision of reality is not in itself sufficient for the discovery of new truth. "The hypotheses must be put to the test."<sup>184</sup> This is where the methodology of science helps to provide the machinery to determine whether or not the pattern perceived is real or deceptive. But no matter what methodology is used it is no guarantee that an hypothesis is true or not for even here the personal element enters in, since the rules and methods used for testing hypotheses are creations of the scientists themselves. It is also well to remember that testing is the testing of hypotheses or labels and not the phenomena itself. "No one has ever seen a stimulus or a response or a reinforcement [...] We do observe behavior which we interpret to be a stimulus or a response or a reinforcement."<sup>185</sup> What methods of science try to do is to bring the scientist as close as possible to the phenomena but no method is ever able to utilize the phenomena themselves but must rely on external clues or interpretations of them.<sup>186</sup>

These three steps, immersion, emergence of a sense of pattern, and putting the pattern to the test, are not three types of knowledge, but are all aspects of the same knowing

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184 Ibid., p. 190.

185 Ibid., p. 191.

186 Ibid.

process. When Rogers comes to this understanding of knowledge, he no longer feels the dichotomy in his mind between what he loosely calls the experiential and the scientific viewpoint. He realizes that knowledge can never be equated with mere conceptualization or formulation although these are intrinsic elements of the knowing process. He concludes that man's organismic experiencing which results in a knowledge that is vague and imprecise is brought to an ever full reflexive consciousness through progressive conceptualization and dialogue.

In conclusion, Rogers is very much in line with the preceding theorists who represent a shift away from a static cyclic concept of man to a process, dynamic concept. The measure of this development is seen in the emphasis put upon a holistic experiential approach to man. Having reached this point, we are now ready to compare Moran's theological understanding of man with Roger's psychological understanding.

## CHAPTER III

### REVELATION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING A COMPARISON OF GABRIEL MORAN AND CARL ROGERS

#### 1. Experience: Basis of Comparison.

In Chapter One there is traced a trend towards a more dynamic notion of revelation, while Chapter Two traces a development towards a more dynamic concept of man. In these two chapters the works of Gabriel Moran and Carl Rogers are presented as representatives of the shift taking place in both of these respective areas. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the concept of man in the writings of Gabriel Moran with the psychological notion of man in the writings of Carl Rogers. Since Moran's view reflects his notion of revelation, the comparison should indicate whether or not man's understanding of revelation reflects his self-understanding, and if so, some of the implications of this finding. In order to compare the thought of these two writers the category of experience is chosen as the focal point of discussion.

Although the word experience is a continuing theme throughout this work it does not necessarily follow that the meaning of this term is clear. Fontinell<sup>1</sup> says that no word, except reason, is more elusive, many-sided, multi-meaninged

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<sup>1</sup> Eugene Fontinell, "Religious Truth in a Relational and Processive World," Cross Currents, Vol. 18, 1967, p. 292.

and common-place. It is a category that dominates modern thought since the eighteenth century. When Locke and other figures of the Enlightenment, for example, challenge rationalism in thought and hereditary authority in politics, they do so largely in the name of experience.<sup>2</sup> Likewise, John Dewey's whole philosophy is a plea to return to experience, to respect it and its potentialities.<sup>3</sup> Yet the meaning assigned to experience in both of these cases is diametrically opposed. To distinguish his own version from the empiricism of Locke and the British school, Dewey describes his concept as empirical naturalism in contrast to what he calls the classical theory of experience.

The meaning of experience used here is that of Dewey's as reinterpreted by Robert Johann.<sup>4</sup> Experience signifies the totality of human interaction with the environment, that is to say, the total life of the self, including all that the life of the self includes. In the words of Robert Johann:

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<sup>2</sup> John E. Smith, "John Dewey: Philosophy of Experience," Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 13, 1959, p. 61.

<sup>3</sup> J. Dewey, Experience and Nature, New York, Dover Publications, 1968.

<sup>4</sup> Johann's definition of experience, although following Dewey's concept, differs from it in his stress on personalism as opposed to Dewey's biologism. See, for example, the opening chapter in Dewey, Experience and Nature, and Robert Johann, "The Return to Experience," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 17, 1964, p. 319-339.



If experience is defined as the life of the self, it follows that one can speak of experience only when there is question of a being that is present to itself precisely as a 'self,' an original center and source of free initiative. Secondly, since the self is present to itself only in its activities, 'in actu exercito' as Scholastics would say, experience is essentially concrete and dynamic. Finally, since the self is active only in reference to what is not itself, only in reference to the Other as constituting its world, it follows that experience as the life of the self includes not only the self but also the whole range of the Other with which it deals as well as the whole range and variety of its dealings.<sup>5</sup>

From this point of view, experience can be described as an all-inclusive whole that is open to endless development and novelty.<sup>6</sup> It is a whole since its elements, the self and the Other, are not isolated from one another but are integrated in a single life.<sup>7</sup> It is an all-inclusive whole since nothing can be conceived as real which is in no way connected with either the self or the Other with which it deals. And finally, it is a whole that is 'open' for not

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<sup>5</sup> Johann, "Return to Experience," p. 325.

<sup>6</sup> -----, The Pragmatic Meaning of God, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1966, p. 23-25.

<sup>7</sup> See Dewey, op. cit., p. 8, where he writes: "'Experience' denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold that are observed, feared, longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magical chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant. It is 'double-barreled' in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality."

only "does the essentially active nature of the self permanently assure its on-going character, but the Other, to which the self is correlative, is present in experience precisely as an abiding invitation to new starts and fresh undertakings."<sup>8</sup>

To define experience in this way is to identify experience and reality. But since experience is always somebody's the question immediately arises, 'whose' experience is it? Johann answers this question by pointing to the subject-object dichotomy as a distinction interior to experience.<sup>9</sup> Experience includes both subject and object. Experience is not something which the self (subject) 'has' as its private possession but is that in which the self is 'involved.' And not only is the self involved in experience, the Other is also. The only reason, then, that a person can call experience 'mine' is not because the Other is excluded from it, but because the self is the only person involved in it as an 'I'.

The concrete synthesis between 'self and Other' is always a synthesis between 'me' and all the rest. In the synthesis which is my life, you belong to the realm of the other. In the synthesis which is your life, and interior to which **you** are an 'I' to yourself and face to face with all the rest, I do not figure as 'I' but as 'you' or 'he', once again a part of the Other.<sup>10</sup>

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8 Johann, "The Return to Experience," p. 325.

9 Ibid., p. 326-327.

10 Ibid., p. 327.

The difference, therefore, between the experience of the self and the Other is not a difference of two realities that are mutually exclusive of one another but a difference in the way the Other is included in the self. Because of the uniqueness of the self, no two have identically the same experience, no two lives can be the same, and yet, in one way or another, the whole of reality is involved in each life, but the concrete synthesis which is each life is always different. In other words, the multiplication that takes place is more a multiplication of perspectives.<sup>11</sup>

Now, when experience is taken in this sense, that is, as the concrete integration of the self and the Other in a dynamically open and all-inclusive synthesis, it is possible to see the connections between Rogers and Moran. In order to simplify this comparison the original sub-headings used in the discussion of Rogers and Moran are kept. By relating what each has to say about man's way of being, growing and knowing to the term experience, it should be possible to locate the points at which their theory converges or diverges.

## 2. The Comparison.

### A. Convergence of Their Theory

(i) Experience: Mode of Being.- Rogers looks on experience as the only reality for the individual. Although

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<sup>11</sup> Johann, The Pragmatic Meaning of God, p. 24.

he does not stop to look at the philosophical question of what 'really' constitutes reality, he is convinced that for psychological purposes reality is basically the private world of experience of the individual.<sup>12</sup> But since the individual is in constant interaction with the environment, the reality he experiences is also the reality experienced by other people. The difference, therefore, is not in a multiplication of reality but in the individual's perception of reality. And since this perception is unique to each 'I', no one can impose his perception of reality upon another nor can anyone fully understand the perceptions of another. For this reason, Rogers can say that experience, for him, is the highest authority, higher even than any revelations received from either God or other men. Of course, this does not mean that the individual is infallible. Because of fear, the individual often distorts experience and twists it to make it coincide with his own self-concept. He denies experiences which he finds frightening. His life is often lived in response to what he thinks he should be and not by what he is, or to what he thinks others want him to think, and feel and behave.

In order to overcome his fears and to accept and open up to experience, the person is in need of help. By means of

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<sup>12</sup> Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications and Theory, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951, p. 485.

a helping relationship, the person is able to examine the various aspects of his own experience and to recognize and face up to the deep contradictions which he often discovers. Through his faith and trust in another, who accepts him fully with unconditional positive regard, he can recognize how much of his behavior and even how much of the feeling of his experiences are not real, that is, not something which flow from the genuine reactions of his whole being but are a front, or a façade, behind which he has been escaping from experience.

As the individual, through the safety and freedom of a helping relationship opens up to experience he begins to 'be' what he 'is,' not what others want him to be and not what he thinks others demand of him, but 'himself.' As he experiences himself, his fears, his joys, his esthetic emotions and all the other emotions which organismically arise in him, he discovers all the richness that exists within himself. He discovers that he need not be afraid of letting himself go in experience because he is at core, positive in nature, basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic.

Similarly, is Moran's emphasis upon experience. If one considers the whole section in which Moran's notion of revelation is discussed and ties the various elements around the concept of experience, it is possible to understand some of the rich connotations Moran attaches to this word. It is man's most fundamental mode of being because it comprehends

both theory and practice. It implies a unity which subsumes knowledge and experience, and yet it is a unity in which distinctions exist. It is the only locus of the real. If God is to be found, it is to human life itself that man must look. There is no other world above or beyond man or extrinsic to man's experience.

Moran is aware that this is difficult to recognize. It takes courage to accept the human condition and to take responsibility for history. One is always tempted to give his freedom over to others who will make the decisions and outline the directions to be followed. But not only is it difficult for man to accept his own experience, he finds it difficult to allow others to be human, as well. Hence, problems of segregation, discrimination and domination arise, all of which points to man's inability to allow others to be.

If it can be said that it takes courage to accept all the many facets of human experience, it can also be said that it is fear that prevents man from accepting his history. Moran points to archaic man, who afraid of time and history, escapes into an extraterritorial world, where dwell the gods, the prototypes that serve as models for all of man's actions. When reality is conceived as extraterritorial, man's only duty is one of imitation. Through imitation, he can participate in the transcendent reality of this sacred world, a reality which is the only real. In such a world man becomes

by ceasing to be himself. He attains reality by escaping from the world of sense and touch which is nothing but a passing shadow, the moving imitation of eternity.

Escape from the world does not, however, pertain only to primitive man. If there is one characteristic of modern man, it is his alienation from his experience. One of the causes of this alienation, Moran believes, is an inadequate notion of Christian revelation. Those who interpret Christianity in such a way that revelation is conceived as a body of truths delivered to man by a God who dwells outside time and space continue to broaden the split between the natural and the supernatural. When such a split exists, time is seen as negative and non-creative, and the world of human experience as a place of contingency and change, possessed of no real ontological value. Whatever value it has is in its being a copy of another world, a world unchanging and eternal, and the basis for true knowledge. It follows that if one attains true value and meaning only by departing this world through contemplation, then the world of human experience must be shunned for how can man devote his time to his secular experience when his salvation lies outside time. Why work when work has no power to redeem.<sup>13</sup> Why devote oneself to science or

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<sup>13</sup> Pierre Teilard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu: An Essay on the Interior Life, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1965, c.1957, p. 65. See also Pierre Teilard de Chardin's analysis of this situation where he writes: "I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that nine out of ten practicing

to the other disciplines when true perfection is to be found in the sacred disciplines? To be told on the one hand that the present life is just a time of waiting, and on the other, that it is necessary to get involved in the affairs of the world is but to create a schizoid type of personality.

Any notion of revelation, then, that withdraws man from his historical experience or conceives of him as an atemporal, non-spatial, non-social being is to misrepresent Christianity. Moran feels Christianity is the religion that focuses on man's experience. For the Christian, history is no longer the cycle of endless repetitions that go on forever but history is that place where man can accept his total historical experience. History is for the Christian as it was for the Jews, that which emerges from the dialogue of God and his people. God is not found in some transcendent instant in the beginning but is with and for man in man's hominization of man. God does not speak once and simply leave a norm or law for the people to follow but he speaks

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Christians feel that man's work is always at the level of a 'spiritual encumbrance.' In spite of the practice of right intention, and the day offered every morning to God, the general run of the faithful dimly feel that time spent at the office or the studio, in the fields or in the factory, is time diverted from prayer and adoration. It is impossible, too, to aim at the deep religious life reserved for those who have the leisure to pray or preach all day long. A few moments of the day can be salvaged for God, yes, but the best hours are absorbed, or at any rate cheapened, by material cares. Under the sway of this feeling, large numbers of Catholics lead a double or crippled life in practice: they have to step out of their human dress so as to have faith in themselves as Christians--and inferior Christians at that."



again and again in man's experience.<sup>14</sup> Faith in an incarnational God provides the inspiration for accepting human history and seeing a meaning in it.

As the person is able to focus in on experience, and open himself to it, he discovers that human reality, despite all its problems, is a positive force, an impulse to freedom from within. Only in experience can man discover who he is and what the world is all about.

Experience is, then, for both Rogers and Moran, the only real world. Both reject anything to do with any form of Greek dualism that locates reality above the experiential flow constituted by the interaction of the person with his environment. As man accepts this process, and both Rogers and Moran believe he can, through the relationship with an other, he discovers that he can trust his experience.

But the problem which faces both Moran and Rogers is how can man open up to the totality of experience? How, in other words, can he grow, and what are the characteristics of growth?

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<sup>14</sup> See also where E. Schillebeeckx writes, "[...] the world of human experience is the only access to the saving reality of revelation and faith. For that matter, how could we listen to a revelation from God--how can it be a revelation to man, if it falls outside our experience? It is impossible for man to know or be aware of realities which he does not experience in some way or another." From "Faith Functioning in Human Self-Understanding," in T.P. Burke (ed.), The Word in History: The St. Xavier Symposium, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1966, p. 45.

(ii) Experience: Mode of Growing.- While experience is considered the locus of the real, the main characteristic of experience is its interactive or relational quality. Interaction and relationship are the key words here. Rogers and Moran both regard man's growth as taking place only in and through relationship. The whole purpose of Rogers' therapy is to provide a helping relationship for the other, so that he, through a climate of safety, is able to explore and accept experience rather than distort or deny it through fear and frustration. In order to provide such a relationship, the therapist needs to possess within himself the qualities of congruence, unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding.<sup>15</sup> When the therapist possesses these qualities, and when they are communicated to the client, growth is possible. Signs of growth have to do with experience, that is, an increasing openness to experience, increasingly existential living and an increasing trust in the organism.<sup>16</sup>

Moran also recognizes that growth takes place only through relationship. Experience, he suggests, must be recognized as a person's contact with reality in the enriched sense of personal life within the community. It is only as

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<sup>15</sup> See above, p. 173-176.

<sup>16</sup> See above, p. 176-179.

man grows in relation to others and opens himself to deeper communion that he finds both himself and the other. Signs of growth are secularity, "a being-with" and eschatology, "a being-toward."<sup>17</sup> To be with, as opposed to being apart, means that man is able to see that the choices he makes are not between God and himself nor himself and other men, but the affirmation of them all together. By living in the Christian community, man is able to receive the courage and the power to accept his freedom and all of human life in the daring risk of faith. To be toward or to be eschatological refers to that characteristic in man in which he reflexively discovers himself absorbed in the destiny of the world and driven by a thirst he cannot completely understand.

If there is any element that stands out in Rogers' and Moran's conception of life it is that of process. This is not surprising since the category of experience is so basic to their works. In the description of experience given above experience is an open whole. Since the self and the Other are not conceived in static categories, the interaction between the self and the Other must always be different and new. As Johann says, the Other to which the self is correlative, is present in experience precisely as an abiding invitation to new starts and fresh undertakings, to the endless invention of new combinations and new connections, with

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<sup>17</sup> See above, p. 89-100.

the consequent and continual emergence of original patterns of meaning.<sup>18</sup> And in Fontinell's description,<sup>19</sup> nature is a flow. The world man inhabits is both precarious and stable, open and unfinished, a challenge rather than a completion, and hence, a world in which certainty and unpredictability are as real as constancy and regularity.

Just as these descriptions point to the process character of experience, so do those of Rogers and Moran. For Rogers, man is a being in process with an inner trust towards self-actualization and autonomy. He lives in a world of continually changing experience in which his life is a flowing, changing process in which nothing is fixed. In short, man's life is a fluid process, not a fixed and static entity, a flowing river of change, not a block of solid material, a continually changing constellation of potentialities and not a fixed quality of traits. No moment in the life of the individual is ever the same, never a repetition of a past experience but rather a complete configuration of inner and outer stimuli which has never existed before.<sup>20</sup> Hence, what the person is and what he will be the next moment, grows out of the experience and cannot be predicted in advance. The self and personality emerge from the experience rather than

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18 See above, p. 198.

19 See above, p. 196-197.

20 See above, p. 177.

the experience being translated or twisted to fit a pre-conceived self-structure. Such a living in the moment eliminates rigidity, tight organization or the imposing of structure on experience. Rather, structure is discovered in experience.

Moran also stresses that man is a being in process and not a closed off static substance. He refers to the process character of man's life as history. And history is not a process of events or a collection of facts into which man is fitted, but is instead, what emerges from the dialogue of God and his people. What is unique about the Old Testament account of man's encounter with God is that God did not speak once and simply leave a norm or laws for the people to follow but he speaks again and again. Because God is He who speaks and acts and man is the creature who hears and responds, there is a process to their intercourse, a process in which God is becoming God-with-us and man is being summoned to a life of responsiveness.<sup>21</sup>

When Rogers and Moran characterize man's growth as process, it is evident that they conceive growth as occurring from within. Growth is not that which just happens to man. As Rogers says, man has in him a self-actualizing tendency which not only maintains and enhances the human organism but

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<sup>21</sup> See above, p. 84.

pushes it to fulfillment.<sup>22</sup> Moran calls this same drive the thirst for plenitude or the impulse to freedom from within.<sup>23</sup> The fulfillment of this drive, however, is not one of self-enhancement, nor is it simply the endless development of the individual's potentialities accomplished in isolation from the rest of mankind. Since man is indissolubly linked with other men, his growth towards freedom and creativity occurs in the degree that other men can also grow. This is particularly brought out in the emphasis Rogers and Moran place on the social nature of man.

The goal of all human growing is to become a person, to be human. Rogers, after listing the characteristics of man as self-confidence, self-direction, openness to experience, creativity, freedom and trust in the organism, sums these up by saying that the goal of man is to be a living, breathing, feeling, fluctuating process, in short, a PERSON.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, Moran, with his Christological interpretation of the universe sees no other goal for man than that he become human. Just as the prophets had no other goal in mind, than that man become real, so, too, the Church has no other goal than to

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22 See above, p. 171

23 See above, p. 90; 94.

24 See above, p. 176-182.

support the human endeavor and to remind men that there may be more to the human than what they can see.<sup>25</sup>

The emphasis both Rogers and Moran place upon experience, and upon the goodness of man and his ability for mature decision making, leads to a mood of hope, in many respects similar to the theology of hope. Walter Capps,<sup>26</sup> who attempts to assess the writings on hope of Ernest Block, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Johannes Metz and Jergen Moltmann, points to several common characteristics in their writings. By examining some of these characteristics and applying them to Rogers' and Moran's writings, it is possible to note some resemblance between Rogers and Moran and also the resemblance they have to some pertinent aspects upon which the theology of hope is built.

To begin with, Capps notes that the theology of hope is directed towards the future. Man is not so much involved with the world above, or with his past as he is with the future. This is also the concern of Rogers and Moran. Moran builds from the premise that history has a direction and that God is working in history. God is no longer viewed above man but with and before man. His promise resides not in the past but in the people enroute. In contrast, therefore,

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<sup>25</sup> See above, p. 85-88; 92.

<sup>26</sup> Walter H. Capps, "An Assessment of the Theological Side of the School of Hope," Cross Currents, Vol. 18, 1968, p. 319-335.

to ahistorical man who without hope in the future withdraws from history to live in a world of unchanging archetypes, the man of faith, no longer alone, but as part of the whole human family moves towards a goal in time. Although Rogers does not give a theological interpretation to history, he views man as future-oriented. Man's whole organism is bent in the direction of maturation. Man's ability to move in this direction depends on his degree of openness to experience and the freedom he has to accept the novel and the different, in other words, his degree of openness to the future.

A second characteristic of the theology of hope is the notion of change. "From the top to bottom, from beginning to end, hope-theology is a theology of change," writes Capps. "Its inherence in 'this world' demands that it give regulative status to change."<sup>27</sup> When change and not permanence is the context of theology, then radical restructuring can occur. For this to happen, however, reliance can no longer be given to systems of thought which are not calculated for the novel, the ever-changing, or the novum. Rather, "access requires another mode of affirmation in which the style is always being created."<sup>28</sup>

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27 Ibid., p. 324-325.

28 Ibid., p. 325.



Both Rogers and Moran agree with this hypothesis. Since this is the topic of discussion for the following section, suffice it to say that both Rogers and Moran reject any system of thought or pattern to which man must be fitted. A life that is made to fit pre-established patterns is not able to be creative, says Moran. Creativity, he insists, demands a future-oriented world and a society centered upon the interpersonal.<sup>29</sup> And Rogers insists that living means an absence of rigidity, of tight organization, and of the imposition of structure on experience. It means instead, he continues, a maximum of adaptability and a discovery of structure in experience.<sup>30</sup>

A third characteristic of hope is its revolutionary aspects. Capp writes:

As the hope-theologians see it, the institution depends upon permanence while the future-orientation is committed to change. Anyone obligated to the future-orientation cannot be content with what is permanent or already established; he would be denying his own fundamental disposition were he to certify that which is. The 'novum' points perpetually to a reality which has not yet been. It stands in contrast to that which already is. Its commitment to the future places it in conflict with all instrumentations which are designed to maintain the established or the permanent. The 'novum' is a revolutionary principle.<sup>31</sup>

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29 See above, p. 98.

30 See above, p. 177-178.

31 Capps, op. cit., p. 327.

Rogers, after describing his mature person, concludes and sums up his description by saying that such mature persons are unlikely simply to exist or to be the passive recipients of reality, but are instead, fit vanguards of human evolution. Moran also stresses this aspect. A notion of revelation that is historical does not permit a concept of man which would leave him unconcerned with the world. Rather, his hope is inextricably joined with social revolution in protest against all forms of inhumanity. He is out front, an all-out revolutionary. His rebellion, however, is never for the sake of rebellion but for a deeper involvement with history.<sup>32</sup>

These are only a few of the characteristics of hope. They are sufficient, however, to point to an aspect of man's becoming, that is, his preoccupation with the future. Man's growth does not take place according to a vertical model nor can he be inserted into a frame of reference in which the direction of interest and value is fundamentally other-worldly. Man, together, with the whole community has a goal in time but only he who has hope can bring it about.

(iii) Experience: Mode of Knowing.- Carl Rogers in his early life struggles with the dichotomy between the mystical subjectivity of his role as therapist and the rigorous objectivity of his role as scientist. As long as the

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<sup>32</sup> See above, p. 96.

dichotomy between a scientific versus an experiential viewpoint continues, he sees knowledge as something which exists out there to be discovered by those with the right instruments and the proper intellectual ability. His struggle with this dualistic view of reality ends, however, when he discovers that the problem of knowledge is not the problem of subjectivity versus objectivity but, rather, the problem of seeing subject and object as distinctions within experience.

With experience as his primary category he realizes that knowledge is not a function of the mind alone but has to do with a total organismic sensing. By letting go in experience, with as few presuppositions as possible and without any conscious thought about the experience, an understanding of experience can be attained which is not possible through means of logical analysis alone divorced from experience. At first, this knowledge is global, imprecise and undifferentiated. But as man reflects upon experience he begins to perceive order and meaning in it. As he is able to conceptualize the experience, that which is only vaguely perceived becomes conscious and explicit. The word, therefore, enables the person to reach a more sharply differentiated meaning for the vague knowing originally perceived through organismic sensing.

It follows that the purpose of research is not conformity of the mind with an outside reality, but rather, its purpose is aimed at the inward ordering of significant

experience. Theory flows out of the experience and not vice versa. The hypotheses that are formulated attempt to catch the significance of an a priori experience. The hypotheses are not the experience but they help the person attain conscious awareness of the experience.

Science to be truly a science must, therefore, begin by an immersion that involves not just the mind, but the whole organism. The more complete the immersion (and that means the ability to tolerate ambiguity and contradiction and the courage to resist the need for closure), the more likely new knowledge can be discovered. From this immersion, the scientist often senses a pattern or gestalt which he attempts to formulate and then to test.

The testing of hypotheses is important to determine whether or not the pattern perceived is real or deceptive. Since real or pseudo-knowledge is the basis on which a person orientates his life, it is important that error be detected. When error persists, there is a distorting effect on experience. The real is still involved in experience but because of the distortion is unavailable.

Similarly, Gabriel Moran, in his study of the nature of revelation, insists on grounding knowledge in human experience. When knowledge is equated with concepts and words, or with static entities cut off from the real world of experience, then revelation is often presented as a number of truths to be

believed. But when knowledge is seen as originating, not in the concept, but in a pre-predicative experience, then it is possible to understand revelation as a knowing experience which involves man, the historical social being and not the mind or abstract reason alone.

On the basis of a conception of knowledge grounded in experience, Moran is able to describe how he understands revelation. Every man, he believes, is born into a supernatural order and is oriented toward a supernatural end before he becomes consciously and reflexively aware of it. Prior to any scriptural or doctrinal instruction, man is already faced with the Christian mystery in terms which are connatural to him. From this prior relationship to being derive objective and subjective elements.

Although concepts and words are the secondary processes of a primary experience, they are nevertheless important if any human knowing is to take place. Man cannot bring to reflexive awareness his lived experience without the mediation of objective expressions. Without concepts or words, the primordial experience, or the simple global awareness remains submerged in obscurity.

If words and concepts are important in all human knowing, they are no less important in the Christian experience. Through the word, the apostles are able to communicate something of their experience of Christ. When their preaching

becomes fixed in scriptures, their spoken words are preserved intact. This deposit ensures that the Spirit of Jesus is recognized. It is the objective structure which does not inhibit man's growth forward but rather guarantees the revelational process.<sup>33</sup>

Since God continues to reveal himself in man's historical experience, there is need for continued reflection. The result of the Church's reflection is the formulation of doctrines which help to bring out the implicit meaning of what is given in experience. Hence the Church's doctrinal statements and conciliar definitions are more in the nature of starting points or frameworks within which to live and work than of conclusions. They are an intrinsic element in the knowing process where knowing is understood as man's primordial receptiveness to being and man's thrust forward to the fullness of life.

For both Rogers and Moran, then, experience, and not thought, is primary. Their objection to the primacy of thought over experience, however, does not come from the mere fact that thought is abstract while experience is concrete. On the contrary, part of the richness attributed to thought is its abstract quality. Abstraction is able to grasp the universal from the many limited concrete and hence, is able

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<sup>33</sup> See above, p. 103-108.

to overcome the limitations of concreteness. In this light, abstraction is an enriching process. For Rogers, it is the discovering and finding of orderliness and lawfulness in the many different experiences of his clients. For Moran, the power of abstraction enables the person to understand his unique experiences in relation to the experience of his own past and that of the community. Abstraction, therefore, need not be viewed negatively, as leaving out the rich variety and profusion of the concrete world in favor of some bare common denominator.

Neither do Rogers and Moran object to the primacy of thought over experience on the grounds that thought is simply one of man's powers. Man is more, they insist, than a nature endowed with various powers and qualities. He is first and foremost a person in relationship. But since a person can only be himself through dialogue and experience, it is experience and not thought that is primary. Although thought can uncover structures and relationships in experience, it can never present other people in person to the thinker. Only ordinary experience can do this. Thinking which is ordered to the fulfillment of persons must, therefore, look to experience.

Prior to any reflection, man knows. He is already in contact with reality through experience. It is this direct acquaintance upon which all thinking depends; without it,

there would be nothing to think about. On the other hand, when the person does take time out to think, it is precisely to try and understand the reality already disclosed through experience, and which is, in a sense, known in an unreflective, unthematic way. For this reason, Rogers can say that experience is for him the highest authority, not another person's ideas, not his own ideas, but first and foremost his experiences to which his ideas must again and again return to be tested for their truth. It is for this reason also that Moran insists that the Christian mystery of revelation is connatural to man prior to any scriptural or doctrinal instruction. If man knows God he knows him first, through a pre-predicative relation between himself and God, a relationship which precedes the subject-object split. This kind of knowledge is a pre-reflective knowledge; it is a kind of knowledge that is present implicitly in all of man's experiences. Without this contact with the real, man could not know anything explicitly and thematically. It is what the real reveals through interaction that regulates and tests all that is formulated in concepts and words. While reflective knowledge provides the person with an objective knowledge, only pre-reflective knowledge provides the real to be understood.

The insistence upon experience as primary does not in any way downgrade the role of reflection. Unless man reflects,



experience becomes nothing more than blind interaction, unworthy of being called human experience. As Rogers says, reflection "is justified because it is satisfying to perceive the world as having order, and because rewarding results often ensure when one understands the orderly relationships which appear in nature."<sup>34</sup> Or, as Moran says, "Concepts are rather to be understood within an originating, primitive cognitive intention which carries the knowing process forward. A continuous process of differentiation and integration gradually fills out man's pre-grasp or drive toward the plenitude of being."<sup>35</sup> And having said this, Moran warns that nothing must be absolutized, least of all Sacred Scripture. God, he insists, cannot be contained in a word, an idea or an institution. If God is to be sought, it can only be in human life. God can be for man only as man takes up his own responsibility and frees himself from every form of slavery.<sup>36</sup>

In conclusion, both Moran and Rogers have an experiential evolutionary concept of man. What is needed, they feel, is not escape from experience, but rather a commitment

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<sup>34</sup> See above, p. 188.

<sup>35</sup> See above, p. 104.

<sup>36</sup> See above, p. 78.

to concrete life and a confidence in its possibilities. This demands of man that he be genuinely open, that he be more committed to life than to ideas about life and, finally, that he not close off history by introducing a God above but that he allow himself to float with the complex stream of his experiencing while at the same time attempting to understand its ever-changing complexity.

#### B. Seeming Divergence

The first section of this chapter attempts to show the similarities between the thought of Carl Rogers and Gabriel Moran. The purpose of this section is to discuss a seeming dissimilarity between these two writers. On the one hand, Rogers says he has to leave the ministry in order to preserve his freedom. He writes:

[...] I could not work in a field where I would be required to believe in some specified religious doctrine. My beliefs had already changed tremendously, and might continue to change. It seemed to me it would be a horrible thing to have to profess a set of beliefs, in order to remain in one's profession. I wanted to find a field in which I could be sure my freedom of thought would not be limited.<sup>37</sup>

And in another place, he writes:

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<sup>37</sup> Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 8.

I trust it is clear now why there is no philosophy or belief or set of principles which I could encourage or persuade others to have or hold. I can only try to live by my interpretation of the current meaning of my experience, and try to give others the permission and freedom to develop their own inward freedom and thus their own meaningful interpretation of their own experience.<sup>38</sup>

While these statements seem to indicate a difficulty on the part of Rogers to profess belief in Christianity, Moran, on the other hand, sees the Christian experience as the very condition of man's freedom. A major characteristic of the true Christian, Moran believes, is his ability to accept human history. Faith in Christ, far from withdrawing man from experience, provides the inspiration for accepting human history and seeing a meaning in it. When this meaning is removed and when history has no support from beyond itself, there is the danger that technology may serve only to enslave and to frighten man, thus, forcing him to escape the terrors of history to some world of unchanging archetypes.

These two seemingly opposite positions pose the problem of belief and unbelief. Can Moran and Rogers be differentiated by saying that Moran is a believer while Rogers is not? In other words, can belief and unbelief be distinguished by whether or not one accepts and believes all that is contained in the written word of God or in tradition, and that is proposed by the Church as a divinely revealed object of belief

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary, universal teaching.<sup>39</sup> Such a simple answer would not take into consideration the many discussions on this problem,<sup>40</sup> nor what has been said above.

It is true that Rogers' statements imply a notion of revelation conceived as a number of truths to be believed, and of a God extrinsic to man. But the rejection of this form of extrinsicism is a basic concern of Moran's theologizing also. If revelation is conceived as a number of truths to be handed down through the ages, then Moran agrees with Rogers that Christianity/religion is inhibitive of freedom, with Marx that it is the opium of the people, and with Freud that it is an illusion and an obsessional neurosis.<sup>41</sup>

But neither do Moran and Rogers differ in belief because Moran is in possession of some reality that Rogers does not have. When experience is defined not simply as man's encounter with himself but rather as the concrete integration of the self and the Other in a dynamically open and all-inclusive whole,<sup>42</sup> then the reality Moran is in

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39 See John Clarkson et al., The Church Teaches, St. Louis, B. Herder, 1955, p. 30.

40 See, for example: Klaus Riesenhuber, "Rahner's 'Anonymous Christian'," Theology Digest, Vol. 13, 1965, p. 163-171, and Anita Roper, The Anonymous Christian, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1966.

41 See above, p. vii.

42 See above, p. 198-199.

contact with is also the reality Rogers contacts. If God and revelation exist for the believer, they also exist for the unbeliever.

Not only is this evident when viewed from the point of view of experience, but it is also evident in Moran's theology of Christ as the key to the understanding of man. Through Christ all of humanity is assumed into a new relation with God.<sup>43</sup> Through Christ every man is faced with the Christian mystery of revelation in terms which are connatural to him prior to any scriptural or doctrinal instruction. The unevangelized man who stands open to the whole of reality and does what he thinks he should has already experienced God's revelation and has already accepted God's grace. The "signs of revelation" for such a man, Moran writes,

are the conditions of his own moral life: his weaknesses, his struggling, his ideals which in fact go beyond the purely human. He meets God at those hard edges of experience which can never be transmuted into an extension of himself [...]  
Here God's grace is at work and here God's revelation in Christ is experienced albeit implicitly.<sup>44</sup>

Rogers and Moran do not differ from each other, then, in their rejection of extrinsicism nor because one is in contact with a reality the other is refused. The difference,

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<sup>43</sup> See above, p. 85-89; also, Gabriel Moran, Theology of Revelation, New York, Herder and Herder, 1966, p. 162-178.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 167.

therefore, must be one of perspective, or what Baum calls, the "intensification of consciousness."<sup>45</sup> But because one is able to explicate what is implicit in every man's life is not reason for pride, Moran continues. The Christian "has been chosen not on the basis of merit, but in order to serve as God's witness in bringing to explicit consciousness what has already been accomplished or is being accomplished by God's grace."<sup>46</sup>

### 3. Beyond Dialogue: The Merging of Self-Consciousness.

In Moran and Rogers, theology and psychology are seen to merge. In them, it is impossible to see two kinds of growth, one natural and the other supernatural. There is one kind of growth for man--human growth. The relationship between man's self-understanding and revelation is therefore inseparable.<sup>47</sup> This relationship can be further spelled out as follows.

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<sup>45</sup> Gregory Baum, "Reply and Explanation," The Ecumenist: A Journal for Promoting Christian Unity, Vol. 9, 1970(No. 1), 1971(No.2), p.19.

<sup>46</sup> Moran, op. cit., p. 168.

<sup>47</sup> See Schillebeeckx, p. 46, where he writes: "[...] this absolute relation enters into human self-consciousness in and through the relative relations to our fellowman and the world. Consequently we cannot separate this absolute relation --to God--from our historically conditioned, inner-worldly relations to this world and to these fellow men. Thus we cannot formalize this relation to God and abstract it out of the historical warp and woof of our existence." (Underlining mine.)

Man's understanding of the nature of revelation reflects his self-understanding. Both views go together. As man's consciousness of himself changes so does his experience of reality change, and hence, his understanding of revelation. In the words of E. Schillebeeckx, "[...] revelation presupposes, as condition of its own meaningfulness, man's search for himself."<sup>48</sup>

Growth towards self-understanding, characterized by an increasing openness to experience is, therefore, growth in revelation. Since revelation cannot take place unless there is a recipient, and since revelation happens for man in his life and nowhere else, it follows that the more man is open, the more the divine can be revealed. As Schillebeeckx puts it, "Every human self-consciousness in and through the world is therefore founded upon and constituted by an accompanying consciousness of God."<sup>49</sup> Hence, to the degree that one helps another grow, to that degree he is an instrument of divine revelation. In this sense, whether or not Rogers considers himself a minister of the Word, he is in fact, a minister of the Word.

Conversely, growth in comprehension of the divine human encounter is growth towards greater self-understanding.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 53. See also, p. 49: "Being present to oneself, self-awareness is therefore in the last analysis religious, is inescapably a religious act [...] to STAND BEFORE ONESELF IS TO STAND BEFORE GOD."

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 45-46.

As man becomes conscious of the transcendent mystery operative in his life, he is given the power and the hope to accept his humanity and to push forward to the transformation of the universe. When the theologian therefore helps another bring to explicit consciousness the presence of God already experienced and known in an unreflective, unthematic way, he is helping man grow towards greater self-understanding.

Theology and psychology, therefore, are no longer concerned with two different kinds of growth, psychology dealing with man's natural growth, and theology with his supernatural growth. Both are concerned with helping man achieve maturity. Each does this by reflecting upon the concrete phenomena of human experience. Since neither discipline has access to a reality the other is denied, dialogue, understood as dialogue between different but related pursuits, vanishes. In its place is an emphasis upon listening. It is only by being open to experience and by listening in on experience that reality can disclose itself. Not to listen is to distort reality or to take the whole for one's own limited perception of it.

Finally, and in conclusion, the shift in man's new consciousness of himself and his fuller understanding of revelation can be recognized by focusing for a moment on the Church's felt need for dialogue with the world. When the Church is concerned almost solely with a supernatural reality,



she sees no need for dialogue. In the Syllabus of Errors of 1864, Pope Pius IX condemns among other modern abominations that the "Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, reconcile himself, and come to terms with progress, liberalism and modern civilization."<sup>50</sup> The main task of the Church is to preserve and pass on the revealed data of revelation without ever taking into consideration the phenomenon of change.

This attitude is completely reversed in the conciliar documents of Vatican II, particularly in the text of the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World. In this document the Church officially states that she wants to enter into dialogue with all men, not only those of other religions, or those who cultivate beautiful qualities of the human spirit but with all, even those who oppress the Church and harass her in manifold ways.<sup>51</sup> What is interesting to note here, however, is that her insistence upon the necessity of dialogue follows upon her recognition that "the human race has passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one," wherein, "history speeds along at so rapid a course that an individual person can scarcely keep abreast of it."<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> "Syllabus of Errors," in Dogmatic Canons and Decrees, New York, Devin-Adair Co., 1912, p. 187-209.

<sup>51</sup> "Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World," in Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Walter M. Abbott, S.J., and trans. by Msgr. J. Gallagher, New York, America Press, 1966, art. 92.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., art. 5.

Because the Church recognizes that "the destiny of the human community has become all of a piece, where once the various groups of men had a kind of private history of their own,"<sup>53</sup> her plea for dialogue is a plea to go beyond a narrow ecumenical type of dialogue to a common search for truth.<sup>54</sup> Her sharing with mankind is a sharing in the same reality. No longer is she a society parallel to the world but rather she moves with the world towards Christ in a new kind of solidarity, so that while she keeps her identity, the boundaries between herself and the world disappear as do those between the sacred and the secular. Through the incarnation, the Son of God is united in some fashion to every man. The Document states:

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Notice, for example, the difference in the plea for dialogue between Paul VI's Ecclesiam Suam and the document Gaudium et Spes. In the encyclical Ecclesiam Suam, Paul VI deals at length with dialogue, from the apostolic point of view: it is through dialogue understood in this way that the Church carries out her main task, which is the announcement of the Gospel to all men so as to offer them, with respect and love, the gift of the truth and grace of which Christ has made her custodian. In Gaudium et Spes, the emphasis is rather on the dialogue between the Church and the world; this dialogue is not directly aimed at the announcement of the Gospel. It is rather the effort to seek the truth together in various fields, or to collaborate in solving the great problems of life. The definition of these two types of dialogue follows upon the supposed distinction drawn between them: in the first, truth is found ready-made in the Christian who passes it on to anyone listening to it, and this is the main task of the Church; in the second, truth is not possessed by one side or the other. Both sides are rather involved in the discovery of truth rather than its preservation.

All this holds true, not only for Christians, but for all men of good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way. For since Christ died for all men, and since the ultimate vocation of man is in fact one, and divine, we ought to believe that the Holy Spirit, in a manner known only to God, offers to every man the possibility of being associated with this paschal mystery.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> "Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World," art. 22.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the relationship of man's understanding of revelation and his understanding of himself is studied in the preceding pages by comparing a contemporary revelational concept of man, that of Gabriel Moran's, with a contemporary psychological notion of man, that of Carl Rogers'. The study begins by investigating the place of Moran's writings on revelation as part of a reversal taking place in Catholic theology. Since an understanding of the nature of revelation is fundamentally the task of grasping more deeply the relation between nature and the supernatural, the first part of the chapter examines the relationship between nature and grace in the writings of John Henry Newman, Maurice Blondel, Karl Rahner, and the North American writers, Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum. This investigation reveals a development away from a static, cyclic notion of revelation towards a dynamic, process concept in which the boundaries separating the sacred from the secular are broken, and a movement towards an emphasis upon human experience as the locus of the real. Both of these movements are reflected in the writings of Gabriel Moran. By interpreting experience in a way that connotes the relational, Moran attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both extrinsicism and intrinsicism. Moran understands revelation as neither a process which is extrinsic to man nor as an expansion of man's own being but rather, as a

historical dialogue between God and the individual within a believing community.

A similar development, from a static to a process model, is also present in the psychological images of man traced in the first part of Chapter Two, beginning with Freud, Jung, Adler, and proceeding through Allport, Goldstein and Rollo May. The presentation reveals a development away from a static, atomistic notion of man towards a dynamic, holistic, experiential concept. The development of this movement with its increasing emphasis upon human experience as an integrated whole is reflected in the works of Carl Rogers wherein Rogers views man as living in a world of continually changing experience in which life becomes a flowing, changing process.

In Chapter Three, by focusing upon experience as the concrete integration of the self and the environment in a dynamically open and all-inclusive whole, an attempt is made to compare the revelational concept of man in the writings of Gabriel Moran with the psychological concept of man in the works of Carl Rogers. This comparison reveals a merging of theology and psychology in the works of these two writers. Man's supernatural growth does not run parallel to his natural growth but is one with it. It follows that man's understanding of the nature of revelation reflects his self-understanding. Growth towards self-understanding is growth in revelation and

conversely, growth in comprehension of the divine/human encounter is growth towards greater self-understanding.

Because of the emphasis given above to the historical situation of human self-understanding, and the historical content of the Christian revelation, the questions of religious education and dogmatic development must be asked anew. In seeking answers to these problems the findings of the above study should be helpful.

A main concern of the religious educator should be the whole learning environment, realizing that when an individual is growing towards maturity, revelation is also occurring. This would not downgrade the historical respect given to Scripture and Tradition. These latter would be used as the explication of what has already been and is being accomplished by God's grace throughout the human race.

In conclusion, further research is indicated. An interdisciplinary study showing the relationship between man's natural desire for God, and the impulse in man towards self-realization may be considered. Specifically, is there any relationship between what theology has described as a natural desire for God (note, for example, Aquinas' notion of natural desire, and Rahner's notion of vorgriff and potentia obedientialis described above) and the concept of self-realization (variously described above as fictional finalism in Adler, self-actualization in Goldstein and Maslow, and functional autonomy and intention in Allport)? Such a research endeavor would make further contributions towards a deepened understanding of the relationship between revelation and man's self-understanding, which this study has opened.

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APPENDIX 1

ABSTRACT OF

Revelation and Self-Understanding: A Comparative  
Study of Gabriel Moran and Carl Rogers

## APPENDIX 1

### ABSTRACT OF

#### Revelation and Self-Understanding: A Comparative Study of Gabriel Moran and Carl Rogers<sup>1</sup>

The relationship between man's understanding of revelation and his self-understanding is studied by comparing the theology of revelation in the writings of Gabriel Moran with the psychological view of man in the thought of Carl Rogers. The study begins by investigating the place of Moran's writings on revelation as part of a reversal taking place in Catholic theology. Since an understanding of the nature of revelation is fundamentally the task of grasping more deeply the relation between nature and the supernatural, the first part of the chapter examines the relationship between nature and grace in the writings of John Henry Newman, Maurice Blondel, Karl Rahner, and the North American writers, Eugene Fontinell, Leslie Dewart and Gregory Baum. This investigation reveals a development away from a static, cyclic notion of revelation towards a dynamic, process concept in which the boundaries separating the sacred from the secular are broken, and a movement towards an emphasis

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<sup>1</sup> Sr. Maureena P. Fritz, doctoral thesis presented to the Department of Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ottawa, Ontario, 1971, ix-251 p.

upon human experience as the locus of the real. Both of these movements are reflected in the writings of Gabriel Moran. By interpreting experience in a way that connotes the relational, Moran attempts to avoid the pitfalls of both extrinsicism and intrinsicism. Moran understands revelation as neither a process which is extrinsic to man nor as an expansion of man's own being, but rather as a historical dialogue between God and the individual within a believing community.

A similar development, from a static to a process model, is also present in the psychological images of man traced in the first part of Chapter Two, beginning with Freud, Jung, Adler, and proceeding through Allport, Goldstein and Rollo May. The presentation reveals a development away from a static, atomistic notion of man towards a dynamic, holistic, experiential concept. The development of this movement with its increasing emphasis upon human experience as an integrated whole is reflected in the works of Carl Rogers wherein Rogers views man as living in a world of continually changing experience in which life becomes a flowing changing process.

In Chapter Three, by focusing upon experience as the concrete integration of the self and the environment in a dynamically open and all-inclusive whole, an attempt is made to compare the revelational concept of man in the

writings of Gabriel Moran with the psychological concept of man in the works of Carl Rogers. This comparison reveals a merging of theology and psychology in the works of these two writers. Man's supernatural growth does not run parallel to his natural growth but is one with it. It follows that man's understanding of the nature of revelation reflects his self-understanding. Growth towards self-understanding is growth in revelation and conversely, growth in comprehension of the divine/human encounter is growth towards greater self-understanding.